The Late Qing *Xinzheng* (New Policies) Reforms in Mongolia, 1901-1911

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the nature, imposition and effects of the late Qing *xinzheng* 新政 reforms in Mongolia, and to analyze the episode from its historical roots till the dynasty's demise in 1911. Put simply, *xinzheng* was a modernization drive implemented throughout the Qing empire in order to save the dynasty from irreversible decline and, to a certain extent, to emulate the astounding success of the Meiji reforms in neighbouring Japan.

For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis has been subdivided into the categories of agrarian policy, administrative reform, training of new armies, establishment of modern schools, introduction of new enterprises, exploitation of natural resources, construction of railways, and establishment of postal and telegram services.

The *xinzheng* were very much the product of macro-historical forces, such as the weakening of the Qing empire since the mid-nineteenth century, the presence of imperialist powers on China's soil, and the relative rise of Han Chinese officials and decline of Mongolian nobility in late Qing politics. The reforms not only failed to save the Qing empire, but they further intensified the inter-ethnic tensions between Han, Manchus and Mongols. Coupled with historical contingencies (e.g. personal ambitions of Qing officials, the attitudes of Mongolian leaders), the *xinzheng* reforms eventually led to the independence movement of Outer Mongolia, and the parting ways between Outer and Inner Mongolia.

Many scholars of Mongolian history have not considered the *xinzheng* reforms in Qing Mongolia as having had any lasting impact upon the region, apart from triggering the independence movement. Consequently, this important event has been largely neglected and generally treated only as a short chapter in Mongolia's history, or as a

side aspect in the relations between China and Russia. Conversely, the reforms in Mongolia magnified the division between Inner and Outer Mongolia, and altered the geopolitical situation in Inner Asia. To date, no study has been attempted which charts the modernization of Mongolia as a direct consequence of the late imperial reform policies. This thesis therefore fills an important lacuna in the historical gestation of inner Asia.

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I started to work on the present topic in 2011. Yet my interest in Chinese frontier studies began in 2009. In this regard, I have to thank Dr. Wing-on Yeung 楊永安, Honorary Associate Professor of the University of Hong Kong. Dr. Yeung was the first scholar to draw my attention to the far-flung corners of China's realm, in particular the significance of the interactions between Han Chinese and non-Han peoples in the frontier regions on the shaping of modern China's history. I am also indebted to Prof. Hon-ming Yip 葉漢明, Adjunct Professor of the History Department, Chinese University of Hong Kong. As the supervisor of my MPhil. study, Prof. Yip has had a profound impact on my intellectual development.

As anyone who studies Chinese history knows, documentary records are voluminous and most of them are kept in the archives on both sides of the Strait. In my case, the materials maintained in Inner Mongolia were also relevant. Getting access to these archival materials required me to make fieldwork trips to Beijing in 2013, Taipei in 2012 and 2014, and Hohhot in 2016. In this connection, I would like to thank the staff at the First Historical Archives in Beijing, the Archives in the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives in Hohhot for their unfailing assistance and useful suggestions, without which my work would not have been possible.

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Throughout my years of post-graduate studies, I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents. Without their continuous encouragement and financial support, I would not have been able to complete the degree.

Introduction

Xinzheng studies: A Brief Survey

This thesis scrutinizes the Qing court's implementation of *xinzheng* 新政 reforms, also known as New Policy/New Policies or New Administration in English, in the Mongolian region during the first decade of the twentieth century and its aftermath. It seeks to investigate why and how the Qing state carried out the reforms in Inner and Outer Mongolia; what were the constraints on the reforms ; how the ascendency of Han Chinese officials in late Qing politics influenced the reform process; and, finally, why the Mongols on both sides of the Gobi Desert reacted so differently to the reforms, leading to the permanent split of the Mongolian region into Mongolia and the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia (now belonging to the People's Republic of China).

The *xinzheng* reforms, which were implemented throughout the Qing empire between 1901-1911, were initiated by the Manchu court as its last-ditch attempt to save imperial rule from collapse. More specifically, the court sought, through these reforms, to tackle the twin challenges of (national) debt and (external) threat that had been plaguing the empire since the late nineteenth century. Due to the leading role played by the imperial court in the reform movement, Chinese scholarship before 1990 tended to dismiss the late Qing *xinzheng* as reactionary.[1] Since a reactionary movement was in contradiction to the revolutionary sentiment of the Chinese government, the reforms did not receive much academic scrutiny before the 1990s: during the eleven years between 1979 and 1989, the number of Chinese treatises on the New Policies amounted to

[1] Chen Xiangyang 陳向陽, "Jiushi niandai Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu shuping," 90 年代清末新政研究述評 [A Review of the Studies of the Late Qing *Xinzheng* in the 1990s] *Modern Chinese History Studies* 近代史研究, 1 (1998), p. 299.

slightly over 100.[2] Since the 1990s, thanks to the deepening of the Chinese government's own modernization reforms, newly found interest in the New Administration began to grow among Chinese scholars. A sign of the change was that, during the seven years between 1990 and 1997, the number of scholarly treatises on the subject exceeded 200.[3] New perspectives on the reforms also emerged, with the "reactionary" *xinzheng* now being re-evaluated as a "bourgeois revolution" that helped to modernize China economically, politically, socially, and intellectually.[4]

Developments of Chinese scholarly interest in the implementation of *xinzheng* at the Qing empire's frontiers followed a similar trajectory: of the 400-odd treatises on the New Policies that were published between 1979 and 2000, only 40 were related to the New Administration in the borderlands, and less than twenty of them were scholarly monographs on the subject.[5] Between 2003 and 2010, no less than 40 monographs were published on the implementation of New Administration in the empire's frontier regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet.[6]

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[2] Chen, "Jiushi niandai Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu shuping," p. 299.

[3] Chen, "Jiushi niandai Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu shuping," p. 299.

[4] Examples of the new narratives include: Wang Jianke 王建科, "Zailun Qingmo xinzheng," 再論清末新政 [Reassessment of Late Qing *Xinzheng*], *Xuehai* 學海, 6 (1993), pp. 80-83; Wang Shouzhong 王守中, "Lun wanqing jindaihua de liangge jieduan—Yangwu yundong he Qingmo xinzheng," 論晚清近代化的兩個階段--洋務運動和清末新政 [On the Two Phases of Late Qing Modernization--Westernization Movement and Late Qing *Xinzheng*], *Journal of Shandong Normal University* 山東師範大學學報, 5 (1990), pp. 21-27; Guo Shiyou 郭世佑, "Qingmo xinzheng yu Xinhai geming," 清末新政與辛亥革命 [Late Qing *Xinzheng* and Xinhai Revolution], *Journal of Xiangtan Teachers' College* 湘潭師範學院學報, 5 (1993), pp. 43-49; Cao Liqian and Guo Dasong 曹立前、郭大松, "Qingmo xinzheng yu zhichan jieji geming liliang de fazhan zhuangda," 清末新政與資產階級革命力量的發展壯大 [Late Qing *Xinzheng* and the Development and Growth of Capitalist Revolutionary Force], *Journal of Shandong Teachers' University (Social Science Edition)* 山東師大學報 (社科版), 1 (1994), pp. 36-39; Xiao Gongqin 蕭功秦, "Qingmo xinzheng yu Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu," 清末新政與中國現代化研究 [A Study of Late Qing *Xinzheng* and Modernization of China], *Strategy and Management* 戰略與管理, 1 (1993), pp. 61-66.

[5] Zhao Yuntian 趙雲田, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu: Ershishijichu de zhongguobianjiang* 清末新政研究: 20 世紀初的中國邊疆 [A Study of Late-Qing's New Administration: China's Frontiers in Early 20th Century] (Harbin: Heilongjiang Educational Press, 2004), pp. 1-2.

[6] Zhao Yuntian 趙雲田, "Erlinglingsannian yilai Qingmo bianjiang xinzheng zhiliao yu yanjiu shuping," 2003 年以來清末邊疆新政資料與研究述評 [Study and Commentary on the Materials for Late Qing *Xinzheng* Since 2003] *HistoryChina.net* 中華文史網, (2011),

The surge of Chinese scholarly interest in frontier studies is attributable to, among others, the Chinese state's sponsorship and support of such endeavor, as evidenced by the establishment of the *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin* 中國邊疆史地研究中心 (Centre for Research in Chinese Frontier History and Geography) within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1983. Tasked with advancing research on frontier studies, the Centre has published collections of primary source materials, journals, and collections of articles and essays on China's frontiers. It also has organized and coordinated conferences, field trips, and other activities related to the studies. The goal of the Centre's promotion of research on Chinese frontier studies can best be illustrated by a standard introduction to its continuing series of publications, which reads:

"Research in the history and geography of China's frontiers ….is not only a necessity for the development of this field, but at the same time bears great significance for protecting sovereignty over (our) national territory, handling relations with neighboring countries, strengthening the unity of China's nationalities, and implementing patriotism education…."[7]

In short, as James A. Millward has noted, scholarship on frontier issues in China should serve to strengthen the State.[8] An important effect of such agenda upon Chinese frontier studies is the assumption of the ever existence of amicable relations between Han Chinese in China proper and the ethnicities in the borderlands. As a consequence of this assumption, the Chinese state and its scholars have traditionally attributed unrests in the frontier regions to external factors (such as foreign powers' instigation) rather than

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http://www.qinghistory.cn/bjmz/362489.shtml.

[7] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, pp. 1-2.

[8] James A. Millward, "New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier," in Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, Jonathan N. Lipman, and Randall Stross eds., *Remapping China: fissures in historical terrain* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 119.

internal causes (such as interethnic tension). For instance, on Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence in 1911, Chinese intellectuals mostly blame either Tsarist Russia's incitation or the Qing imperial residents' misrule in the region for causing the movement, whilst downplaying the interethnic tension that had long been simmering between the Mongols and Han Chinese that was resultant from the latter's moneylending and economic exploitation in the Mongolian region.[9] During the era of Republican China, many Chinese scholars held the view that the "ignorant Mongols" (or other frontier peoples) would be content to be members of the *Zhonghua Minzu* 中華民族 (Chinese nation) and would not have any aspiration for nationhood. By drawing upon non-Chinese sources and works, I seek to reveal that interethnic tension between the Mongols and Han Chinese during the late Qing period constituted a crucial cause for the Mongols' demand for independnece, and that the Khalkha Mongols had made repeated attempts to break away from the Qing empire by soliciting Russia's assistance well before 1911. In this regard, works by Mongolian historians, such as M. Sanjdorj[10], Urgunge Onon (and Derrick Pritchatt)[11], B. Batbayar (better known as Baabar)[12], and E. O. Batsaikhan[13] have shed valuable light on the Mongols' perspectives on the Han Chinese-Mongol tension during the late Qing period and the factors that led to Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence in 1911.

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[9] For an example of Chinese narrative, see Hai Chunliang 海純良, "Qingmo xinzheng yu waimenggu duli," 清末新政與外蒙古獨立 [Late Qing *Xinzheng* and the Independence of Outer Mongolia] *Inner Mongolia Ethnic University Journal* 內蒙古民族大學學報, 1 (2009), pp. 35-38.

[10] M. Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*. Translated by Urgunge Onon. (London: C. Hurst, 1980).

[11] Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims Its Independence in 1911* (Leiden, The Netherlands: H. J. Brill, 1989).

[12] Baabar, *From world power to Soviet satellite: history of Mongolia.* Translated by D. Suhjargalmaa et al. (Knapwell: University of Cambridge, 1999).

[13] Emgent Ookhnoi Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, The Last King of Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2009).

Since the 1980s, about ten titles focusing on the New Administration in the Mongolian region have been published in China. Some of them are evaluations of the historic actors, whilst others are narratives of the reforms.[14] One common characteristic of these works was that they either focus on Inner Mongolia or Outer Mongolia exclusively. As a consequence, there has been little meaningful comparison of the impact of the New Policies on these two Mongolia, which, in my opinion, is important to our understanding of why the Mongolian region split as it is today.

Generally speaking, these Chinese works are well grounded in published and archival sources, and have thus greatly facilitated other researchers in conducting their inquiries. However, since these authors rely almost exclusively on Chinese source materials and approach their subject with an ideological perspective, I sometimes find their narration and interpretation of the subject somewhat limited in breadth and depth. For example, when explaining the failure of *xinzheng* reforms in Mongolia, some of them ignore the long-standing interethnic tensions between Han Chinese and the Mongols, whilst others attribute the failure to the "feudal character" of the reforms themselves.[15]

When compared with Chinese *xinzheng* studies, the body of English language

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[14] Example of the former includes Xue Ruihan 薛瑞漢, "Qingmo xinzheng shiqi de Shanqi yu menggu," 清末新政時期的善耆與蒙古 [Shanqi and Mongolia of the New Political Period at the End of Qing Dynasty] *History Teaching* 歷史教學, 8 (2004), pp. 12-16. Examples of the latter are Xing Yichen 邢亦塵, "Luelun qingmo menggu diqu de 'xinzheng'," 略論清末蒙古地區的"新政" [A Brief Commentary on Late-Qing's "New Administration" in the Mongolian Region] *Inner Mongolian Social Science* 內蒙古社會科學, 3 (1986), pp. 37-42; Tian Feng 田鋒, *Qingmo neimenggu "xin zheng" ji qi shehui ying xiang* 清末內蒙古"新政"及其社會影響 [The Social influence of "new policies" at the End of the Qing Dynasty in Inner Mongolia]. Master Dissertation, Inner Mongolia Normal University (2004); Fan Mingfang 樊明方, "Qingmo Waimeng xinzheng shuping," 清末外蒙新政述評 [A Review of the New Policy Exercised in Outer Mongolia at the End of Qing Dynasty] *The Western Regions Studies* 西域研究, 1 (2005), pp. 35-43.

[15] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, p. 166.

literature on the New Administration is much smaller. While many English works have been written on Qing China's Self-strengthening Movement during the Tongzhi reign (1862-1874),[16] the only English book with late Qing *xinzheng* reforms as its focal point is Douglas R. Reynolds' *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan*.[17] This neglect in the treatment of the late Qing reforms, as Reynolds has suggested, could be attributable to several factors, including (a) the *xinzheng* reforms were associated with a regime that had "failed". Why study failure? (b) The post-1911 scholarship on leaders of the revolution concentrates on revolutionaries versus others. *Xinzheng* actors, merely "reformer", are generally disqualified from serious study by their uncertain political views and assignments; (c) researchers have failed to appreciate the awesome complexities of the late Qing achievements.[18] Regrettably, Reynolds' work failed to stir up further interest among the Western scholars in the *xinzheng* reforms. Moreover, since this book, as its sub-title has suggested, merely focuses on how Japan helped China break the iron grip of tradition and embark upon its road to modernity, it is not directly related to the present inquiry.

The only English work that deals with the *xinzheng* reforms in the Mongolian region is Mei-hua Lan's "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia".[19] An article published in 1999, Lan's work is the first attempt in English language that investigates the origin and the implementation of New Administration in the Mongolian region, and

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[16] Examples include Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957); John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).

[17] Douglas R. Reynolds, *China 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1993).

[18] Reynolds, *China 1898-1912*, pp. 193-194.

[19] Lan Mei-hua, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," in Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman eds., *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan* (Armonk, N.Y. ; London : M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 38-59.

the Mongolian response to the reforms. She has drawn on, in addition to Chinese materials, English and Mongolian sources, thus breaking a new ground in the study of this subject. The article has provided a solid foundation, on which further inquiries can be made. However, given the short length of the article (which is composed of 19 pages), Lan's work can hardly be considered as an adequate, in-depth study of a subject that is so important to the development of modern China. Moreover, the content of the article, which was published in 1999, needs substantial updating as a result of the new findings that have emerged in China's frontier studies since then.

Since the twenty-first century, new works by scholars on both sides of the Strait on China's borderlands, such as Jusahal's 珠颯 *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu* 18-20 世紀初東部內蒙古農耕村落化研究 (A Study of the Agriculturalization and Hamletization in Eastern Inner Mongolia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Centuries), and Lin Shixuan (Lin Shih-hsuan)'s 林士鉉 *Qing ji Dongbei yi min shi bian zheng ce zhi yan jiu* 清季東北移民實邊政策之研究 (A Study of the Policy on Moving People to Strengthen the Border in Northeastern China during the Late Qing Period)[20] have shed new light on various aspects of Qing frontier developments. Though they are not directly related to the *xinzheng* in the Mongolian region, they have deepened our understanding of the background of the reforms.

On the other hand, the rise of the "New Qing History" historiography in the United States since the 1990s, which directly challenges the views of the earlier Sino-centric

[20] Jusahal 珠颯, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu* 18-20世紀初東部內蒙古農耕村落化研究 [A Study of the Agriculturalization and Hamletization in Eastern Inner Mongolia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Centuries] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People's Press, 2009); Lin Shixuan 林士鉉 [Lin Shih-hsuan], *Qing ji Dongbei yi min shi bian zheng ce zhi yan jiu* 清季東北移民實邊政策之研究 [A Study of the Policy on Moving People to Strengthen the Border in Northeastern China during the Late Qing Period] (Taipei: History Department of National Cheng Chi University, 2001).

narrative of Qing history, has prompted a wave of investigations into the Qing expansion at its frontiers. Works like Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*,[21] Mark C. Elliott's *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*,[22] and James A. Millward's *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*,[23] have provided us fresh perspectives on the Qing imperial institutions and their use of Central Asian models of rule to strengthen relations with non-Han nationalities.

Moreover, as the above discussion shows, the publication in English of Mongolian works and sources in recent years has also greatly facilitated this inquiry. All these newly available materials have facilitated a revisit of the New Administration in the Mongolian region, a subject whose importance has long been underestimated, as evidenced by the neglect treatment it has received so far. For one thing, the reforms were a catalyst for the final eruption of anti-Manchu and anti-Chinese sentiment among the Mongols that eventually led to the Khalkha Mongols' declaration of independence in 1911, and this in turn has drastically transformed the geopolitical situation in Inner Asia. Moreover, though the *xinzheng* period in the Mongolian region had few concrete achievements to show for it, it laid the foundation for Mongolia's continuing modernization.

A Word on Nationalism

A cornerstone of this thesis is the transformation of Mongolian ethnic identity into

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[21] Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

[22] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001).

[23] James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

modern nationhood, culminating in the creation of the Mongolian Republic. The investigation into Mongolian nationalism is however dealt with implicitly rather than as a study of the intellectual currents leading to the gestation of the modern Mongolian nation. Fully developed, such an endeavour would need to entail a discussion of the nationalist phenomenon along three separate trajectories: Firstly, as an example of nationalism as a factor in the break-up of multi-ethnic empires, as would become apparent in the European equivalents of the Qing (Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires). Nationalism as a seminal phenomenon in the development of modern Europe has been analysed by a number of political historians who have established nationalism as a special sub-discipline in historical research. For the purpose of this study, it may suffice to refer to Benedict Anderson,[24] Anthony Smith,[25] and Ernest Gellner.[26]

Secondly, the recent scholarship concerning the nature of the Qing empire would need to be revisited. The present thesis uses the fundamental tenets of the so-called New Qing History and the latesest research findings of Qing studies as a useful point of departure, namely that the Qing enterprise was a poly-ethnic construct from its inception during the early seventeenth century; that the Qing state proactively sought to further the economic chances and social mobility of *all* its subjects, thus creating the foundations for the modern Chinese state; and that the ethnically divided nationalism during the final decades of the Empire arose out of the confluence of relative economic hardship and the introduction of new notions of human and national destiny (Darwinism, nationalism). For the present thesis, authors working on aspects of nationalism(s) in the late Qing period influenced my progress more than any other aspect of nationalism. Zhu Weizheng's recent work on modern Chinese history provided valuable insight,[27] while more established

[24] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).
[25] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) and *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London: Routledge, 2009).
[26] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).
[27] Zhu Weizheng, *Rereading Modern Chinese History* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

authors such as Wasserstrom[28] and Duara[29] provided crucial inspiration. Although separated by one whole generation and located further east, Rana Mitter's analysis of nationalism in Manchuria, another Qing border zone, provided useful insight.[30]

Thirdly and finally, a fully-developed study of nationalism would need to centre on the transformation of Mongolian self-perception, from tribal identity to the blazing image of Chinggis Khan as embodiment of the Mongolian country (*ulus*), via the responsibility of being the effective co-founders of the Qing empire and mainstay of Qing forces, to the ultimate creation of a modern Mongolian nation state. Owen Lattimore's work is being cited throughout this thesis,[31] while a more recent analysis has been provided by Bulag.[32]

All of the above has been taken into consideration, but the topic of nationalism was found to be too expansive to be studied separately in this thesis. However, the creation of (Outer) Mongolia as an independant state can still be identified as a consequence of the *xinzheng* reforms, and for this reason my thesis seeks to fill the huge gap that has existed in the body of English language literature on the subject of the *xinzheng* reforms in the Mongolian region. My paper is an inquiry into why the Qing state sought to introduce reforms in the Mongolian region (which it had left intact for centuries) during the last ten years of its rule, what the constraints on the reforms were, and how the ascendancy of Han Chinese officials in late Qing politics influenced the reform process. Finally, by adopting a comparative approach, I strive to explain why the Mongols on the two sides of the Gobi Desert reacted so differently to the reforms.

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[28] Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom ed., *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2003).
[29] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
[30] Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
[31] Owen Lattimore and Urgungge Onon, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).
[32] Uradyn E. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

Sources and Methodology

As with all researchers of Qing studies, I started my inquiry by consulting the archival materials that are kept in official archives on both sides of the Strait. To this end, I visited the First Historical Archives in Beijing in 2013 and the National Palace Museum in Taipei in 2012 and 2014, where I had access to the correspondences between the Throne and its frontier officials, such as *Zhupi zouzhe* 硃批奏摺 (Palace memorials approved by the Emperor's hand), *Gongzhong shangyu* 宮中上諭 (imperial edicts in the palace collection), and *Lufu zouzhe* 錄副奏摺 (Records of great state council memorials) maintained by the Qing court. These archival materials, preserved by successive Chinese governments since Qing as state records, have provided valuable insights on the thinking of the Throne and its officials about the management and operation of the empire's affairs, including the implementation of *xinzheng* in the frontier regions. Since the late twentieth century, the First Historical Archives have published volumes of these *zouzhe*, *shangyu*, and *qijuzhu* 起居注 (records of an emperor's words and deeds) of some of the reigns of Qing dynasty. The publication of these materials has greatly facilitated the scholars of Qing history in their research, though it does not completely obviate the need for archival visits.

In addition to visiting the First Historical Archives and the National Palace Museum, a visit to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives at Hohhot in June 2016 also proved to be helpful to my inquiry. The records kept in the Archives, many written in Mongolian and some in Chinese, supplemented the materials I obtained in Beijing and Taipei.

Apart from official archival materials, another source of primary materials of equal importance was the memorials, correspondences, and dossiers authored by high-ranking Qing officials who had been actively involved in the *xinzheng* in the Mongolian region,

such as Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, Yigu 貽穀, Xu Shichang 徐世昌, Xiliang 錫良, Sando 三多, and others. Since the early Republican years, the works of these senior Qing officials have been edited and published by their descendants, friends, or former subordinates. Generally, these documents were taken from the official archives of the various *Yamen* 衙門 these officials had served or from their private collections and, hence, the reliability of these documents was not in doubt. For this reason, some Chinese historians, such as Zhao Yuntian, treat these works as archival materials on par with the state documents mentioned above.[33]

In preparation for the introduction of reforms, the State dispatched during the early *xinzheng* era several young officers to tour the Mongolian region (mainly eastern Inner Mongolia) to report on what they had seen. Unlike traditional state bureaucrats, these officers were intellectuals who had been educated in Japan or the West. As a consequence, their reports offered an alternative view on Mongolian affairs to those boilerplate reports by frontier officials. These reports, such as Yao Xiguang's 姚錫光 *Chou Meng chu yi* 籌蒙芻議 (Humble Opinions on the Planning of *Xinzheng* for Mongolia) and Wu Luzhen's 吳祿貞 *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji* 東四盟蒙古實紀 (A Factual Record of the Four Eastern Mongolian Leagues)[34], proved to be an important source of information about the real Mongolian situation and how the reforms were carried out in the region, though these authors were not entirely immune from the cultural and racial biases of the many Han Chinese intellectuals of the time against the Mongols.

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[33] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, p. 3.

[34] Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, *Chou Meng chu yi* 籌蒙芻議 [Humble Opinions on the Planning of *Xinzheng* for Mongolia], 1908 (reprinted Hohhot: Yuan fang chu ban she, 2008); Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji* 東四盟蒙古實紀 [A Factual Record of the Four Eastern Mongolian Leagues], 1906 (reprinted Hohhot: Yuan fang chu ban she, 2008).

Apart from archival materials, officially compiled histories of the successive reigns of the dynasty also provide valuable information about the late Qing period, including the New Administration in the frontier regions. Of particular relevance to my research are *Da Qing lichao shilu* 大清歷朝實錄 (The veritable records of the Qing dynasty) of the Guangxu and Xuantong reigns, and *Guangxuchao donghualu* 光緒朝東華錄 (Records from within the Eastern Flowery Gate, Guangxu Era). These records contain a lot of primary materials taken from the royal archives, government publications (such as *dichao* 邸鈔 (government news announcements)), and newspaper reports of the time. In addition, *fangzhi* 方志 (gazetteer), such as *Suiyuan Tong Zhi Gao* 綏遠通志稿 (Comprehensive Draft Gazetteer of Suiyuan) also contain useful information about the implementation of *xinzheng* at different Mongolian cities, towns, or districts. Last but not least, newspapers and magazines published during the period, such as *Shen Pao* 申報 (Shanghai News) and *Dong Fang Zazhi* 東方雜誌 (The Eastern Miscellanies), *Minbao* 民報 (People's News) are also valuable sources of materials for their reports on important issues, public opinions on such issues, as well as government pronouncements.

Understandably, the above works mainly reflect the views of the Qing court and the Chinese literati of the time. To counterbalance these imperialist or nationalist narratives of Mongolian history, I have had to draw upon non-Chinese sources. In this regard, I consulted a number of travel accounts and missionary reports authored by Russians and other Europeans who journeyed the Mongolian frontier during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Examples of this travel literature include A.M. Pozdneyev's *Mongolia and the Mongols*, James Gilmour's *Among the Mongols*, and Elizabeth K. Kendall's *A Wayfarer in China: Impressions of a Trip across West China and Mongolia*.[35] Finally, as discussed in the above, the translation and publication of

[35] Alexeĭ Matveevich Pozdneyev, *Mongolia and the Mongols*. Edited by John R. Krueger et al., translated

Mongolian materials in English in recent years has given me valuable Mongolian and Russian perspectives on Qing China's New Policies in Mongolia. For example, in *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu: The Last King of Mongolia*, Mongolian historian E. O. Batsaikhan has provided a wealth of Mongolian and Russian archival materials that have not been published in English works.

Main Arguments

My main arguments are as follows:

(a) Thanks to their different geographical proximity to China proper and different history of association with the Qing empire, Inner and Outer Mongolia had achieved different levels of development in terms of economy, society, and political system by late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. These differences in turn would affect their elites' response towards the New Policies;

(b) The major reforms introduced in Mongolia during the *xinzheng* decade, such as land reclamation by Han Chinese farmers, the imposition of Chinese style administrative units, etc., were nothing new. They had been introduced into Mongolia on a piecemeal basis during the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns with a view to meeting certain practical needs. The *xinzheng* reforms merely institutionalized these temporary measures into permanent ones;

(c) The main goals of the reforms were to tackle the dual challenges of the debt and the threat faced by the Qing since mid-nineteenth century, that is, to raise additional revenue to meet the huge debts resultant from war repatriations and foreign loans, and to counter the growing foreign (mainly Russian) presence in the region;

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by John Roger Shaw and Dale Plank, 1892 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1971); James Gilmour, *Among the Mongols*, 1883 (reprinted New York: Praeger, 1970); Elizabeth K. Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China: Impressions of a Trip across West China and Mongolia* (London: Constable, 1913).

(d) The introduction of *xinzheng* reforms also coincided with the ascendency of Han Chinese officials in late Qing politics. As a result, the reforms were also a manifestation of Han Chinese thinking (such as agriculturally based economy). In addition to modernizing Mongolia, these reforms also sought to "Sinicize" the region. In the end, the reforms initiated by the Manchu court served to advance Han Chinese interest in the region;

(e) The *xinzheng* reforms further aggravated the differences in outlook between the Inner and Outer Mongolian elites and their relationship with the Qing and its successor state the Republic of China. This explains why the Inner and Outer Mongolian elites would eventually part ways during the Pan-Mongolian movement in the early twentieth century.

Organization

Apart from the Introduction and the Conclusion, the main body of this thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one presents the historical background of the Mongols' subjugation to the Manchus in the seventeenth century, early Qing policy towards the Mongols, and its imperial administration in the region. Chapter two examines changes to the Mongolian region brought about by Qing rule from its heyday up to the nineteenth century, in particular the penetration of Han Chinese influence in the region, and the growing pauperization of the Mongols resultant from Han Chinese moneylending and economic exploitation. Chapter three traces Tsarist Russia's growing expansion and presence in Mongolia since the seventeenth century, culminating in the Sino-Russian rivalry in the region in the nineteenth century. Chapters four and five investigate the implementation of New Administration in Inner Mongolia, where the reforms were carried out most rigorously and hence their impact was most explicit. This served as a warning to the Khalkha Mongols, and strengthened their aspiration for

nationhood. Chapter six deals with the Outer Mongols' declaration of independence in 1911. It shows that, despite the Khalkhas' pinpointing the New Policy as their greatest grievance against Qing China, the *xinzheng* reforms merely functioned as a catalyst for their independence endeavor, since evidence suggested that the Khalkhas had repeatedly approached Russia for assistance well before 1911. Chapter seven examines the wrangling between Republican China and the Khalkha Mongols over the loyalty of Inner Mongolian elites and investigates why the Inner Mongols chose to remain in the fold of China, instead of forming a new nation-state with their brethren in the north.

Chapter 1

Mongolia in the Early Qing Period

Subjugation of Mongolia

In the early seventeenth century, the lands nomadized by the Mongolian peoples across the Inner Asian steppe were roughly divided by the Gobi Desert into two regions: Eastern Mongolia and Western Mongolia. Eastern Mongolia, which is the subject of this study, could be further sub-divided into two areas, depending on their location relative to the Gobi Desert/Chinese heartland: Southern/Inner Mongolia and Northern/Outer Mongolia. Qing Inner Mongolia comprises today's Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia in the People's Republic of China, whilst Outer ("Khalkha" in Mongolian) Mongolia consists of the present-day Republic of Mongolia.

Except for the brief interludes of unification under the rules of Chinggis Khan and Dayan Khan in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries respectively, the Mongolian peoples were, in the words of Owen Lattimore, a collection of tribes rather than a people and, as typical of all tribal politics, they were at chronic war with each other.[36] Therefore, to informed contemporaries of Ming China, such as Xiao Daheng and Ye Xianggao, the Mongols were groups of people living north of the Great Wall with a complex variety of cultures (held together by intelligible dialects) and a variety of economic milieux (most of which were nomadic but others agricultural).[37]

Prior to the Eastern Mongols' subjugation by the Manchus in the seventeenth century, Ligdan Khan (a descendant of Chinggis Khan) of the Chahar Mongols in Inner Mongolia attempted to unify the multitude of independent tribes of Eastern Mongolia in

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[36] Lattimore and Onon, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia*, p. 6.

[37] Pamela K. Crossley, "Making Mongols," in Pamela K. Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton eds., *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 64.

the imperial tradition of Yuan rulership. However, his efforts failed as most of the Mongolian chieftains would not recognize his leadership nor could any of them provide such leadership. As Charles R. Bawden observes, the disunity of the Eastern Mongols, their fatal tendency to allow Ligdan's imperial power to be challenged and contested by other powerful chieftains meant that the Manchus, in the course of their gradual expansion and consolidation southwards towards China, were able to subdue, or acquire as allies, piecemeal, incoherent groups of Mongols.[38]

(a) Subjugation of Inner Mongolia

It took the Manchus nearly 100 years to subjugate the whole of Eastern Mongolia. And it was the tribes of Inner Mongolia, which were lying astride and alongside the path of Manchu expansion into Ming China, which were the first to lose independence to Manchu rule.

The Manchu-Mongol alliance started under Nurgaci, founder of the Latter Jin state (which claimed to succeed the Jurchen Jin empire (1121-1234), and was the predecessor of the Qing empire). For the Manchus, an emerging power in the northeast of Ming China, the elimination of independence of the Inner Mongolian tribes was not so much ridding themselves of direct or potential rivals as acquiring allies in their struggle against, first the Ligdan Khan (who had been coopted by Ming China to ward off the Manchus) and then against the Ming. As Hung Taiji, Nurgaci's son and successor, remarked, "To conquer Yanjing (an ancient name for Ming capital city Beijing) is like felling a huge tree, we must first hack it on both sides, and the tree will then fall by itself." [39]

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[38] Charles R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia* (London; New York: Kegan Paul International, 1989), p. 39.

[39] *Da Qing lichao Taizong shilu* 大清歷朝(太宗)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Taizong reign] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1985-87), vol. 62, p. 853.

As early as 1594, the chieftains of the Horqin and Khalkha tribes of Inner Mongolia sent ambassadors to the Manchus to propose the establishment of friendly relations. Taking advantage of the constant feuding among the Mongolian chieftains, the Manchus subjugated them either by sealing military or marital alliances with them, or by defeating them militarily. In 1606, these Mongolian princes presented Nurgaci the title *Kundulun khan* (the Revered Khan).[40] In 1634, Hung Taiji and his Southern Mongolian allies defeated the Ligdan Khan decisively. The formal end of the Inner Mongolian tribes' independence may be dated 1636 when Hung Taiji elevated himself to emperor and adopted the name of Qing for the new Manchu dynasty at a grand celebration attended by the 49 princes of Inner Mongolian banners.

(b) Subjugation of Outer Mongolia

Between 1636 and 1691, Outer (Khalkha) Mongolia was the only part of Eastern Mongolia that remained independent of Manchu rule. Seventeenth-century Khalkha was divided into three hereditary khanates: Tiisiyetii Khanate, Sechen Khanate and Jasaghtu Khanate.[41] Though these khanates remained independent in name, they had to offer periodic tribute of "Nine Whites" (eight white horses and one white camel) to the Manchu Qing emperor as early as 1637.[42] This could be interpreted as a sign that the Qing emperor exercised quasi-suzerainty over these khanates.

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[40] According to Sin Chung-il, an emissary sent by Korea's Yi court to Nurgaci's headquarters at Fe Alai in 1595-1596, Nurgaci referred to himself as the Jurchen state's *ejen* (lord), the same word as in Mongolian, thereby establishing the monarchical term of self-reference among the Jurchens that would become an expression of the Qing link to the Mongolian Great Khans—see Pamela K. Crossley, *The Manchus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 61.

[41] A fourth khanate—the Sayin Noyan Khanate—was created by the Yongzheng emperor in 1725 in recognition of the loyalty of the Borjigids (a lineage of Chingissid direct descendants) to the Qing court.

[42] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia,* p. 59.

In early 1688, the Zunghars, a tribal confederation of Western Mongols, invaded Khalkha Mongolia under the leadership of Galdan Bosogtu Khan on the pretext that the first Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (Head of the Lamaist faith in Outer Mongolia) was disrespectful towards the Dalai Lama. Galdan decisively defeated the Khalkha forces led by the Tiisiyetii Khan. The Khan and the Khutuktu (who also was the Khan's brother) fled south and sought refuge on the borders of Inner Mongolia. A debate among the Khalkha leaders ensued as to their future: whether they should seek help from the Russians (with whom the Khalkhas had trade and diplomatic exchanges since the early seventeenth century), or should turn to the Manchus for protection. It was said that the Khalkhas finally chose to submit to the Manchus because of the Khutuktu's insistence. The Khutuktu reportedly said to the Khalkha leaders:

"The Russians never worship the Buddha. Their customs are different from ours. Their language and manner of clothing are different from ours. Submission to Russia will not be in our long-term interest. Rather, we should move inside (southward) and submit to the Great Emperor (of the Qing), as this will bring us permanent good fortunes."[43]

In the summer of 1688, the Khutuktu wrote to the Kangxi emperor:

"If I could live in the protection of the Holy Emperor, my desires would be satisfied. I beg the Holy Emperor to allot me with an area with good water and pasture, so as to show mercy on me. I also ask for the restoration of my temples."[44]

Under pressure of the Zunghars, other Khalkha noblemen and people also fled to Inner Mongolia for refuge. In 1690, the Kangxi emperor decisively defeated the Zunghars in the battle of Ulanbudang. In the following year, the emperor convened a

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[43] Zhang Mu 張穆, *Menggu youmu ji* 蒙古游牧記 [Record of nomad life in Mongolia], 1867 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1965), vol. 7, p. 5.

[44] Quoted in Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 77.

great convention at Dolon Nor in Inner Mongolia, which was attended by the khans, the Khutuktu, and some 550 Khalkha nobles as well as the princes of 49 Inner Mongolian banners. The emperor announced to the Khalkha khans and princes,

"You will be treated in the same manner as the 49 banners (of Inner Mongolia). Your names and titles will be the same as those of the 49 banners. This shows that I treat you all impartially without any discrimination."[45]

The convention thus marked the formal incorporation of Khalkha Mongolia into the Qing empire. Before the Dolon Nor Convention, the nomad peoples roaming north to China had constantly posed threats to the country's agricultural civilization, resulting in constant confrontations between the two for almost two millennia. As the Yongzheng emperor remarked, "A day of unrest outside the borders is a day without rest [for the people] inside the borders."[46] Following the subjugation of the Mongols of both Inner and Outer Mongolia, the military threat was now largely eliminated. As the Kangxi emperor proudly observed,

"From reading classics and histories I note that the Mongols beyond the Great Wall had often contended with the Middle Kingdom. No dynasties, from Han, Tang, Song to Ming, were immune from the havocs wrought by the Mongols. None of them was able to exert authority in Mongolia and turn its people into loyal subjects as we have done."[47]

From 1691 till 1911, Eastern Mongolia was no longer any independent political entity. The hereditary khans and princes were now formally bound to the Manchu royal house by hierarchical ranks and titles, by salaries and rewards, and by marriage

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[45] Zhang, *Menggu youmu ji*, vol. 7, p. 6.

[46] *Da Qing lichao Shizong shilu* 大清歷朝(世宗)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Yongzheng reign], vol. 105, p. 389.

[47] *Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu* 大清歷朝(聖祖)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Kangxi reign], vol. 180, p. 931.

alliances. The Khutuktu (who had been elevated to be the head of Lamaist faith of the land at an assembly of Khalkha Mongol khans and noblemen in 1639) was formally appointed by specific imperial command in 1718 to head the Lamaists of Northern Mongolia.[48] Whereas the khans could trade with Russia, and negotiate with the latter on more or less equal terms before 1691, they were now cut off from Russia as far as practicable.

The above discussion shows that:

(a) Inner Mongolia's relationship with China was closer than that of Outer Mongolia, in terms of its geographical location and history of association with the Manchus;

(b) Outer Mongolia's subjugation to the Manchus was the result of an external threat, not a spontaneous demand among the Khalkhas. As such, there were internal divisions over to whom they should submit, Qing China or Tsarist Russia. At least to some Khalkhas, Russia could be a counterweight to China;

(c) National security had long been a major factor in Qing-Mongolian relationship and, as subsequent discussions would show, this factor was a dominating consideration in the *xinzheng* reforms.

Mongolian Influence on Qing Formation

Owen Lattimore et al. once observed,

"The Manchus favored the Mongols because, in the tradition of a conquering dynasty of barbarian origin, they began their rule by trying to maintain, at the edge of the conquered territory, a 'reservoir' of tribal auxiliaries who were, by definition, to be well treated in order to keep them loyal to the house ruling over China but, equally by definition, were to be exhorted to keep up the ancient barbarian military virtues and

[48] Zhao Yuntian 趙雲田, *Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu* 清代蒙古政教制度 [The Political and Religious Systems of Qing Mongolia] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1989), p. 272.

prevented, by positive laws and regulations, from becoming assimilated to the Chinese."[49]

In my opinion, Lattimore's observation, though apt, is at the same time an oversimplified statement as it has under-estimated the Mongolian influence on the Manchu political culture, in particular during the early period of Qing formation. As the following discussion will show, the Mongols' contributions to the Qing scheme were much more than that of military. Indeed, the Mongolian influence on the Manchu state was so pervasive that Taiwanese scholar Lin Shih-hsuan argues that Mongolia was omnipresent in the Manchu political culture.[50]

Commenting on the Qianlong emperor's grand commemoration of the return of the Torgots[51] to the Qing fold in 1771, James A. Millward argues the Qing formation was just one of the "reimperialization" processes that were played out across much of Central Eurasia from 1500 through the eighteenth century. He notes that one of the characteristics of the new political formations that emerged from this process was that they continued many Mongolian imperial institutions, especially in their military and in the Mongolian system of legitimization by decent from Chinggis Khan.[52]

Indeed, both Nurgaci and Hung Taiji had co-opted, apart from Chinese elements, many Mongolian elements in their nation-building efforts. According to David M. Farquhar, Mongolian institutions of the sixteenth century and before were the source of

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[49] Lattimore and Onon, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia*, p. 15.

[50] Lin Shixuan 林士鉉 [Lin Shih-hsuan], *Qing dai Menggu yu Manzhou zheng zhi wen hua* 清代蒙古與滿洲政治文化 [Qing Mongolia and Manchu Political Culture] (Taipei: History Department of National Cheng Chi University, 2009), p. 380.

[51] A Western Mongol tribe that had fled westward to Russia in the early seventeenth century to escape the growing power of the Zunghars.

[52] James A. Millward, "The Qing Formation, the Mongol Legacy, and the 'End of History' in Early Modern Central Eurasia," in Lynn A. Struve ed., *The Qing formation in world-historical time* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 100-101.

many of the most important Manchu innovations related to their later conquest.[53] A good example was that the *Baqi* 八旗 (Eight Banner) organization had strong Mongolian roots. Ideologically, many of the concepts of the Qing imperial rule, such as "ruler", "emperor", "tax" were derived not from the Chinese but from Mongolian sources. The ideal of a universal ruler, which was derived from the Buddhist *chakravarti-raja* (wheel-turning king), had been transmitted through Tibet to Mongolia in Yuan times. Also, the concept of "Heavenly Destiny" 天命, the first reign title of Nurgaci declared in 1616, was transmitted to the Manchus from the Mongols. Further, Peter C. Perdue considers that the Mongolian script was the greatest gift of the Mongols to the Manchus as it provided the basis for the creation of the new Manchu national language.[54] He sums up the Mongolian influence on the Manchu state as follows:

"In short, the Mongols contributed a great deal to the early Manchu state. They provided military allies, horses, and a tradition of legitimation reaching back to Chinggis Khan. Along with the Yuan seal came the concept of a universal empire encompassing many peoples, an ideal of rulership that vastly transcended either the state of the Manchus' ancestors, the Jurchen or Jin, or that of the Ming. Personal connections through kinship and the literary connections through the script bound the two peoples together."[55]

Apart from co-option of Mongolian elements in the process of Qing formation, Hung Taiji went to great length to prove his Mongol-Chinggisid credentials by promoting the story that he had received the Yuan seal from Ligdan's son.[56] This was

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[53] David M. Farquhar, "Mongolian versus Chinese Elements in the Early Manchu State," *Ch'ing shih wen-t'i* 清史問題 3 (1971), p. 11.

[54] Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 126.

[55] Perdue, *China Marches West*, p. 127.

[56] Mongolian popular tradition denies that the seal ever came into the possession of the Manchus at all. See Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 47.

important because, for the Mongols, the system of political legitimacy rested on, in addition to Buddhism, the cult of Chinggis Khan since, as Johan Elverskog notes, the Chinggis Khan was transformed after his death from founder of the empire to the sanctified holder of the right to rule.[57]

Qing Policy towards Mongolia

Given the important contributions of the Mongols towards Qing formation and its rule of over two and a half centuries in China, it is necessary to examine how the Manchus managed to ensure the loyalty of the Mongols. The Manchu success can be attributed to the Manchu-Mongol kinship, its patronage of Lamaism, and administration in Mongolia.

(a) Manchu-Mongol Kinship

Manchu-Mongol kinship was one of the central pillars of the early Qing regime. This was mainly created through intermarriages between the noble families of the two peoples. Through intermarriage and other techniques, the Manchus successfully made many Mongolian noblemen members of the ruling family, and thus reliable military allies in their campaigns against Ming China and the Zunghars during the period of Qing formation, and in the suppression of uprisings in China proper during the later Qing rule. As a consequence, the intermarriage program of the Manchus was a highly regulated, large-scale and long-term arrangement.

The first Manchu-Mongolian marriage alliance was sealed in 1612, when Nurgaci himself married the daughter of the chief of the Horqin Mongols. In his campaign against the Ligdan Khan, Hung Taiji used marriage ties to cement alliances with the Southern Mongolian tribes and, as a result, the number of such allies rose from four in

[57] Johan Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), p. 52.

Nurgaci's time to 21.[58] During the reigns of the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors, the intermarriage program became even more systematized and regulated, as other techniques—gifts, stipends, tax exemption, education, access to official posts—were introduced to win the hearts of the Mongolian nobility. For example, annual salaries ranging from 2,500 *silver taels* and 40 bolts of silk to 100 *silver taels* and 4 bolts of silk were awarded to the Mongolian nobility of different ranks.[59] In 1662, the Kangxi emperor decreed that sons born to Mongolian consorts would be granted high ranks equivalent to those for the sons of Manchu noblemen.[60] Young Mongolian boys were selected as consorts for Qing princesses, and were brought to Beijing for education in Manchu and Chinese culture, before they were sent back to their tribes. In 1789, the Qianlong emperor decreed that special subsidies of silver (ranging from 40 to 300 *taels*) and silk (ranging from four to 10 bolts) would be granted to the *efu* 額駙 (consorts for Qing princesses) of different ranks annually.[61] Elaborate funerals were held upon the death of Qing princesses and their consorts. The Manchu-Mongolian kinship was so close that the Qianlong emperor once boasted, in a poem he wrote, that all the Mongolian noblemen who attended a royal banquet were his sons and grandsons.[62]

Through inter-marriage, the Mongolian nobles constituted an important component

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[58] Ma Ruheng 馬汝珩 and Ma Dazheng 馬大正 eds., *Qing dai de bian jiang zheng ce* 清代的邊疆政策 [The Frontier Policies of the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1994), p. 283.

[59] Kungang 崑岡 et al. comp, *Qinding Da Qing huidian shili* 欽定大清會典事例 [Imperially commissioned statutes and precedents of the Qing dynasty], 1899 (reprinted Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), vol. 978, "Lifanyuan" 理藩院 [Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces], "Fengbi" 俸幣 [Stipend and Currency], p. 441.

[60] Ma and Ma eds., *Qing dai de bian jiang zheng ce*, p. 290.

[61] *Huangchao wenxian tongkao* 皇朝文獻通考 [A comprehensive study of the Qing imperial documents], 1787 (reprinted Taipei: Xin xing shu ju, 1965), vol. 42, "Guoyongkao" 國用考[Study of National Finance], 4, pp. 3-4.

[62] Zhaolian 昭槤, *Xiao ting za lu* 嘯亭雜錄 [Xiaoting Miscellany], 1880 (reprinted Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1980), vol. 1, p. 18.

of the Manchu royal house, and would play an important role in late Qing politics. However, being a close ally of the Manchus, the Mongols also became a target for discrimination by Han nationalists during the final years of the Qing rule.

(b) Patronage of Tibetan Buddhism

Joseph Fletcher remarked that the Tibetan Buddhist "Yellow" Church was one of the three important factors in the taming of the once terrible Mongols.[63] The Tibetan Buddhist faith, also known as dGe-lugs-pa or the "Yellow Church" or simply Lamaism, was re-introduced to Mongolia during the reign of Altan Khan in the sixteenth century. Altan Khan was so powerful that he was able to invite the third Dalai Lama of Tibet to visit Mongolia in 1577, thereby reviving the Mongolian tradition of an alliance of the Buddhist Church with a secular power.[64]

For the Khalkhas, the elevation of the first Jebtsundamba Khutuktu was of primary significance as it gave them for the first time in Mongolian history an indigenous religious leader. Through the combination of political and religious power, Tibetan Buddhism began to grow substantially in Outer Mongolia. After the Khalkhas submitted to the Qing court in 1691, the Buddhist Church also fell under Manchu control. In 1718, the Kangxi emperor confirmed the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu as the paramount religious leader for all the Khalkhas. However, in the eyes of the Khalkha Mongols, the Khutuktu ranked third in the Lamaist Church, after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas of Tibet.[65] As history would show, this factor was of utmost importance in the Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911, when the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu became the rallying figure of the Mongolian world in their struggle to break away from Manchu rule.

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[63] Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800," in John K. Fairbank ed., *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, Late Ch'ing, 1900-1911 Part I* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 52.

[64] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia,* p. 29.

[65] Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800," p. 52.

In Inner Mongolia, the Janggiya Khutuktu, a reincarnating lama and the abbot of the monastery Koke Sume erected in Dolon Nor, was made by the Qing court the ecclesiastical head of the land in 1701. The Qing government, anxious to prevent the development of a single Mongolian church that might serve as a rallying point for Mongolian unity, had been careful to build up the standing of the Janggiya Khutuktu as a counterweight to the Jebtsundamba's influence, and it also tried subtly to maintain an equilibrium of power in Mongolia between the Dalai Lama and the two Mongolian primates.[66] Also, to prevent an alliance between the lay aristocracy and the lamaist church, the Qing government discouraged the finding of reincarnations of Khutuktus in noble families. Following the death of the second Jebtsundamba Khutuktu in 1758, the Qianlong emperor decreed that future incarnations of the Khutuktu had to be found in Tibet.

Chinese sources seem to suggest that the Qing court's patronage of Tibetan Buddhism was for strategic purposes: by promoting Tibetan Buddhism the Manchus were able to ensure the loyalty of their Mongolian subjects. A much quoted proof was a 1792 stele inscription entitled *Lama shuo* (On Lamas), found in the Yonghe gong, a Tibetan Buddhist temple in Beijing:

"As the Yellow Church inside and outside (of China proper) is under the supreme rule of these two men (the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama), all the Mongol tribes bear allegiance to them. By patronizing the Yellow Church we maintain peace among the Mongols. This being an important task we cannot but protect this religion."[67]

Lending weight to this claim were the occasional derogatory remarks made by Qing emperors about the lamas in official records. For instance, the Kangxi emperor

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[66] Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800," pp. 52-53.

[67] Quoted from Elisabeth Benard, "The Qianlong emperor and Tibetan Buddhism," in James A. Millward, et al., ed., *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 123.

once observed,

"The Mongols by their nature deeply believe in deceitful words. Whenever they hear of lamas, Khutuktus, or bierhan, they, without checking its truthfulness, kowtow wholeheartedly and donate their livestock and properties, thinking they would thus be blessed and live forever. They do not mind even if they are thus reduced to poverty and ruined."[68]

Prince Li, a member of the Qing imperial clan and author of *Xiao ting za lu*, also writes, "That the State has shown special favor to monks of the Yellow Church, is not because it worships the religion to pray for good fortune and luck. It is because all the Mongolian tribes have worshipped the Yellow faith for a long time. The State therefore makes a fetish of the faith in order to win the hearts of these people, so that they will submit to us loyally and serve as a screen for our security."[69]

However, by using contemporary Tibetan and Mongolian sources, modern scholars have arrived at a different conclusion. For instance, having examined the biographies of Jang gya Rolpai Dorje[70] and the third Panchen Lama, Tibetan histories of Buddhism, portraits, and the tomb of Qianlong, Elisabeth Benard concludes that the Qianlong emperor was deeply involved with Tibetan Buddhism and maintained sustained relationships with important lamas.[71]

No matter what was the real motive that lay behind the Manchu patronage of the religion, the Lamaist church grew rapidly during Qing rule in terms of the number of monasteries, power, wealth, and influence. Besides promoting the two Khutuktus as religious leaders, the Manchu court also ordered the construction in Mongolia of monasteries, such as the Shira Sume in Dolon Nor, Amur-Bayaskhulangtu Keyid in

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[68] *Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu*, vol. 143, p. 574.

[69] Zhaolian, *Xiao ting za lu*, vol. 10, "Zhangjia hutuketu" 章嘉呼圖克圖 [Janggiya Khutuktu], p. 361.

[70] Qianlong's childhood playmate, schoolmate, religious teacher and artistic consultant.

[71] Benard, "The Qianlong emperor and Tibetan Buddhism," p. 132.

Urga, as well as other imperial monasteries. By and large, each reincarnation had his own monastery. According to some statistics, the numbers of monasteries in Qing Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia were over 1000 and 740 respectively.[72]

Most of the monasteries were built and financially supported by the Mongols themselves. Under the Qing rule, the monasteries and lamas were exempt from taxes and services and enjoyed many privileges. Apart from royal patronage, the *jasak* (ruler) of each banner also donated the monasteries with *shabis* (bondsmen), and large areas of pastureland for the monasteries' livestock. The monks also constantly solicited contributions from the banner subjects for lamaist rituals (such as making Buddha images out of butter), and ordinary herdsmen dared not refuse. Since the government exempted monasteries and their *shabis* from taxation, the tax burden fell all the more heavily upon the Mongolian commoners. Meanwhile the monasteries used their wealth for all kinds of business transactions, including usury.

Moreover, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, increasing numbers of Mongolian young men took vows and became monks. With more and more adolescents entering the monasteries, and increasing amounts of Mongolia's pasturelands and produce going towards the payment of monastic ceremonial expenses rather than to feed the people, serious consequences for the Mongolian economy and society ensued. As this would have implications upon the development of Mongolia in the nineteenth century, the issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

(c) Qing Administration in Mongolia

Before the nineteenth century, the Qing administrative system in the Inner Asian frontiers was different from that in China proper and other frontier regions, in that the Manchus, not unlike other multiethnic empires of the time, exercised indirect rule in

[72] Ma and Ma eds., *Qing dai de bian jiang zheng ce*, p. 145.

these territories. As Charles Tilly observes, indirect rule has two major elements: (a) retention of particular, distinct compacts for the government of each segment; and (b) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute and military collaboration with the centre.[73]

That the Qing exercised indirect rule in its Inner Asian frontiers could be attributed to the vastness of these territories and their fragmented political organizations. Nicola Di Cosmo notes that the Qing administrative system in its Inner Asian frontiers could be divided into three components: the *Lifanyuan* 理藩院 in the metropolis, the imperial residents and the native elites in the periphery.[74] The following paragraphs will examine these three components individually.

(i) *Lifanyuan*

Lifanyuan was the institution established by the Manchus at the centre specifically to handle Inner Asian affairs. It was also the first of its kind in the history of imperial China. Ning Chia notes that there is a linguistic difference between the Chinese and Manchu names of this imperial institution: whereas the Chinese name 理藩院 means "Barbarian Control Office" or "Court of Colonial Affairs", its Manchu name, *Tulergi golo be dasara jurgan*, should be translated as the "Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces". She argues that this difference reveals the different concepts between the Chinese and Manchus about Inner Asia and its peoples: whereas the Chinese name contains a strong cultural conception of the "civilized" versus the "barbarous", its Manchu counterpart merely indicates that Inner Asia was a province away from the

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[73] Charles Tilly, "How Empires End," in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: the Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), p. 3.

[74] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998), p. 294.

centre.[75] This could be regarded as a manifestation of the Qing imperial ideology, whereby the five major peoples of the empire (Manchus, Hans, Mongols, Huis and Tibetans) were five components with equal status, with the royal house at the centre of the scheme.

The *Lifanyuan* was set up by Hung Taiji in 1638 on the basis of the *monggo jurgan* or *menggu yamen* 蒙古衙門 (bureau of Mongolian affairs), a government agency that had been established two years earlier to manage Manchu relations with the Southern Mongols. Following Qing conquests of other Inner Asian regions, such as Northern Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, functions of the *Lifanyuan* also expanded accordingly. By 1760, the *Lifanyuan* was composed of a chancery, six *si* 司 (bureau) and subordinate agencies. For most of the Qing period, the *Lifanyuan* was the preserve of Manchu and Mongol administrators. It was not until the final years of the Qing that Han Chinese officials were appointed to positions in this organization.

As a result of Qing expansion into Inner Asia during the following century, the number of bureaus of the *Lifanyuan* increased from four to six by the mid-eighteenth century. These bureaus were:

(a) *qijisi* 旗籍司 (the Inner Mongolian bureau), in charge of affairs relating to the leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia;

(b) *wanghuisi* 王會司 (the Inner Mongolian reception bureau), responsible for the management of *chaojin* 朝覲 (pilgrimage to the Qing emperor), *weilie* 圍獵 (imperial hunt) and *chaogong* 朝貢 (tribute) rituals of Inner Mongolian princes. ;

(c) *dianshusi* 典屬司 (the Outer Mongolian bureau), similar to the *qijisi* for Inner Mongolian affairs, this bureau was responsible for the administrative affairs relating to the Khalkha Mongols, Zunghars, and Tibetans;

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[75] Ning Chia, *The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty*. Ph. D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University (1991), pp. 83- 85.

(d) *rouyuansi* 柔遠司 (the Outer Mongolian reception bureau), similar to the *wanghuisi* for Inner Mongolian affairs, this bureau handled the reception of Outer Mongolian chieftains;

(e) *laiyuansi* 徠遠司 (the Eastern Turkestan bureau), responsible for relations with Xinjiang; and

(f) *lixingsi* 理刑司 (the judicial bureau), responsible for judicial matters throughout the Inner Asian frontiers.

The *Lifanyuan zeli* 理藩院則例 (*Lifanyuan* regulations) provided the legal basis for the governing of the empire's Inner Asian frontiers. First compiled in 1696 by order of the Kangxi emperor, the *zeli* was subsequently revised in 1727, 1817 and 1826 respectively. The Regulations prescribed the treatment of local elites, in particular the Mongolian aristocracy, and the powers to be granted to them. Ranks, posts, promotions and demotions, salaries, visits to court, ceremonies, banquets, and funerals were all meticulously regulated. The Regulations also dealt with the appointment of officials, rewards and punishments, military matters, political gatherings of the Mongolian chiefs, and, in general, the functions of the military and civil administration. It also fixed the punishments for crimes such as robbery, theft, and murder.

Ning Chia argues that, through its management of Inner Asian rituals of *chaojin*, *weilie*, and *chaogong*, the *Lifanyuan* had redefined the political, cultural and economic connections between China proper and Inner Asian societies and these new connections had turned the Inner Asian peoples into direct imperial subjects.[76] As evidenced by the strong support the Mongolian nobles gave the Manchu ruling house and the relatively peace in the Mongolian region during most of the Qing rule, the *Lifanyuan* had indeed served as an important and effective link between the Manchus and Mongols.

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[76] Ning Chia, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644-1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14, no. 1 (1993), p. 61.

Before 1906, the organization and operations of the *Lifanyuan* basically reflected the imperial ideology of segregating the five peoples of the empire. However, all these would have to be changed during the *xinzheng* period as the major function of its successor agent *Lifanbu* would be the encouragement of large-scale migration of Han Chinese commoners to the frontiers.

(ii) Imperial Residents

Below the *Lifanyuan* was a network of imperial residents created by the Manchu state in its Inner Asian borderlands, responsible for enforcing Qing policy in their jurisdiction. To this end, the Qing created a form of self-government in these regions within an imperial judicial and administrative framework without committing large numbers of troops or spending large sums of money.[77]

In Mongolia, the imperial residents were high officials of the Manchu banners or high members of the Mongolian aristocracy. Delegated with military and civilian powers, these imperial residents-- *jiangjun* 將軍 (military governor), *dutong* 都統 (lieutenant governor) and *dachen* 大臣 (*amban*/official)-- were appointed to supervise the banners within their jurisdiction; control Qing garrisons (composed of Manchu, Mongol and Han Chinese *baqi* 八旗 (Eight Banners) units); raise taxes to pay for the frontier administration; manage foreign (mainly Russian) relations; and control the movement of people across the frontier.

In Inner Mongolia, Qing administration was placed under the supervision of four imperial residents: the *jiangjun* of Suiyuan, and the *dutongs* of Hulun Buir, Chahar, and Jehol. Technically, the entire territory of Outer Mongolia came under the jurisdiction of the *jiangjun* of Uliastai. In practice, however, by 1800 the *amban* at Urga--*banshi dachen* 辦事大臣--had general supervision over the eastern part of the territory, while the *jiangjun* of Uliastai was in charge of the western part. In order to strengthen Qing

[77] Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," p. 292.

presence in the territory formerly ruled by the Zunghars, another senior official, *canzan dachen* 參贊大臣 was created in 1762 in the region around Kobdo in westernmost Outer Mongolia, which had originally been under Uliastai.

(iii) Banner System

Like other multiethnic empires, the Qing co-opted the native elites into the local administration of its Inner Asian frontiers. In Mongolia, the Qing ruled primarily through co-opting the Mongolian elites into the banners, a system that Joseph Fletcher argues was another of the three main factors that combined to reinforce the decline of the Mongols' once-glorious military power and the decay of the nomadic economy.[78] However, instead of modeling Mongolia's administration on that of Chinese heartland, the banner institutions created by the Manchus managed to preserve many of Mongolia's political, social, and economic traditions. By applying the principle of the so-called *yin su er zhi* 因俗而治 (govern in accordance with customs), the Manchu court was able to command the loyalty and support of the Mongolian elites for centuries.

First created by Hung Taiji in 1635 in Inner Mongolia, the banner (*qosighus*) system was a population based political-military organization, which later came to be applied to all parts of the Mongolian world that became subjects to the Qing rule.[79] The system seemed to have worked well with the Mongols, as David M. Farquar observes, "there seems to have been virtually no difficulty in establishing the banner system of government among them (Mongols), and at no time does Mongolian dissatisfaction with Manchu control seem to have derived from this system itself."[80]

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[78] Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c.1800," p. 51.

[79] David M. Farquhar, "The Origins of the Manchus' Mongolian Policy," in John K. Fairbank ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 204.

[80] Farquhar, "The Origins of the Manchus' Mongolian Policy," p. 204.

Appointed by the *Lifanyuan* to rule a banner, the *jasak* was the central figure in the Qing system of indirect rule in Mongolia. Without exception, a *jasak* was always of the lineage of Chinggis Khan or one of his brothers. With his position hereditary, a *jasak* enjoyed, theoretically, almost complete autonomy to act within the boundaries of the regulations fixed by the *Lifanyuan*. His civil responsibilities included the recommendation of bannermen for appointment to high office (subject to the *Lifanyuan*'s ratification); the appointment of junior officials, mainly his military and civilian assistants (*tusalaghci*); the supervision of the banner census (which determined the number of recruits, taxes, and corvée the banner must supply to the imperial government); the collection of tax (rate fixed by the *Lifanyuan*); the decision (subject to appeal to higher authority and the *Lifanyuan*) in family and criminal law cases; the supervision of trade and the property of foreigners (essentially Russians); the participation in the league's triennial assemblies; and the enforcement of the observances of the Lamaist church. He also kept watch on movement across the borders, maintained the relay stations, and provided horses for travelling officials. His military duties included the command of the banner's troops, and the maintenance of their weapons and training camps. Naturally, his most important duty was to ensure that no seditious activities occurred, for which he would be held responsible and liable for punishment.

Under Manchu suzerainty, the domains of the banners were redesigned according to the strategic interests of the Qing. Also, the Qing court had started a process of weakening the Mongols by steadily increasing the number of banners, with each of them theoretically of equal standing. As a consequence, powerful *aimags* (tribes) that had once obeyed a single tribal leader now consisted of several separate banners, such as the three banners of Kharachin Right, Kharachin Middle, and Kharachin Left. Each of the banners had a *jasak* with autonomy in his own banner and direct responsibility to

the Imperial government. For instance, the number of banners in Inner Mongolia during the reign of Hung Taiji was eleven, and it grew to forty-nine in Kangxi's time. In Outer Mongolia, the number of banners also increased progressively, as illustrated by the following table:

Year	Number of Banners
1693	37
1697	55
1724	75
1736	86

(Source: Zhao, *Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu,* p. 81)[81]

Above the banners were leagues (*chighulghan* or *meng*), which were formed by grouping a number of banners under their jurisdiction. During Qing rule, there were six leagues in Inner Mongolia and four leagues in Outer Mongolia (which coincided with the four tribes of the region). Each of the leagues bore the name of the place in which it held its triennial meetings. The number of banners that composed of a league varied. League chiefs (captain generals) were appointed by the emperor from among the noblemen of the league upon the recommendation of the *Lifanyuan*. Traditionally, the league chiefs of Outer Mongolia were filled by the four khans of the region. The nobility of each league met at their triennial meetings to regulate inter-banner disputes and decide criminal cases. The banners were not supposed to communicate with the *Lifanyuan* direct and their submissions had to route through the league chiefs.

In addition to the ten leagues, there were large areas in Inner and Outer Mongolia, such as Dariganga, Chahar, the Alashan territories, the Kobdo frontier and the guard post zone (*kharagbul-un nutugh*) along the Russian border, that were outside the banner

[81] Zhao, *Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu*, p. 81.

system described above, and were known as superintendent banners (*bugude darugha*) or *Nei shu Menggu* 內屬蒙古 (Court Mongolia)[82] For historical reasons, the banners of *Nei shu Menggu* were not ruled by their own hereditary *jasak-princes* but by imperial appointees and, consequently, imperial orders were executed with less opposition in these banners.

The banner system differed widely from the frontier management strategies of former dynasties. For instance, under the tributary system of the Ming, the Court could not claim to supervise the Mongolian chieftains, nor could it enforce its regulations governing taxation and criminal law in the Mongolian land. In contrast, the Qing court, through the *Lifanyuan*, exercised supervision and control over the Mongolian chieftains. For one thing, the *jasak*'s position, though hereditary, had to be approved by the emperor upon the recommendation of the *Lifanyuan*. As a consequence, the social position of the *jasaks* changed decisively because their authority no longer rested on traditional canons of legitimacy but on their appointment or recognition by the Manchu court. Moreover, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a *jasak* had to rule his banner within the confines of regulations set by the *Lifanyuan*. Any abuse of power on the part of the *jasak* would be dealt with harshly by the Qing authorities, who might dismiss him outright and strip him of his titles, no matter how august his lineage. In 1800, for example, the Qing court dismissed the Sechen Khan Sangjayidorji, a descendant of Chinggis Khan, from his position as league chief and deprived him and his descendants of their khanship.

In contrast to the relatively open (and economically more productive) grazing conditions of pre-Qing Mongolia, the Manchus had defined the domain of each banner, and carefully fixed and delimited its pasture lands. The purpose of the demarcation was

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[82] Lan Mei-hua, *Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911: A Pan-Mongolian Endeavor*. Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University (1996), p. 42.

to restrict the Mongols' freedom of migration, thereby preventing them from expanding their power into neighboring banners. (On the other hand, the demarcation could also be used to prevent conflicts between banners over pasture lands). By a ruling of 1632, any *jasak* who had exceeded his legal jurisdiction would be liable to a fine. Also, according to a regulation made during the Kangxi reign, if any *jasak* pronounced a death sentence without consulting his counterparts of the neighboring banners, he himself would be punishable for murder. The judicial powers of individual *jasak* were further reduced by the introduction of the Chinese system of reviewing legal cases at various administrative levels. For instance, capital cases had to be referred to the *Lifanyuan*. By the end of the eighteenth century, Mongolian noblemen could make decisions only in minor cases; their provisional rulings in more serious cases had to be confirmed at higher levels.[83]

As can be seen from the above discussion, the Qing court applied the traditional *fen er zhi zhi* 分而治之 (divide-and-rule) strategy in Mongolia, with its chief aim being to prevent the Mongols from re-uniting under a nobleman or a religious figure. And this strategy appears to have worked very well since Mongolia remained under Qing rule till the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, it was clear that Mongolia constituted a key component in the Manchu scheme of empire. Politically, Mongolian nobility was part of the Qing ruling family. Culturally, Mongolian influence was prevalent in the Manchu imperial ideology and institutions, and this was particularly visible during the early period of Qing formation. Militarily, the Mongols played an important role in the Manchu

[83] Dorothea Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols," *The International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998), p. 321.

conquest of China proper, and the subsequent suppression of uprisings that broke out in China proper. Moreover, the Mongolian region was an important bulwark of the Qing empire against external threats from the north.

No doubt, the changes brought about by the Qing rule in Mongolia had economic as well as social implications. This is one of the issues on which Chinese and Western historians have conflicting views. Western and Mongolian historians usually take a negative view of the Qing legacy in Mongolia. For instance, Joseph Fletcher argues that the nomadic society of Mongolia was in decline in the nineteenth century with many Mongols being pauperized.[84] M. Sandorj also maintains that Chinese moneylending, which flourished under Manchu dominion of Mongolia, ruined the Mongols' subsistence economy and retarded the development of the nation's productive forces.[85] On the other hand, modern Chinese historians generally take a more benevolent view about the impact of Manchu rule on Mongolia, in particular during the early period. Zhao Yuntian, for example, argues that the long period of peace and stability brought about by the Qing rule in Mongolia promoted the economic and social development of the land.[86] Clearly, this issue requires further examination and will form the subject of the following chapter.

Finally, Robert A. Rupen observes that "the identical policies proclaimed by the Qing court particularly for both Inner and Outer Mongolia often differed in practical results."[87] Clearly, the New Policies implemented by the Qing court in the early

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[84] Joseph Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet," in John K. Fairbank ed., *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, Late Ch'ing, 1900-1911 Part I* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 351.

[85] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. xiii.

[86] Zhao, *Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu*, p. 286.

[87] Robert A. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century. Part I* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1964), p.70.

twentieth century fits Rupen's observation neatly considering the fact that Outer Mongolia attempted to break away from the Manchus as a result, whilst Inner Mongolia has continued to remain in China's fold until today. Precisely how this did happen is the question that this study seeks to answer.

Chapter 2

Decay of Mongolia in the Nineteenth Century

During the early period of Qing rule in Mongolia, the peace and stability brought about by "Pax Manjurica" was conducive to economic recovery in this war-torn region. As a result, nomadism began to thrive again in the Mongolian region. In 1705, the Kangxi emperor told his ministers, "During my last tour beyond the Great Wall, I saw that the mountains and valleys were swamped with livestock. I toured on for eight days and herds of livestock seemed endless."[88] Another sign of the revival was that, between 1728 and 1731, the Qing court was able to requisition a total of 81,000 camels, 148,600 horses, and 475,000 sheep from Khalkha Mongolia.[89]

However, nomadism was in decline again in Mongolia in the nineteenth century, resulting in among others the pauperization of many Mongols. The decline can be ascribed to a multitude of factors, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Spread of Agriculture

Bawden argues that agriculture was an innovation that the conservative Qing court pushed in Mongolia for the purpose of supplying its armies and avoiding the long haul out of China.[90] In fact, historical records show that some Mongols had engaged in agriculture on their lands since the Ming period, and that the Mongols living several hundred miles northeast of Beijing came to trade with the Chinese for plows and seeds.[91] In fact, the effect of the Qing subjugation of Mongolia was that, by removing

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[88] *Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu*, vol. 220, p. 222.

[89] Zhao, *Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu*, p. 303.

[90] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, pp. 83-84.

[91] Sechin Jagchid and Peter Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 314.

the long-term hostilities between China proper and Mongolia, it further facilitated the expansion of agriculture into the region, in particular in Inner Mongolia in the *xinzheng* decade.

In addition to supplying the Manchu garrisons stationed in Mongolia as noted by Bawden, the Qing court's promotion of agriculture in the region had other strategic considerations. For instance, in the winter of 1698, the Kangxi emperor dispatched officials to the banners of Aohan, Naiman and Baarin in eastern Inner Mongolia to instruct their people on agrarian matters. He decreed:

"The lands of the banners of Aohan, Naiman and others are very suitable for cultivation of all sorts of grain. At times of harvest, the landless people around the Khingan Range can buy grains nearby without the trouble of coming into the borders for grains."[92]

No matter what the Qing motive was, agriculture spread in Mongolia during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, especially in Inner Mongolia. For instance, following a 1691 tour of the borderlands, the Kangxi emperor observed,

"For the Mongols, agriculture was not their livelihood of subsistence. Now that peace has been extant for such a long time, everywhere I visited I could see that they (the Mongols) had transformed the hillsides into farmlands. After sowing seeds they would go elsewhere to pasture their animals and come back in autumn for the harvest."[93]

Actually, the Qing court seemed to recognize the merits of cross-border cultivation. For instance, in 1712, the Kangxi emperor remarked,

"Now that land is scarce and the population is dense, many people from different

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[92] Zhang, *Menggu youmu ji*, vol. 3, p. 58.

[93] Heshen 和珅 and Liang Guozhi 梁國治 et al. comp, *Rehe Zhi* 熱河志 [Gazateer of Rehe], 1781 (reprinted Shanghai : Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1987), vol. 75, p. 2587.

places have moved across the borders for accommodation and cultivation. In recent years, there have been good harvests (beyond the borders). All the people in the Capital city and nearby areas, who also rely on these grains, are thus greatly benefitted."[94]

Apart from teaching the Mongols cultivation, the Qing court also, from time to time, acquiesced in Han Chinese farmers tilling on the Mongolian lands. Nevertheless, cross-border cultivation was in contradiction to the traditional Manchu policy, which could be dated as early as 1655, that sought to restrict the contact between the Mongols and Han Chinese, in particular the prevention of large scale Han Chinese migration to the Mongolian region. However, deviations from and abandonment of the established policy, I would argue, were inevitable because of several factors at work. First among these factors was the steady growth of Han Chinese population in the heartland, which eventually led to outward migration to the borderlands. As the Kangxi emperor noted in 1716,

"Now that peace has been in existence for a long time, the population has continued to grow, yet there has been no increase in the area of farmlands (in the heartland)….Some suggest that more lands should be reclaimed for cultivation, but they do not realize that there is no reclaimable land in the heartland. Today, there are many people who make their living by tilling lands beyond the Pass."[95]

In the years that followed, the population growth continued steadily. According to the Qianlong emperor's estimate, the population of China proper had grown over 15-fold from the Kangxi reign up to his time, from 23,312,200 people as at 1710 to 3,007,467,000 people as at 1782.[96] The trend remained unabated since then. According to another estimate, during the 100-odd years from 1741 up to 1850, the empire's

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[94] *Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu*, vol. 250, p. 476.

[95] *Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu*, vol. 268, p. 629.

[96] *Da Qing lichao Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1441, p. 249.

population had grown from 0.14 billion to 0.43 billion.[97] With the spectacular growth in population in China proper whilst the increase of farmlands failed to catch up, the only logical development was the outward expansion of Han Chinese to the frontier regions, including Mongolia in the north.

Another factor that further contributed to the migration of Han Chinese farmers to Mongolia was the frequent outbreak of natural disasters in northern China. Historical records showed that, throughout the Qing rule, natural disasters and famines erupted incessantly in the northern provinces of Zhili, Henan, and Shandong. As the Qianlong emperor observed, "On the occasion of famines, the common people would have nothing to rely on. They either move to the Yangzi and Huaihe rivers in the south, or journeyed beyond the Pass in the north."[98] In the event of natural disasters and famines, the State would, as a stopgap measure, turned a blind eye when Han Chinese farmers who lost their lands and livelihood in the affected areas migrated to the Mongolian lands to make a living. For example, when the Yellow River inundated Beijing and the Zhili province in 1723, the Yongzheng emperor ordered that victims of the flood be allowed to cultivate on Mongolian lands, and the Court asked the Mongolian banners to shelter these victims.[99] This policy shift, known as *jiediyangmin* 借地養民 (Feeding the people on borrowed lands) in history, was regarded as a landmark in the State's utilization of Mongolian resources to resolve crises in the heartland. In 1743, when a drought hit Tianjin, Shandong, and Henan, the Qianlong emperor ordered the officials at the border check-points to relax their control by allowing Han Chinese farmers to make a living in Mongolia, fearing that social unrest might arise if the restriction was

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[97] Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲, *Zhongguo li dai hu kou, tian di, tian fu tong ji* 中國歷代戶口、田地、田賦統計 [Statistics on China's Households, Farmlands, and Land Taxes through the Ages] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1980), pp. 251, 256.

[98] *Da Qing lichao Gaozong shilu*, vol. 309, p. 44.

[99] *Da Qing lichao Shizong shilu*, vol. 4, p. 101.

vigorously enforced.[100]

At the same time, some Mongols also welcomed cross-border cultivation by Han Chinese farmers with a view to boosting their incomes. For example, in 1732, the Mongols of famine-stricken Ordos petitioned the Court to allow them to lease their lands to Han Chinese farmers so that they could collect rents in return. Moreover, in order to increase their revenue to cover their growing expenditure, those Mongolian princes whose territories were favorably situated began to set aside part of their lands and arrange for Han Chinese tenants to cultivate them.[101] By the year of 1749, there were tens of thousands of Han Chinese farmers in the three Kharachin Banners in Inner Mongolia.[102] As the Jiaqing emperor aptly remarked,

"Had those (Mongolian) princes and dukes not recruited the (Han Chinese) farmers and provided them with lands for tilling, they (the farmers) would have nothing to live on, and would not have remained in the frontiers for long. Therefore, the existence of large numbers of drifters who had journeyed beyond the Pass was caused by those princes' and dukes' recruitment of farmers for land cultivation."[103]

The spread of agriculture and Han Chinese settlements were not confined to Inner Mongolia only. Han Chinese agricultural settlements could also be found in Khalkha Mongolia, even in the areas bordering Russia. A.M. Pozdneyev, who journeyed to Outer Mongolia in 1892, noted in his diary the following:

"As we approached Mt. Bain-ulaan (the westernmost part of Outer Mongolia), which is also called Bain-khangai, we began to see the fields of the Chinese, and beyond them we came upon their settlements. According to the accounts of the local

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[100] *Da Qing lichao Gaozong shilu*, vol. 208, p. 685.

[101] Lattimore and Onon, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia*, p. 16.

[102] *Da Qing lichao Gaozong shilu*, vol. 348, p. 799.

[103] Kungang et al. comp, *Qinding Da Qing huidian shili*, vol. 978, "Lifanyuan" 理藩院 [Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces], "Huding" 戶丁 [Household Men], p. 435.

Mongols, there are, generally speaking, a large number of Chinese farmers living in the valley of Kharaa River, and they sow wheat extensively, renting their land from the Mongol *hoshuns* (banners). The Chinese engage very little in tilling the soil, and all operations on their fields are done by Mongols."[104]

Despite the above deviations, the Court's basic policy towards Han Chinese immigration and cultivation in Mongolia remained negative, culminating in an order by the Qianlong emperor in 1748 that prohibited further cultivation in the region. The emperor decreed,

"Under the old Mongolian customs, its people would search for lands with water and grass for livestock breeding, unlike the people of the heartland who rely on tilling the fields. During the Kangxi years, the *jasaks* of Kharachin and other banners, because of the vastness of their lands, often enlisted farmers (from the heartland) to till their lands. These farmers would exit through *kouwai* 口外 (beyond Zhangjiakou) in spring to till the lands and would be sent back home in winter. As a consequence, the Mongols, desiring the profits incurred from rents, allowed the outsiders to stay, and the latter's number has reached tens of thousands by now. The Mongols gradually rented out their lands cheaply, resulting in the loss of pasturelands and that of their livelihood of subsistence."[105]

Apparently, the *jasaks* in question were more interested in boosting their income from renting out their land than protecting pasturelands for their subjects. The emperor therefore dispatched officials to the banners in question to arrange for redemption of the lands that had been rented out to Han Chinese farmers, and then repatriated the latter home. Similar prohibitions were repeatedly issued in subsequent reigns. However, history shows that the repatriation policy was not consistently executed, probably out of

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[104] Pozdneyev, *Mongolia and the Mongol*s, vol. 1, p. 37.

[105] *Da Qing lichao Gaozong shilu*, vol. 348, p. 799.

practical consideration. For example, in 1806, the Jiaqing emperor decreed,

"Over the past few years, refugees have continued to go there (Gorlos Banners) to open lands for cultivation, and their number has grown to over 7,000. If we expel all of them now, these unemployed people will lose their means of living immediately and end up in a miserable state. I therefore decide that they be permitted to remain there."[106]

With State connivance and inconsistent enforcement actions, the number of Han Chinese agricultural settlements, legal or otherwise, grew steadily in the Mongolian region. An indication of the proliferation of Chinese settlers was that, in 1791, the *jasak* of Gorlos petitioned the Qing government to legalize the status of the numerous Shandong and Zhili peasants who had already settled there. In 1799, the State had finally accepted what had by then become an accomplished fact by creating a sub-prefecture to administer the settlers under the civil jurisdiction.

As the Qianlong emperor rightly observed, the expansion of agricultural settlements was made at the expense of the grazing areas for the Mongols' livestock. For example, in the Josotu league of Inner Mongolia alone, the total area of land that had been leased to Han Chinese farmers for cultivation had increased from 36046.71 *qing* 頃[107] in 1760 to 40293.05 *qing* in 1813.[108] By the end of the nineteenth century, the primary economic form of most banners in Juu Uda and Josotu leagues had changed from animal husbandry to agriculture, half of the banners in the Jirem league were cultivated. In Chahar, Tumed and the two leagues of Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab, the role of agriculture also became increasingly important.[109]

Naturally, the reduction of pasturelands would substantially affect Mongolia's

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[106] *Da Qing lichao Renzong shilu* 大清歷朝(仁宗)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Jiaqing reign], vol. 164, p. 137.

[107] One *qing*=6.6667 hectares.

[108] Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, pp. 70-71.

[109] Quoted in Lan, *Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, pp. 56-57.

traditional nomadism. With Han Chinese farmers taking up the better grazing fields for cultivation, Mongolian herdsmen would be forced to move their animals to inferior pastures and their livelihood was thus affected. As a result, impoverished Mongols who could no longer make a living as herdsmen became tenant farmers, renting farmlands from their banner princes or from Han Chinese merchant landlords.

As will be discussed in Chapter 4, one of the important reforms of the late Qing *xinzheng* was the extensive opening of potential agrarian lands in the Mongolian region for Han Chinese settlers. This not only represented an official change to the earlier policy of protecting Mongolia from Han Chinese penetration, but also threatened to substantially change the nomadism of the region, and encroached upon the vested interest of many Mongolian landlords. As a consequence, the reform alienated many Mongols, and would eventually lead to uprisings in Inner Mongolia and the declaration of independence by Outer Mongolia.

Penetration of Han Chinese Trade

As noted in the previous chapter, Joseph Fletcher argues that many Mongols became pauperized in the nineteenth century under the Qing rule. In this connection, Sanjdorj argues that it was Chinese moneylending, spreading simultaneously with the penetration of Chinese trade in the region, which gripped the Mongolian economy and retarded the development of the region's productive force.[110]

For the nomadic Mongols, trade with neighboring China was quite indispensable as the latter was a source for flour, tobacco, tea, and handicraft products, all of which the Mongols could not produce by themselves. During the Ming and early Qing periods, Mongolian trade missions would seek permission from Chinese rulers to come down into China, either in the frontiers (known as *Biankouhushi* 邊口互市) or sometimes to

[110] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. xii.

Beijing (known as *Jingshihushi* 京師互市), to exchange their horses for Chinese agricultural and handicraft products. However, a different trading relation emerged thereafter, whereby the Mongols no longer brought their animals down into China but traded with Han Chinese traders, known as *Bianshang* 邊商 or *Lumengshang* 旅蒙商, who had traveled from China proper to Mongolia to conduct business.

The change first occurred in Inner Mongolia, following its subjugation by the Manchus in 1636. In order to win over the Inner Mongolian elites, the imperial court allowed Han Chinese traders to trade with Mongols at the border town of Zhangjiakou, or towns like Guihua, and Dolon Nor in Inner Mongolia since the early Qing period. For lack of source materials, it is impossible to determine exactly when similar change took place in Outer Mongolia. In this regard, I would subscribe to the views put forth by Bawden and Sanjdorj, who surmised that Han Chinese traders probably first entered Khalkha Mongolia in the wake of the Qing forces sent in 1696 by the Kangxi emperor to bring about the final defeat of Galdan.[111] This could be collaborated by an order issued by the Kangxi emperor, who said, "The traders who followed the army are indispensable….and should be allowed to trade (with the Mongols on the way)."[112]

During the early years, most of the Han Chinese traders were seasonal, and they traded around the bigger population centres in Mongolia, such as the monasteries and the Manchu army camps, before returning to the Chinese heartland. By the eighteenth century, the presence of Han Chinese merchants in Mongolia was so conspicuous that it started to attract official attention. For example, Sanjdorj reckoned that there were over 1,000 Han Chinese traders in Urga alone in the middle of the century.[113] In the towns of Guihua and Suiyuan in 1776, the number Han Chinese shops amounted to 140 and 80

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[111] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 95; Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 26.

[112] *Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu*, vol. 171, p. 851.

[113] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 34.

respectively.[114] Similar to its handling of Han Chinese farmers tilling on Mongolian lands, the state sought to manage and control the outflow of Han Chinese traders to Mongolia by means of, among others, a permit system.

The permit system was first implemented in Inner Mongolia before the turn of the eighteenth century and was extended to Outer Mongolia around 1720.[115] Under the system, a Han Chinese trader had to apply to the *Lifanyuan*, through the offices at Chahar, Dolon Nor, or Suiyuan, for a *piao* 票 (permit) before he could trade at designated places in Mongolia. The number of traders and hired hands (maximum ten men), the goods to be imported and their quantity (maximum 20 cart-loads), and their destinations were specified on the permits in Manchu, Han, and Mongolian languages. The import of certain items (such as cast-iron kettles, needles, scissors, knives, etc.) that the Mongols might convert into weapons was forbidden. Before a year was up, the traders had to leave Mongolia and return their permits to the issuing offices. If a trader obeyed the regulations, he could get a new permit and go to Mongolia again. If he was found to have violated any of the regulations, the permit would be rescinded and he would be punished.

The Han Chinese traders were under strict control once inside Mongolia. They were not allowed to marry Mongolian women. They could not stay overnight in Mongolian tents, or even make long visits during the day. They were not allowed to erect permanent buildings outside the trade town. When trading in the banners they were only allowed to live in a cloth tent, not a felt tent.

Obviously, the permit system was aimed at preventing Han Chinese traders from establishing close relationships inside Mongolia, or remained in the region for a long

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[114] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 03-587, 'Guanli GuiSui shangren zhe' 管理歸綏商人摺 [Memorial on the management of the traders of Guihua and Suiyuan], *Junjichulufuzouzhe* 軍機處錄副奏摺 [Records of Great State Council Memorials], 9 July 1776.

[115] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia,* p. 96.

time. However, there were so many opportunities for evasion that it had no lasting effect on the penetration of Han Chinese trade in Mongolia. As early as 1725, the first permanent Chinese shop was established in Urga, whilst periodic checks disclosed large numbers of illicit traders in the region. In 1792 there were, for instance, 214 permits due at Dolon Nor that had not been returned. Permits were specifically checked in the years from 1775 to 1781 and many Han Chinese expelled, but by 1800 a register of Han Chinese trading in Mongolia not only showed that they were there in large numbers—as many as two hundred in one banner—but that a high percentage had never bothered to get a permit at all. Ten out of twenty-seven in one banner were trading without permits, and so were thirty-three out of sixty-six shops.[116]

Similarly, the regulations forbidding mixed marriages were often evaded. In 1805, the general of Uliastai decreed that those traders who were to be expelled from Mongolia for trading without a permit and who were married might take their families with them if they wished. Otherwise, the families were to return to their original banners. From this it is perfectly clear that Mongolian wives and mixed children were involved, and that a blind eye was usually turned to the situation.[117]

Management of Han Chinese migrants

With the continuous inflow of Han Chinese farmers and traders, Chinese settlements began to grow in the Mongolian region, in particular in eastern Inner Mongolia. In the circumstances, it became increasingly necessary for the State to appoint officials at such spots to manage these Han Chinese migrants, who were different from the Mongols ethnically and culturally, and subject to a different judicial system from the latter. In 1719, in response to an enquiry from a Kharachin prince, the

[116] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia,* pp. 96-97.

[117] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia,* p. 98.

Lifanyuan, for the first time in Qing history, posted one *lishi siyuan* 理事司員 (executive) at each of the three Kharachin Banners and the two Tumed Banners, and they were tasked with managing the Han Chinese farmers and traders at those banners.[118] In addition, these *lishi siyuan* were also responsible for collecting and distributing levies and rents, and deciding disputes between Mongols and Han Chinese. Similar appointments of executives were made in Urga and other important towns in Outer Mongolia, such as Kyakhta and Uliastai in the 1720s. In 1723, the first *ting* 廳 (sub-prefecture), under the direct supervision of the state, was established in Jehol in eastern Inner Mongolia as an administrative jurisdiction for Han Chinese migrants. In the years that followed, other levels of administrative jurisdiction that prevailed in China proper, namely *fu* 府 (prefecture), *zhou* 州 (department) and *xian* 縣 (county) were also set up in Inner Mongolia. All told, the State had established three *fu*, one *zhou*, eleven *ting*, and eight *xian* in Inner Mongolia up to the eve of the *xinzhing* period.[119]

The above measures were small innovations introduced to meet practical needs of the time. However, as Chapter 4 will show, these inventions would evolve into major reform measures during the *xinzheng* period. And these measures also had serious implication upon the Qing governance of Mongolia. For one thing, these *lishi siyuan*, by their nature of duties, were open to bribery and corruption. As such, they were highly profitable and could be sold at high prices in Beijing, ranging from 5,000 to 200,000

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[118] Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 505-1-10, *Kalaqin youyiqi Zhasake yamen dangan* 喀喇沁右翼旗札薩克衙門檔案 [Kharachin Right Wing Banner Jasak's Office Archives], 16 April 1719.

[119] Oyungerel 烏云格日勒, "Qingmo neimenggu de difang jianzhi yu chouhua jiansheng 'shibian'," 清末內蒙古的地方建置與籌劃建省"實邊" [Local Construction and Planning of Provincialization in Inner Mongolia in Late Qing Dynasty] *China's Border land History and Geography Studies* 中國邊疆史地研究, 1 (1998), pp. 15-22; Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, p. 149.

taels of silver.[120] As a consequence, corruption was rampant in the Qing administration of Mongolia, thus causing serious dissatisfactions among the Mongols with the Qing rule. Moreover, the dual management system in Mongolian lands led to tussles between local officials of the State and Mongolian banner chiefs because each of them would shield the subjects under their respective jurisdiction, thereby "impeding the conduct of official business."[121] As Chapter 4 will show, the expansion of Chinese style administration in Mongolia during the *xinzheng* period further undermined the power bases of the Mongolian *jasaks* and princes, and led to the fragmentation of the affected leagues' and banners' territories.

Han Chinese Moneylending and Mongolian Poverty

From the above discussion, it is clear that the Qing court's control measures failed to restrict and control the penetration of Han Chinese trade into the region. As a consequence, Han Chinese trade and moneylending spread from the trading towns to the banners in the late eighteenth century. In this regard, Sanjdorj argued that it was the protection, encouragement and participation of Manchu high-ranking officials and Mongol feudal lords (who had investments in the stock of Chinese shops or were in debt to Chinese moneylenders) that greatly developed and strengthened Chinese moneylending in Mongolia.[122]

Moneylending, which was prevalent in nineteenth century Mongolia, was already known in the eighteenth century. The flourishing of moneylending was, in part, resultant from the standard business practice between the Mongols and Han Chinese traders, i.e. credit trading, that had existed since the seventeenth century. The Mongols sold their

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[120] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 36.

[121] Kungang et al. comp, *Qinding Da Qing huidian shili*, vol. 976, "Lifanyuan" 理藩院 [Ministry Ruling the Outer Provinces], "Sheguan" 設官 [Establishment of Bureaucracy], p. 424.

[122] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 42.

livestock and by-products (e.g. meat, wool, and furs) to Han Chinese traders in exchange for necessities (such as flour, grain, and clothing, etc.) and other manufactured goods. However, the supply of their livestock and products were seasonally-fluctuating and the Mongols were usually keen to unload their goods as quickly as possible, whereas their demands for necessities were regular and immediate. As a result, the Mongols often had to buy their necessities first on credit and then pay back later in raw materials. However, more often than not, a Mongol who had thus got into debt used most of the raw materials he produced to pay his old debts and had no choice but to incur a new debt in order to buy the necessities of life. As the *jiangjun* of Uliastai Tsevdenjav noted in a letter to the *Lifanyuan* in 1757,

"The (Han Chinese) traders sold on credits to the Mongols and the Mongols took advantage of not having to pay ready cash and livestock, and disregarded the high prices. Later on, when the debtors collected their debts, the Mongols had to pay with all their property…"[123]

Yet, it was the Mongols' heavy obligation to pay taxes, or to find money to commute their corvées that involved them most heavily in debt. On the face of it, the Manchus did not demand heavy taxes from the Mongols. Theoretically, the rate of taxes, which were firstly paid in kind but later in silver, was not high and most of what was extracted from the Mongols was destined for expenses incurred in supporting the Manchu administration in Mongolia. However, the taxes and corvées, if commuted, cost far more than their true rate and thus became heavy and burdensome on the Mongols, as well as a drag on Mongolia's economic development. For example, one of the taxes to be levied was the "Nine Whites" that the four khans and the Khutuktu of Outer Mongolia had to present to the emperor annually. In reality, the actual tribute consisted

[123] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, pp. 44-45.

of much more than the notional nine animals since they had to offer groups of animals, together with all sorts of precious gifts and rarities (silver Buddhas, scriptures written in gold, etc.). What was more burdensome than the gifts themselves was the expense of getting the tribute missions to Beijing, maintaining them there and bribing the officialdom, which could run up to half a million *taels* of silver and the services of 1,500 men.[124]

Corvées included all types of official duties the Mongols had to perform for the Manchu administration in Mongolia, such as providing the Manchu army with provisions and transport for its goods and its soldiers, manning the postal relay stations and financing the frontier watch posts, and providing the expenses of the Manchus officers in Mongolia. These corvées, whose number increased and scope extended over time, became very heavy demands on Mongolia's resources. According to one estimate, the main imperial relays and the services within each individual banner accounted for as many as three million head of animals in a year.[125] The Mongols, who were often short of ready cash, horses, livestock and provisions for executing such duties, had to turn to the Han Chinese traders for assistance as the latter operated an elementary banking system in the region. On occasions, competitions among Han Chinese traders for Mongolian clients would lead to the former making minor concessions (e.g. reduction of goods prices relative to other shops or slight extension of interest-free periods of loans, etc.) to the latter. For example, a relay office of the Tiisiyetii Khan *aimag* petitioned the league chief in 1803 for permission to sever its clientship with the Han Chinese trader Dashengkui 大盛魁 one of the most important Chinese trading firms

[124] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 102.

[125] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 103.

with Outer Mongolia, in favour of another Chinese shop Badar because of the goods prices differential between the two shops:

"When in *aimag* settlements we were unable to make deliveries on time to the army bases in Uliastai, we bought the extra, urgently-needed horses, camels and other items from Dashengkui in accordance with the "clientship" contract. But we found that their weights were unjust, and too often they rejected the silver as being unpure. As for charging interest, they did not even delay one day but wanted to start charging immediately. Therefore, we talked with the Chinese Vanchin and Banyandorj of the shop Badar, of which we were once 'clients', about establishing a new 'clientship'…We will wait for your instructions on whether or not we may establish a 'clientship' with Badar."[126]

According to Manchu laws and regulations, the interest on loans could not exceed 3 per cent per month or 36 per cent annually, and that it could not in total exceed the original loan. Consequently, the duration of loan repayment should not exceed three years. If a debtor, either private or official, could not pay a debt within three years, the interest would be added to the original debt, the total would become a new debt and the repayment period would be extended. If the debtor could not repay during this extended period, the interest would again be added to the original debt to be rolled over into another new debt agreement, with the repayment period extended. Thus, year after year the interest on one debt multiplied, and the interest became a loan which also drew interest. If one could not pay off a debt within a given time, the interest on the interest multiplied and became almost impossible to repay. For example, in 1810, a Mongolian prince Tserennamjil took a loan of 600 *taels* of silver at 36 per cent interest per year. After a year, his loan plus interest totaled 816 *taels*, of which he paid 290 *taels* and left

[126] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 53.

526 owning. By 1816, with the growth of interest, these 526 *taels* had become 1,871.[127]

Therefore, no Mongolian debtors, whether private or official, were able to pay their debts on time and consequently became endless debtors to the Han Chinese traders by taking new loans when their debts were still unpaid. Scattered records give us a glimpse of the magnitude of private debts in Qing Mongolia: In 1802, the private debts of a certain banner in the Tiisiyetii Khanate amounted to three horses, 219 cows, 36 sheep and goats, 828 squirrel furs, 5,689 *qian* (equal to 5 grams) of grain, 509 *qian* of flour, 21,272 bricks of tea, and 165 pieces of raw hide.[128] Similarly, official debts also grew dramatically during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1757, the outstanding official debts of the four khanates in Outer Mongolia reached 150,000 *taels* of silver; by 1775, it had reached 200,000 *taels*. In 1855, the official debt of Tiisiyetii Khanate alone was 727,000; in 1884, Tiisiyetii Khanate and Sechen Khanate each had debts of over 960,000 *tael*s, whilst the debts of Sayin Noyan Khanate amounted to 300,000 *taels*.[129] In 1911, the average debt for each banner was 11 million *taels*. By 1912, Dashengkui took away 500,000 sheep and 70,000 horses from Outer Mongolia yearly as interest alone.[130] No wonder that Mongolian scholars like Sanjdorj consider that Chinese trade and moneylending not only ruined the Mongols' subsistence economy, but also slowed down the development of the region's productive force.

While many Mongolian noblemen were in debt to Han Chinese traders, it was the commoners who bore the blunt of the financial burdens. Since the subjugation of Mongolia to the Manchus, the commoners, in addition to traditional service and taxes owed to their lords, had to support their lords' frequent and expensive trips to Beijing and Chengde, and finance their extravagant lifestyle in the Capital, etc. Furthermore, it

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[127] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 49.

[128] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 80.

[129] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 58.

[130] Lan, *Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, p. 53.

was also commonplace that many noblemen exacted illegally from their subjects and asked the latter to pay their private debts. For example, one *jasak* of Tiisiyetii Khanate took one sheep in ten (the official rate was one sheep in twenty annually) from the people of his banner, and levied taxes in tea on herds smaller than this. In three years at the beginning of the nineteenth century, his exaction in kind could be calculated at over 6,700 *taels* of silver, while he also exacted over 21,000 *taels* to pay his private debts to the Chinese shops.[131] Many commoners were impoverished as a result and were led to vagrancy since they were unable to pay taxes or even make a living in the banner territories. No doubt, the hefty financial burdens imposed the Mongolian commoners led to their resentments against Han Chinese traders, their Mongolian lords, and finally the Manchu rule.

Growth of Monastic Establishment and Wealth

Douglas Carruthers, who journeyed to Mongolia in 1910, opined that the influence of Lamaism was, among others, the chief cause of the poverty-stricken state of the Mongolian nomad tribes.[132] Similarly, Bawden argued, rather provocatively, that Lamaism, morally and materially, the curse of Mongolia.[133] In the following paragraphs, I will concentrate on the material impact of the growth of Lamaism during the nineteenth century upon Mongolian economy and society.

As noted in Chapter 1, the influence of Lamaism grew rapidly under Qing patronage. Increase in the number of monasteries aside, the growth was also manifest in the lama population. Wu Luzhen, who joined Prince Su's entourage during the latter's investigation trip to Eastern Inner Mongolia in 1906, observed,

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[131] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 150.

[132] Douglas Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia: A Record of Travel and Exploration in North-West Mongolia and Dzungaria*, 1914 (reprinted New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1994), p. 314.

[133] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 160.

"Lamaism was prosperous. There are monasteries in every banner. Every banner has 4-5 monasteries, and countless temples. The number of lamas (in different temples) varies, ranging from around 700 on the high side, to some 400 on the low side. Generally speaking, there are over 1,000 lamas in each banner, or one quarter of its male population."[134] On the number of lamas, James Gilmour, a Scottish missionary who spent 12 years in Mongolia during the nineteenth century, was inclined to think that 60 % of the Mongolian male population was quite a moderate estimate.[135] In the monastery of Amur-Bayasqulangtu in Khalkha Mongolia alone, Pozdneyev reckoned that the total number of lamas stood at two thousand or more.[136] While all the above figures were based on personal impression and hence lacked any scientific basis, it was nevertheless beyond doubt that the lama population in Mongolia was huge and it continued to grow so that, in 1918, there were 84,268 lamas and novices out of 207,227 males in the four khanates of Outer Mongolia, or nearly 41% of the male population.[137] Though some scholars such as Bawden would argue that the monasteries in nineteenth century Mongolia offered the only alternative way of life to absorb the surplus manpower no longer needed in the region's cattle-rearing economy,[138] that such a large proportion of the male population had been withdrawn from productive labor was undoubtedly a drag on the region's economy.

In Qing Mongolia, every family would try to send one of its sons into a monastery, thus providing a constant source for lamas. This could be ascribed to the Mongols' piety as well as their poverty (since the material conditions for lamas were generally better

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[134] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 175.

[135] Gilmour, *Among the Mongols*, pp. 223-224.

[136] Pozdneyev, *Mongolia and the Mongol*s, vol. 1, p. 23.

[137] I. M. Maiskii, *Mongolia on the Eve of the Revolution* (Moscow: Academy of Science of the USSR. Institute for Eastern studies, 1959), pp. 290-291, quoted in Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911*, p. 42.

[138] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 169.

than for laymen). Moreover, a monastery was the only place where a commoner could receive education and, given the very nature of the church as a celibate society, it provided a certain measure of social mobility for talented young men. Lastly, as Wu Luzhen noted, "once a man was registered as a lama, he would be exempted from corvées (and taxes)."[139] As a result of these factors, the number of lamas continued to grow steadily.

Exemption from state taxes and corvées aside, a lama was also eligible to receive stipends from the state. The Qing court stipulated that all registered lamas would receive stipends from the local banners regularly. However, there was great disparity in the value of the stipend that a lama would receive, subject not only to his rank in the monastic hierarchy but also to the financial condition of the banner from which he came. For instance, according to the record of the Koke Sume of Dolon Nor in 1878, the stipends paid to the lamas varied from sixty-two *taels* to thirty-four *taels* annually.[140] The difference continued to widen throughout the nineteenth century and, in the end, low-ranking monks often found that they could not survive on what they received, and had to rely on family support (if the monastery he served was close to his home) or resort to begging or theft to stay alive.

The Lamaist monasteries' property, most of which came from donations from noblemen and commoners alike, mainly consisted of *shabinar* or *shabis*, animals and land. S*habis* were mainly donated to a monastery by Mongolian noblemen. Like the lamas, *shabis* would be exempted from most state taxes and corvées. Similarly, the number of *shabis* increased steadily. In Outer Mongolia, the total number of *shabis* increased from 30,000 in 1750 to 50,000 in 1810, to 70,000 in 1862, and to about

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[139] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 175.

[140] Tang Xiaofang 湯曉方, "Lun jindai Menggu diqu lamajiao de simiao jingji," 論近代蒙古地區喇嘛教的寺廟經濟 [A Discussion on the Lamaist Monastic Economy in Modern Mongolian Region] *Inner Mongolia Social Sciences* 內蒙古社會科學 1 (1987), p. 58.

100,000 in 1911.[141]

Through labor and taxation the *shabis* provided the economic base of the church. They herded the monastery cattle and provided various regular services for the church, such as the repair of temples, financing religious services, etc. Apart from regular obligations, the *shabis* had to cope with the many periodic demands that were made on them, such as shouldering the greater part of the cost of the obsequies of a deceased Khutuktu, and that of the escort of a new Khutuktu from Tibet to Urga, etc.[142] The growth of these services became a heavy burden on the *shabis*. As far back as 1785, there were nearly 4,000 *shabi*-families without cattle of their own, amounting to almost 22 thousand individuals.[143] Performing services aside, the affluent *shabis* were also required to pay direct taxes to the church. With the sharp rise in taxation towards the end of the nineteenth century and its inflated computation in terms of silver, the burden on the *shabis* was no lighter than the rest of the commoners.

Animals constituted another important component of the church's property. Since the church was exempted from taxation, the number of the church's animals increased steadily though they were subject to the same natural hazards and calamities as those of the ordinary people. For instance, in 1918 in Outer Mongolia, the number of animals owned by the monasteries was as follows:

	Horses	Camels	Cattle	Sheep/Goats
Total	1,150,511	228,640	1,078,407	7,188,005
Monastery-owned (%)	190,383 (16.5)	32,537 (14.2)	178,944 (16.6)	1,418,431 (19.7)

[141] I. Ia. Zlatkin, *Studies of a New and Newer History of Mongolia* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1957), p. 126, quoted in Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911*, p. 44.

[142] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, pp. 161-162.

[143] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 161.

(Source: Maiskii, *Mongolia on the Eve of the Revolution*, pp. 302-303)[144]

The above figures did not include the large number of herds owned by the high lamas personally. In 1918, while the average number of animals owned by one monastery or temple was 662, it was 2370.7 for the household of a high lama, and only 60 for a commoner household.[145]

Lands provided the monasteries with another source of revenue. According to Wu Luzhen's report, "(The monasteries) have purchased plenty of lands near the (Chinese) border. The temples in the banners of Horqin and Aohan own lands as far as the banners of Jasaghtu and Gorlos. Uncultivated areas are turned to pasturelands for profits."[146] As for arable lands, the monasteries would either rent them out to Chinese farmers or cultivate them with their own *shabis*.

Following the penetration of Han Chinese trade and development of commerce into Mongolia, the monasteries became involved in various commercial activities (such as trading in livestock, renting out farmlands and pasturelands, running caravans, etc.) and even engaged in usurious lending. With the transition to a money economy in the nineteenth century, usury became a much more important feature of the monasteries' financial activities. Surviving accounts show that Urga was engaging officially in usury by the end of the eighteenth century. For instance, a monastery fund in Urga collected 9,556 bricks of tea as interest alone on items sold earlier on credit, and in 1882 it collected 12,665 bricks.[147] During the early period, a comparatively modest rate of interest was being charged: in 1799, for instance, a rate of one per cent per month on a

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[144] Maiskii, *Mongolia on the Eve of the Revolution*, pp. 302-303, quoted in Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911*, p. 44.

[145] Maiskii, *Mongolia on the Eve of the Revolution*, p. 303, quoted in Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911*, p. 44.

[146] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 174.

[147] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 100.

loan of one thousand *taels*. The rates rose as silver became more sought after, as much as one hundred per cent per annum, and in some cases a rate of two hundred per cent.[148]

Conclusion

The early Qing policy towards Mongolia was basically conservative, in that the Court not only discouraged the Mongols from intermingling with the Chinese from the heartland, but it also strove to maintain the Mongolian economy and society intact. One of the examples was the so-called Gold Watch-posts that were set up within Mongolia to prevent the exploitation of the region's rich mineral resources. However, as the above discussion shows, the policy failed to achieve its goals. Instead, we witness economic and social decay of Mongolia during the nineteenth century, mainly as a result of oppressive taxation, Chinese settlement, shrinkage of pasturelands, unpayable debts and abuses of banner princes' authority.

The following conversation between the *tuslagch* (second-ranking official) of the Tserendondov banner and Pozdneyev vividly describes the financial burdens of a Mongolian banner under Qing rule in the nineteenth century:

"Our *khushuu* (banner) now has to supply over 1,000 *taels* of silver, and goods for military provisions and other needs worth 13,000 bricks of tea, to the regular rotation service office attached to the office of the chief of the *aimag* (tribe). We also have to supply eight geldings and one camel for official transport for the office of the league and the office of the Imperial Resident in Khuree (Urga). People from our *khushuu* also serve at the twenty Khalkha relay stations. Our *khushuu* supplies 100 soldiers attached to the Khiagt (Kyakhta) judge's office. Our *khushuu* has actually borrowed over 10,000 *taels* of silver with interest for official use from over seventy Chinese traders such as Tumenjargal, Buyant, Ta Sheng-k'uei (Dashengkui), Puntsag, and Dash from Peking

[148] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, pp. 163-164.

(Beijing), Khuree (Urga), Uliasutai (Uliastai), and Khiagt (Kyakhta), and from some Mongols as well. Our *khushuu* also borrowed over 10,000 *taels* of silver from other *khushuus* in this *aimag* for official use. Even if we sell the clothes off our backs and go naked, we shall never be able to pay all the debts and official taxes."[149]

The conversation is quoted at some length as it shows the real condition of a banner under onerous state taxation and corvées. Besides, the general indebtedness of the Mongols to foreign traders allowed the latter to take enormous quantities of wealth, mainly livestock and by-products, out of Mongolia annually. According to one official document, nine Chinese shops alone took 270,000 sheep, 6,700 horses, 1,000 cows, and 6,000 camels, as well as wool and furs from Mongolia. Shishmarev, the Russian consul in Urga, estimated that Chinese traders took about 25,000 horses, 10,000 cows and 250,000 sheep from the area of Urga alone every year.[150] Since livestock was the main source of wealth of Mongolia, the removal of large quantities of livestock naturally ruined the Mongols' livelihood and retarded the growth of the region's economy.

It was the ordinary people, namely the commoners, *shabis* and low-ranking lamas, who were most affected by the deterioration of social and economic conditions. For one thing, there was little they could do to protect themselves against the exorbitant taxation, levies and exactions imposed by banner princes or the monasteries. Besides, they were ultimately made responsible for the arduous burden of debts, whether it was their personal debts, the personal debts of their lords, or official debts incurred on behalf of the banner as a whole. By 1855, it was calculated that there were 32,000 paupers in Tiisiyetii Khan *aimag*, with some five thousand people on the verge of death by starvation, out of a total population not much over half a million in Mongolia. By 1884 or 1885 the number of paupers in Tiisiyetii Khan *aimag* and Sechen Khan *aimag*

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[149] Pozdneyev, *Mongolia and the Mongol*s, vol. 1, pp. 19-20.

[150] Sanjdorj, *Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia*, p. 91.

together had risen to nearly 71,000. In 1896 the office of one banner in Sechen Khan *aimag* reported to the League that people were so destitute, *taijis* and commoners alike, that they had nothing to live on, let alone anything with which to pay their taxes, debt-interest, and corvée-substitute.[151] Those unable to subsist in the banners or the monasteries took flight to the growing trade-monastery-garrison centres, such as the frontier cities of Inner Mongolia, as well as Urga, Uliastai, Kobdo, and Kyakhta in Outer Mongolia, where they became a kind of semi-criminal working class who lived by primitive skilled or unskilled labour, prostitution, begging, and robbery.

As a consequence, popular resentment against Chinese traders and settlers began to emerge. Such sentiment sometimes boiled over, as in Outer Mongolia in 1829 and 1887, when lamas at temple dances beat up Chinese spectators and soldiers. Sentiments against Qing rule and greedy Mongolian noblemen also boiled over in the late nineteenth century. Some primary sources released in the 1970s point to the occurrence of insurrections in Inner Mongolia in 1861, 1864, 1870, 1890, 1899 and 1901.[152] However, as these uprisings were short-lived and localized, they failed to form a nationwide movement against the Qing rule—evidence of the success of the Manchus' divide-and-rule policy.

For historical and geographical reasons, Inner Mongolia's relationship with the Manchu ruling house and China was closer than that of Outer Mongolia. Qing control in Inner Mongolia was tighter than that in Outer Mongolia. Penetration of Han Chinese influence in Inner Mongolia advanced more quickly than was the case north of the Gobi. All these had implications upon the developments in the two areas during the nineteenth and early twentieth century Mongolian history, leading to the suggestion that

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[151] Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, pp. 142-143.

[152] Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), p. 212.

it was Inner Mongolia that showed the way and that it was Outer Mongolia that followed. This pattern will be examined more closely in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

In the following chapter, I will briefly survey the Russian presence in Mongolia since the early seventeenth century, and how it evolved into a threat to the Qing empire's northern border in the nineteenth century, thereby affecting the implementation of *xinzheng* in the Mongolian region.

Chapter 3

Growing Russian Presence in Mongolia

This chapter will examine the growing Russian presence in Mongolia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the security threat the Russian presence posed to Qing China. Admittedly, Russia was not the only foreign power that sought to expand its influence in the areas north of the Great Wall. However, only Russia was closely involved in the independence movement of Outer Mongolia in 1911. As such, this chapter will focus on the Russian activities in the region.

Russian extension to Mongolia before Mid-nineteenth Century

From the late sixteenth century onwards, Tsarist Russia began to extend eastward to Siberia, and the expansion eventually brought it into contact with Mongolia and China. As early as 1604, Russian settlers came into contact with the Khalkha Mongols for the first time.[153] Judging from the debate among Outer Mongolian princes and noblemen over who they should turn to for protection—the Russians or the Manchus—in the face of the Zunghars invasion in 1688, I would argue that Russia was, at least in the minds of some Mongolian leaders, an effective counterweight to the Manchus, especially on occasions when they ran into trouble with the latter.

Thanks to its geographical location wedged between the Qing and Russian empires and the special role occupied by the Mongolian noblemen in the Manchu regime, Mongolia had played an indispensable role in the Qing-Russian relationship before the mid-nineteenth century. Before direct contact was established between Tsarist Russia

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[153] Bayilduyci, "Yibasiling nian zhiqian menggu zai zhonge guanxi zhongde diwei he zuoyong," 1840年之前蒙古在中俄關係中的地位和作用 [The Role and Function of Mongolia in Sino-Russian Relations before 1840], in Bayilduyci, *Chengjisihan de yi chan*, p. 111.

and Qing China, Mongolia was Russia's principal source of information about China. Mongolian noblemen had played an important role in the Qing-Russian negotiations of the Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1727), which delimited the boundaries of the two countries and regulated their cross-border trade.

Russian Presence in Mongolia during Mid-nineteenth Century

The relations between Qing China and Tsarist Russia during the 150 years preceding the signing of the Treaty of Aigun were characterized by stability and relative harmony. However, as a result of the signing of the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Beijing (1860), and Tarbagatai (1864), Russia had acquired over 665,000 square miles of land from China, mainly in Manchuria and northwestern Xinjiang. What had prompted Russia to take such expansionist actions in northern Asia during the mid-nineteenth century was Qing China's defeat by Britain in the First Opium War in 1840-1842 and the consequential loss of Russian overland trade with China to maritime trade dominated by Britain, as well as Russia's growing concern about a possible encirclement by Britain of its vulnerable Asian frontiers. Beset by internal rebellions, Qing China was not in a position to resist Russian actions, and its weakness presented the Russian empire opportunities to secure vast territories for itself.[154]

Throughout the nineteenth century, Mongolia was basically a side-issue for Russia since its main object in the region at the time was Manchuria.[155] Yet, Russian representatives in Mongolia continued to make attempts to instigate Mongolian princes and noblemen to shift their allegiance from Beijing to Moscow. For instance, in 1852, Governor General Muraviev of Eastern Siberia dispatched his agent Zenovick to

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[154] S. C. M. Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 28- 29.

[155] Gerard M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1949), p. 46.

persuade some Mongolian noblemen to seek protection from Moscow on the excuse of the imminent collapse of the Qing dynasty amid the Taiping Rebellion. In 1854, Muraviev suggested that the Tsar should proclaim Mongolia a Russian Protectorate, on the ground that:

"In case the Manchu dynasty fell and decided to retreat into its homeland, we should act at once to take steps to prevent a new Chinese government in Peking (Beijing) from extending its authority over Mongolia, which in such an event could be proclaimed our protectorate."[156]

However, Muraviev's plans were not adopted by the Russian government, which considered it more appropriate to win the understandings of the Khutuktu and maintain a friendly bond with the important Mongolian noblemen.[157] This showed that, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Tsarist Russia's policy towards Mongolia was to use it as a "buffer zone" against China, rather than absorbing it into the Russian empire.

Nevertheless, Russian diplomats continued to stir up trouble in Mongolia, as evidenced by the comment made by the *amban* of Urga Zhang Tingyue 張廷岳 on the alleged collusion of the Russian consulate (set up in 1861) with local bandits, "The Russians' trick is to cause trouble at every opportunity, taking advantage by exploiting other people."[158]

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[156] Quoted in Robert A. Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900-1978* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979), pp. 6-7.

[157] A. Popov, "Tsarskaia Rossiia I Mongoliia v 1913-1914 gg," ("Tsarist Russia and Mongolia 1913-1914,") Introduction, in *K.A.* (Moscow-Leningrad, XXXVII, 1929), 7, quoted in Peter Sheng-ha Tang, *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959), p. 287.

[158] National Palace Museum (Taipei), 102347, 'Zoubao zi eguo zai kulun sheli lingshi yilai lingshi qingxing' 奏報自俄國在庫倫設立領事以來領事情形 [Memorial on the Russian Consul's Activities since Russia Set up its Consulate in Urga], *Junjichulufuzouzhe* 軍機處錄副奏摺[Records

Zhang's view was later echoed by many Chinese politicians and scholars, who invariably blamed Russia for inciting Outer Mongols to declare independence in 1911. However, according to contemporary Russian sources, the Khalkhas had long harbored resentment against the Manchu rule and Han Chinese exploitation, and their independence movement was chiefly the outcome of their grievances, whilst Russian instigation only played a secondary role. As Yakov Shishmarev, a Russian diplomat who spent some 50 years of his life in Mongolia, noted in 1885:

"The Mongols remember their history. They have not forgotten the struggle that they had led for centuries against the Chinese and for their independence experience. The Mongols do not like to see themselves oppressed. Moreover, the Manchu authorities' arrogant attitude towards Mongols and the latter oppression by Chinese officials and merchants become intolerable for the Mongols and strengthen their resolution towards independence."[159] Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that, as early as 1895, the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu sent his personal envoy Da Lama Badamdorj to St. Petersburg secretly to seek Russian assistance to free Mongolia from the Manchu yoke, and Da Lama Badamdorj presented the following requests to the Tsar's agent:

a) Mongolia, from ancient times up to the period of Enh Amogalan (Kangxi emperor) had had its own territory and managed its own affairs. Accordingly, it was now time to declare independence of the Qing state and (for Mongols) to set up its own state. If there were a rising for that purpose, would Russia provide aid?[160]

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of Great State Council Memorials], 4 Aug. 1870.

[159] Quoted in Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu*, p. 2.

[160] In his study on the influence of the search for ethnic roots in Ming and Qing Fuzhou, Michael Szonyi argues that kinship practice was, rather than the simple implementation of a set of unchanging principles or rules made explicit in the neo-Confucian canonical texts, a form of strategic practice in which resources both material and symbolic were accumulated and deployed in pursuit of diverse interests. (*Practicing Kinship: Lineage and Descent in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.:

b) If at the time the Qing troops should invade, would (Russia) provide arms and, if Mongol strength were inadequate, send troops to the aid (of Mongols)?

c) Would Russia tell the Manchu state that it was proper for Mongolia to become an independent state, and get prompt agreement to this? and

d) May we be allowed to rule the whole of the ancient Mongol territory, making the White Wall (Great Wall) stand as the frontier of Mongol territory?[161]

I listed the Mongols' requests of this unsuccessful mission at some length because they show that the Khalkhas' ambitions, especially those relating to their independence and territory, were quite consistent with their requests submitted to Russia in July 1911. In other words, the Khalkhas' quest for independence was not triggered by the Qing court's *xinzheng*, and the latter merely acted as a catalyst for the independence movement.

Due to Moscow's cautious approach towards Mongolia, the country's interest towards the region during the nineteenth century was basically restricted to economic and trading issues. At the end of the nineteenth century, Russia started to require special railway rights in Mongolia and Manchuria. In June 1896, Russia obtained from China the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway linking Russia and Manchuria, thus enabling it to establish control in North Asia. By a diplomatic note exchanged between Russia and Britain in April 1899, Russia obtained a British promise to refrain from competing for railway concessions in the regions north of the Great Wall, and Russia in return agreed not to interfere with British interests in the Yangtze basin. In June of the same year, Russia secured from China an agreement that "if railroads are in future built from Peking (Beijing) to the north or to the northeast towards the Russian frontier,"

Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 197) Similarly, the Khalkhas' search for their ethnic roots before the subjugation by Kangxi, it is argued, was another form of strategic practice in which they sought to deploy social and religious resources in pursuit of their own interests.

[161] Quoted in Baabar, *From world power to Soviet satellite*, p. 117.

China, if not built them itself, would reserve the right of construction for the Russian Government or a Russian syndicate.[162] In other words, Russia sought to turn the part of China north of the Great Wall into its sphere of influence. Also, Russia's special railway rights in Mongolia would handicap the Qing government's plan to develop the railroad network in Mongolia during the *xinzheng* decade.

In addition, the Russo-Chinese Bank was closely concerned with the foundation of a syndicate, with a capital of 500,000 rubles, for research into the mining resources in China. The syndicate, in its turn, created in early 1900 a limited company Mongolor, with a capital of three million rubles, to exploit the concessions for mining gold in the territories of Tiisiyetii Khanate and Sechen Khanate. As Chapter 4 will show, the Mongolor was a successful example of mining enterprises in late Qing as it had generated much needed revenue for the cash-strapped government.

Nevertheless, Russian trade in Mongolia during the second half of the nineteenth century led a hopeless existence due to lack of capital.[163] For one thing, the Russian traders were small merchants from Siberian towns, and were no match for the Chinese merchants who had established themselves in Mongolia long before their arrival. The Chinese merchants were numerically superior to their Russian counterparts—for six Russian shops there were as many as seventy-four Chinese.[164] Moreover, the Russian cloth was no match for the American and English cloth traded by Chinese merchants in terms of price and popularity. As a consequence, the nature of Russian trade in Mongolia did not appear impressive in the second half of the 19th century.[165]

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[162] John V. A. MacMurray ed., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1894-1919* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), I, 204, 207-208.

[163] Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*, p. 50.

[164] Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*, p. 52.

[165] Tang, *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia*, p. 288.

Sino-Russian Rivalry in Mongolia

Russia's continued expansion into Manchuria brought her into direct conflict with Japan. The rival ambitions of these two countries over Manchuria and Korea finally led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, resulting in the humiliating defeat of Russia and the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in the following year. By this treaty, Russia recognized Korea as part of Japan's sphere of influence and agreed to evacuate Manchuria.

In 1907 and 1910, Russia and Japan signed two pairs of treaty respectively, each composing of one public treaty and one secret treaty. The public treaties confirmed, among other things, the territorial integrity of China. However, the secret treaties divided Manchuria and Mongolia into two spheres of interest, with Russia in the north and Japan in the south. Outer Mongolia thus fell into Russia's sphere.

Following the loss of Manchuria, the Russian Government started to focus its attention on Mongolia. On 29 January 1905, Count I.I. Ignatiev sent the following dispatch to the Tsar:

"Mongolia is becoming a key in our policy towards Inner China, Tibet, Hymalyan Mountains, India and Central Asia. The situation in Mongolia requires that we pay a special attention to every development in this neighboring land linked to Russia through historical, political and economic interests. The issue of Mongolia is of a special importance for us despite the war with Japan. There should be no other option for Mongolia except becoming an autonomy and a buffer zone between Russia and China. She is certain to become in future a platform against China and a sphere of Russian interest."[166]

As subsequent events show, the above view constituted the basis for the Russian policy towards Mongolia. In line with this view, Russian politicians immediately began

[166] Quoted in Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu*, p. 3.

a determined campaign to solve the "Mongolian question"; "official circles, representatives of commerce and industry, the press, various societies, all set to work"[167] on a new programme that would compensate for the Port Arthur-Mukden failures.

A Russian consulate was opened at Uliastai in 1905 and another at Kobdo in 1911. Large Russian companies started to see opportunities in doing business in Mongolia since 1908. In the Ministry of Trade and Industry, a special Departmental Committee was established in 1909 to collect information on the Mongolian market.[168] In 1910, a committee was set up in Irkutsk to strengthen and boost trade with Mongolia. There was a scheme afoot to connect Mongolia with the Trans-Siberian Railway.[169] Finally, a number of trade voyages were dispatched for Mongolia. All of the above activities, while apparently commercial, could not obscure the political interest of the Russian empire. Members of the voyages advocated the establishment of a Russian commercial bank in Mongolia, in part to aid the Russian merchants but also to "compete" with the Chinese credit system then in force all over Mongolia.[170] According to a Russian estimate, in the year of 1907, the Russian commodities exported to Mongolia via Kyakhta were estimated at 5,000,000 rubles, and those via *Maimaicheng* 買賣城 (known as Altanbulag today) amounted to 3,253,500 rubles, and most of the pelage processed by the most renowned tannery in Russia was imported from Mongolia.[171]

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[167] I. Maiskii, *Sovremennaia Mongoliia* (*Contemporary Mongolia*) (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 253, quoted in Tang, *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia*, p. 288.

[168] Popov, "Tsarskaia Rossiia I Mongoliia v 1913-1914 gg," ("Tsarist Russia and Mongolia 1913-1914,"), II, quoted in Tang, *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia,* p. 288.

[169] Maiskii, *Sovremennaia Mongoliia* (*Contemporary Mongolia*), p. 253, quoted in Tang, *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia*, p. 288.

[170] Popov, "Tsarskaia Rossiia I Mongoliia v 1913-1914 gg," ("Tsarist Russia and Mongolia 1913-1914,"), II, quoted in Tang, *Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia*, p. 288.

[171] Anonymous 闕名, "EMeng Maoyi Zuijin zhi Qingkuang," 俄蒙貿易最近之情況 [The latest development of Russo-Mongolian Trade], in *Minguo jingshi Wenbian* 民國經世文編 [A Collection

Diplomatically, the Russians continued to cultivate the friendly bond with the Khutuktu and important Mongolian noblemen. In a confidential telegram to Tsar Nicholas II, Russian privy counselor Lessar wrote in January 1905,

"There are no signs that the Mongols are being attracted and becoming loyal to any of the sides (Russia or China). To attract the Mongols it is desirable to…. establish ties with Mongol princes and offer them presents, while giving them time to think over…"[172]

For example, a Russian official presented the Khutuktu (who was fond of Western toys, photograph, and motor cars) with a motor car, and brought it to Urga at vast expenditure of effort and money despite the fact that there were no roads in the city.[173] In addition, the Russians also built for Khalkha princes and nobility Russian style houses, and taught them how to buy and use machines for cheese-making. They also built a Russian hospital at Urga which treated no less than 6,000 Mongols every year.[174] In short, Russia tried every effort to win over the different levels of the Mongolian community.

Conclusion

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Mongolia was an international backwater functioning mainly as an intermediary between its two giant neighbors: the Qing and Russian empires. In the second half of the nineteenth century, an ever changing balance of power between the two empires not only had re-drawn their mutual boundaries in

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of Works on Statecraft of the Republican China] (Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1965), vol. 21, pp. 2720, 2722-2723.

[172] Quoted in Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu*, p. 3.

[173] Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China*, p. 278.

[174] Chen Chongzu 陳崇祖, *Wai Meng jinshi shi* 外蒙近世史 [Recent History of Outer Mongolia], 1922 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1965), pp. 18-19.

Russia's favor, but had also turned Mongolia from a diplomatic side issue into a subject of competition between them. For the Russians, who had demonstrated a tendency to continuously expand outwards to acquire buffer zones for the protection of their vulnerable centre, Qing China's weakness was too tempting a target not to exploit. As a consequence, Russia continued to extend in China's northern frontiers and its eastward expansion brought its presence to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria (and even Korea). Russia's expansion into East Asia was aided in no small measure by its railway construction projects, such as the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways. In the early twentieth century, the major re-alignment of the balance of power in the Far East brought about by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, though succeeding in checking Russian ambitions in Manchuria (and Korea), further enhanced Mongolia's importance in Russia's quest for sphere of influence, thereby heightening the tensions between Qing China and Tsarist Russia in Outer Mongolia.

Undoubtedly, the growing Russian presence in Mongolia posed a serious threat to the Qing court, who had, since the reign of Kangxi, regarded the region as an important screen for China proper against security threats from the north. (And such perspective remained prevalent among Chinese intellectuals during early Republican period.) As Wu Luzhen observed,

"Manchuria is our Dynasty's birthplace. Beijing is our Central Government's pivot. Mongolia borders Manchuria on its east, and guards Beijing on its south. Should Mongolia be lost one day, not only would the recovery of Manchuria's sovereignty become hopeless, the three frontier provinces would become the battle ground for the foreign powers. These foreign powers can move forward to storm Beijing, and harass Shandong and Hebei. (Should this happen) there would be no peace on the lands north of the Yellow River."[175]

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[175] Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞, "Jing ying Menggu zhi yijian," 經營蒙古之意見 [Views on the Management

From the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese, who had been suffering their own brand of humiliation at the hands of Western powers since the mid-nineteenth century, perceived a strategic lesson: that the militarily humiliated Russia was a paper tiger unable to sustain military operations in Asia. Consequently, the Chinese moved to consolidate their control in Outer Mongolia.[176] As the following chapters will show, the consolidation was to be achieved by the implementation of *xinzheng* reforms in the Mongolian region. However, the reforms led to the humiliation of the Mongols, and they turned to the humiliated Russians for relief from the humiliated Chinese.[177] That the Mongols would turn to Russia for assistance should not come as a surprise since, as stated in the preceding paragraphs, Russia had long been considered by the Mongols as an effective counterweight against China. How the *xinzheng* reforms would affect the Mongolian region and why they would lead to the Khalkhas' declaration of independence in 1911 will be discussed in the following chapters.

In the next chapter, I would examine how the factor of national defense against Russia would inform the New Policies introduced in Inner Mongolia, namely by boosting the migration of large numbers of Han Chinese into the region, and by establishing Chinese-style administrative units in the region to tighten the state's control.

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of Mongolia], in Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞 and Wu Yanshao 吳燕紹, *Jing ying Menggu tiao yi* 經營蒙古條議 [Proposals on the Management of Mongolia] 1906 (reprinted Hohhot: Yuan fang chu ban she, 2008), p. 230.

[176] Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled*, p. 5.

[177] Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled*, p. 5.

Chapter 4 *Xinzheng* in Inner Mongolia (I)

On 29 January 1901, while taking refuge in Xi'an in northwestern China following the occupation of Beijing by the expeditionary forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance (comprising Germany, Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, United States of America, and Japan), Empress Dowager Cixi issued, in the name of Guangxu emperor, a Reform Edict, which stated:

"Since the removal of the court (to Xi'an in August 1901), the Empress Dowager has been consumed with anxiety night and day, and the Court is filled with remorse as it reflects upon how the accumulated and continued abuses and our excessive attention to empty formalities over the past several decades have contributed to the present calamitous situation.

Now that peace negotiations have commenced, all affairs of government must be thoroughly overhauled, in hopes of gradually achieving real wealth and power. …. We therefore call upon the members of the Grand Council, the Grand Secretaries, Six Boards and Nine Ministries, our Ministers abroad, and the Governors General and Governors of provinces to reflect carefully on our present sad state of affairs, and to scrutinize Chinese and Western governmental systems with regard to all dynastic regulations, national administration, official affairs, matters related to people's livelihood, modern schools, systems of examination, military organization, and financial administration. ….By every available means of knowledge and observation, seek out how to renew our national strength, how to produce men of real talent, how to expand state revenues, and how to revitalize the military….."[178]

[178] Zhu Shoupeng 朱壽朋 comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu* 光緒朝東華錄 [Records from within the Eastern Flowery Gate, Guangxu Era], 1909 (reprinted Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1958), IV, pp. 135-136, adapted from the translation of the edict in Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912*, p. 203.

With this remarkable *shangyu* 上諭 (royal edict), the Court launched the era of *xinzheng* that lasted from 1901 till the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911. The edict is quoted at some length because it has highlighted several central features of this, also the last of the Qing state's reform endeavor, which was also known as New Policy or New Administration in history.

First, *xinzheng* was introduced at a time when the Qing dynasty was on the verge of collapse. The imperial court was forced to flee to Xi'an after the capital city of Beijing had been occupied by the international expeditionary forces. Large portions of the empire's territory had been taken up by these foreign powers as "concessions": with France established itself in Guangzhou Bay and the Southwest China; Russia in Liaodong; Britain in the Yangzi region; Germany in Shandong; and Japan in Fujian. Domestic revolutionary movements were breaking out with increasing frequency, threatening not only the survival of the Qing dynasty but also that of the imperial system. Fiscally, the imperial treasury was broke as a result of the needs to suppress internal uprisings and to fight external wars with Western powers and Japan that plagued the empire since the mid-nineteenth century. The war reparations of 450,000,000 *taels* of silver that were imposed by the victorious powers for the loss caused by the Boxer Uprising dealt a further blow to the cash-strapped Court. As a consequence, China had to mortgage its custom income and salt tax as guarantee of the reparations. It was estimated that China's foreign debts had totaled 1,232,702,316 *taels* as a result.[179]

Second, *xinzheng* would go beyond the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 1860s. Whilst the Self-Strengthening Movement was in essence an institutional reform

[179] He Qinglian 何清漣, "Qingmo zhongguo de daliang waizhai jiqi fenxi," 清末中國的大量外債及其分析 [China's Hugh Foreign Debts During the End of Qing Period and an Analysis of the Issue] *Journal of Finance and Economy* 財經研究, 12 (1986), p. 45.

confined to economic and military modernization, *xinzheng* would seek to transform the basic social, political, and ideational structures of the empire.

Third, the overall aim of *xinzheng* was to renew national strength, and this was to be realized through producing men of real talent, expanding the state revenues, and revitalizing the military.

Finally, unlike the Self-Strengthening Movement in which reforms were conducted within the confines of China proper, *xinzheng* was to be extended to every corner of the empire, including its frontier regions, which were basically left untouched during the Self-Strengthening Movement.

Rise of Han Chinese Officials and *Xinzheng*

On 21 April 1901, Cixi created a new organization *Duban Zhengwu Chu* 督辦政務處 (Bureau of Government Affairs) at the centre with the responsibility being to coordinate the planning and implementation of all the reform proposals. Headed by the powerful Prince Qing, this bureau included leading Manchu aristocrats, such as Ronglu 榮祿, Kungang 昆岡, and influential Han Chinese officials, such as Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (to be succeeded by Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 upon his death), Wang Wenshao 王文韶, Lu Chuanlin 陸傳霖 as *duban* 督辦 (superintendents), as well as powerful governors-general Liu Kunyi 劉坤一 and Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 as *yaowei canyu* 遙為參預 (consulting members in absentia).[180] The composition of the bureau was noteworthy for its inclusion of a high proportion of Han officials, and many of them, such as Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi, and Yuan Shikai, were leading reformists during the late Qing period. This also signified the rise of Han Chinese

[180] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., *Guangxu Xuantong liangchao shangyu dang* 光緒宣統兩朝上諭檔 [Archive of Guangxu and Xuantong imperial edicts], (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University, 1996), vol. 27, pp. 49-50.

officials in the decision-making process of state policies following the suppression of Taiping Rebellion (1850-1871), in which Han officials played a significant role in defeating the rebels.

On 12, 19 and 20 July of the same year, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong submitted a series of three joint memorials to the Throne, offering various suggestions about the reform programme, the reorganization of the Government system, and the adoption of Western methods in the reforms. These memorials were to serve as the blueprint for the *xinzheng* reforms. Of particular relevance to our present discussion was the importance they attached to the promotion of agriculture:

"China is an agricultural country. In terms of vastness of land and mildness of climate, China is much superior to Europe. China is most suitable for agriculture, and no countries could surpass China, where all kinds of plants can grow. There is a Chinese saying that all the great benefits in the world go to farmers. The essence of enriching the people and the country lies in producing more goods from the soil. Without agriculture as foundation, there will be neither industry nor commerce."[181]

As the following discussion will show, this agriculture oriented philosophy was to guide the State's plan in the opening and development of the Mongolian region. As a consequence, opening Mongolian lands to agriculture and the attending migration of Han settlers would become the principal reforms in Inner Mongolia, as well as the major source of income for the State to finance the various new reform proposals.

Due to reasons of geographical proximity and different political and societal developments between Inner and Outer Mongolia, the reforms for the Mongolian region started in Inner Mongolia, and the scale of the reforms in Inner Mongolia was much more intensive and extensive than its counterpart north of the Gobi. And this would widen the gap between Inner and Outer Mongolia, and impact upon their relationship

[181] Zhu comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu*, IV, pp. 4758-4761.

with China during the early Republican period.

Debt and Threat

Implementation of *xinzheng* in Mongolia could be generally divided into two phases: the first phase was from 1901 to 1906, and the second from 1906 till the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. The reforms introduced during the first phase were meant, in the main, to counter the twin challenges posed by, in the words of James Reardon-Anderson, the debt and the threat.[182] In other words, the reform measures were aimed at raising money and strengthening the empire's frontiers against Russia's intrusion.

As noted above, the Qing court was on the verge of financial bankruptcy resultant from internal and external conflicts, war reparations, and foreign debts. In order to raise adequate money to pay for the war reparations and debts as well as to finance the reforms, the Court decreed in May 1901 that the state's financial burden would be shared out among all provinces within the empire, regardless of their respective financial conditions. This imposed serious burdens on all provincial governments, in particular to poor provinces such as Shanxi, whose share of war reparations reached millions of *silver taels* each year.[183] In order to meet the heavy financial obligations, it was only logical for officials in Shanxi (and other poor frontier regions) to look beyond the border to Inner Mongolia (where land and natural resources were abundant) as a new source of income. Therefore, reclaiming Mongolian lands became an attractive target for the provinces adjacent to Inner Mongolia.

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[182] James Reardon-Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers: China's Expansion Northward 1644-1937* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 71.

[183] Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 433-74, *Qin chai kenwu dachen dangan* 欽差墾務大臣檔案 [Imperial Commissioner of Reclamation Affairs Archives], 5 May 1901.

On the other hand, following Russia's intrusion into China's Inner Asian frontiers since the nineteenth century, some senior Qing officials regarded Tsarist Russia as the most serious of China's foreign threats. In 1875, Ding Baozhen 丁寶楨, the Governor of Shandong, memorialized the Court:

"What worries me most is Russia, to be followed by Japan. Though China is accessible to other foreign nations by sea, it is not accessible to them on land, since these nations are tens of thousands of *li* (里=16 km) away. Although Japan is close to us by sea, the land passage is still blocked. Only Russia can access China by sea and on land, and is closer to us than other nations. Land wise, Russia is connected with us at Heilongjiang in the northeast and Xinjiang in the northwest; the situation is very perilous…..In my opinion, the threats caused by other nations are illness of the limbs, which are distant and light. The Russian threat is a disease at the heart, which is near and serious…." [184]

It is against these two challenges that Qing China started to implement various reforms in Inner Mongolia. And it is the purpose of this and the following chapters to investigate how these reforms were undertaken and how they impacted upon the Inner Mongols.

A. *Fangken Mengdi* 放墾蒙地 (Reclaiming Mongolian Lands for Agriculture)

One Chinese scholar Tian Feng considers that *fangken mengdi* was, of all *xinzheng* reforms implemented in Inner Mongolia, the one that the Qing state had pursued most vigorously and that its results were the most noteworthy.[185] As the following

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[184] Wang Yanwei 王彥威 comp, *Qing ji wai jiao shi liao* 清季外交史料 [Diplomatic Historical Data of Late Qing], 1933 (reprinted Beijing: Shu mu wen xian chu ban she, 1987), vol. 1, p. 20.

[185] Tian Feng 田鋒, *Qingmo neimenggu "xin zheng" ji qi shehui ying xiang* 清末內蒙古"新政"及其社會影響 [The Social influence of 'new policies' at the End of the Qing Dynasty in Inner Mongolia]. Master Dissertation, Inner Mongolia Normal University (2004), p. 6.

paragraphs will show, judging from the Qing state's reclamation efforts, the total area of lands reportedly opened in Inner Mongolia, and the revenue collected therefrom during the *xinzheng* decade, I consider Tian's statement a reasonable assessment.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing state's finance became more and more hard pressed as a result of frequent internal uprisings and external conflicts. Amid the State's fervent quest for new sources of income, some court and frontier officials argued that reclaiming Mongolian lands, which were in their views ample and under-utilized, would be the quickest and most effective instrument to raise revenues for the central and local governments' coffers. For example, in 1897, Hu Pinzhi 胡聘之, the governor of Shanxi, noted,

"The reclaimable land (in western Inner Mongolia contiguous with Shanxi) is no less than 300,000 *qing*. Should all the lands be opened, after deducting the rents payable to the Mongols and all the necessary fees, the state would still collect government rents amounting to two to three million *silver taels* each year."[186]

Hu's view was echoed by a court official Huang Siyong 黄思永, who submitted in the same year,

"In the two Inner Mongolian leagues of Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab, there are flat and fertile pasturelands with an area of several thousand *li* in length and breadth. The land on the east and west sides of Hetao 河套[187] is particularly fertile. …As most of the lands are now cultivated by (Han) commoners privately, it would be better if the State take over the management (from the Mongol landowners)."[188]

In the eastern part of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, similar requests were also

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[186] *Yu zhe huicun* 諭摺彙存 [A Compilation of Royal Instructions and Memorials], 1907 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1967), vol. 16, p. 1806.

[187] Hetao is the northern section of Ordos plateau fronting onto the Yellow River.

[188] Zhu comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu*, III, p. 3956.

raised by frontier officials who were under acute shortage of funds because their principal sources of funding, namely fiscal provisions from Beijing and other provinces, were frequently interrupted by the internal turmoil that broke out in China during this period. For example, the arrears of funds due to Heilongjiang amounted to 1,206,900 *silver taels* between 1854-1868.[189] In1898, Enze 恩澤, the general-in-chief of Heilongjiang, memorialized the Court for opening the land under his purview to agriculture, for the purposes of, among others, raising revenue and meeting local demands for grains.[190] Specifically, Enze put forth in his memorial an important justification for subsequent reclamation activities in Inner Mongolia, namely:

"The greatest profit in the world derives from the promotion of agriculture. It is therefore most appropriate to open lands in important frontier areas. This is because land reclamation will lead to concentration of people, and concentration of people will place us in a strong position (against Russia). This is an important way to consolidate the frontier, and to generate profits."[191]

Put simply, land reclamation in the borderlands was considered by these officials as an important measure to counter the twin challenges of the debt and the threat.

From the 1880s up to 1902 when reclamation of Mongol land formally started, frontier officials' requests for opening Mongolia are summarized as follows:

Year	Office	Name	Areas Requested for reclamation
1883	Shanxi Governor	Zhang	Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues, Tumed

[189] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 30-20, 'Qing sujie Heilongjiang yukuan zhe' 請速解黑龍江餘款摺 [Memorial seeking to expedite delivery of outstanding funding for Heilongjiang], *Heilongjiang Jiangjun yamen dangan* 黑龍江將軍衙門檔案 [Heilongjiang General-in-Chief's Office Archives], 20 Sep. 1868.

[190] Zhu comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu*, p. 4478.

[191] Zhu comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu*, p. 4478.

		Zhidong	and Chahar banners
1886	Shanxi Governor	Gangyi	Dalat, Hanggin, Urad Banners
1887	Heilongjiang General-in-Chief	Gongtang	Hulan and Butha, etc.
1895	Acting Heilongjiang General-in-Chief	Zengqi	Hulan etc.
1896	Heilongjiang General-in-Chief	Enze	Hulan, etc.
1897	Shanxi Governor	Wu Pingzhi	Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues
1899	Heilongjiang General-in-Chief	Enze	Jalait, Durbet and Gorlos RearBanners
1900	Heilongjiang Lieutenant General	Shoushan	Jalait, Durbet and Gorlos RearBanners
1901	Suiyuan Town General	Xinge	Guihua and Tumed Banners, etc.
1901	Heilongjiang General-in-Chief	Sabao	Butha and Jalait Banner

(Source: Hao Weimin 郝維民 and Jakhadaied Chimeddorji 齊木德道爾吉 ed., *Neimenggu tongshi* 內蒙古通史 [A General History of Inner Mongolia], vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (II), pp. 606-607)[192]

Notwithstanding these appeals, the Court had so far been very cautious in granting requests for opening the pasturelands of Mongolian banners to agriculture, fearing this

[192] Hao Weimin 郝維民 and Jakhadaied Chimeddorji 齊木德道爾吉 ed., *Neimenggu tongshi* 內蒙古通史 [A General History of Inner Mongolia], vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (II) (Beijing: People's Press, 2012), pp. 606-607.

would affect Mongolian livelihood and lead to trouble. It was not until the era of *xinzheng* when large-scale reclamation of the lands in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia formally became the State's policy. On the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2, this "new" policy represents a drastic departure from the segregation policy that the State had practiced, albeit inconsistently, in the regions above the Great Wall since the Manchus' occupation of China proper in the seventeenth century. What prompted the Qing court to change its mind was a memorial submitted by Cen Chunxuan 岑春煊, the governor of the Shanxi province, in 1901, which stated,

"In my opinion, the current political situation is difficult, the national finance is destitute, and the enormous amount of war reparations is unprecedented.….
In order to tackle insolvency, people have put forth proposals to downsize the State's manpower establishment or to revive (the country's) industry and commerce. However, reducing the number of soldiers and officials does not save much, whilst mining and manufacturing does not generate instant profits. Now that we are spending money like river sand yet we are seeking to raise revenue only by trivial amounts. Though these measures are commonsense approaches of financial management, they cannot meet our desperate needs.

I note that the lands of the 13 banners of the Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues contiguous with the northwestern part of *Jin* 晉 (Shanxi province) are the most open and flat in the northern frontiers. The Ordos and other banners of Yeke Juu are surrounded by large rivers and hence easy to irrigate. ….In terms of size, these banners are no less than three to four thousand *li* in length and width. If we reclaim three to four tenths of their lands, we should be able to make available hundreds of thousands of *qing* of cultivable land. Twenty-five years ago, former *jiangjun* of Heilongjiang Enze petitioned for the opening of the uncultivated land of the Jalait Banner, where receipts from the *huangjia* 荒價 (land contract fee) of half of the reclaimed land was estimated

to be 400,000 to 500,000 *taels* of silver. As for today's Ordos and the banners adjacent to *Jin* frontier, even if we reclaim half of their lands, the receipt will be three to four times as much…It will really benefit the State."[193]

Clearly, challenge of the debt was one of the most important considerations that made the cash-strapped Qing court to abandon the previous policy ambiguities and embrace Cen's proposal wholeheartedly. However, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, Cen's request was nothing new. Since the 1870s, successive Shanxi governors such as Zhang Zhidong, Gangyi 剛毅, and Wu Pingzhi had memorialized the Court for opening the "Mongolian wastelands" adjacent to the Province to agriculture. The reasons for their appeal can be summarized as follows:

(i)Official recognition of the fact that some Mongolian lands had already been rented out privately and that the rent arising therefrom was an important source of income to Mongols. As Wu Pingzhi noted, "Mongol livelihood (now) comes from rent rather than from herding";[194]

(ii) Maintenance of Law and order in the borderlands. The illegal influx of Han immigrants had turned the border area lawless and uncontrollable. As a consequence, the area became vulnerable and insecure;

(iii) Consolidating the frontier against external threat. As Enze noted in the above, there was a need to move Han immigrants to the frontier to strengthen its defense against the Russian threats to the frontiers; and

(iv) Raising additional revenues to meet Shanxi's heavy financial burden. Since the early twentieth century, Shanxi had been beset with compensation cases over damages to the properties of foreign missionaries in the Province during the Boxer turmoil. In May 1901, the Qing court in exile demanded large financial contributions from all

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[193] *Yu zhe huicun*, vol. 19, p. 2407.

[194] *Yu zhe huicun*, vol. 16, p. 1810.

provinces to meet demands for war reparations, saying

"The amount of reparations is too enormous this time…We are now in extreme difficulties and must try our utmost to raise the money……All the Governors General and Governors of provinces must overhaul the local situations and do away all unnecessary expenses……As to how this could be achieved, (all Governors Generals and Governors) must plan very carefully and do their utmost to raise the money. …They must not use "no money could be raised" as an excuse and shirk their responsibility."[195]

This Court's demand was the last straw for Cen, who had grave difficulties making both ends meet. It was against this background that Cen submitted the above-quoted memorial in 1901.

In the following years, large scale *fangken* was carried out in the western and eastern parts of Inner Mongolia respectively, leading to far-reaching impact upon the region. In the following paragraphs, I will first give an account of how *fangken* was carried out in these two parts of Inner Mongolia and then examine its impact.

(i) Western Inner Mongolia

In January 1902, in response to Cen's proposal, the Court decreed,

"In the thirteen Mongol banners of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues on the northwestern border of Jin, there are plenty of uncultivated and fertile lands. We should immediately open these lands to fill up the frontier's coffer. This would also be beneficial to the livelihood of the Mongols and Han commoners."[196]

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[195] Palace Museum Ming-Qing Archives Department 故宮博物院明清檔案部 ed., *Yi he tuan dang an shi liao* 義和團檔案史料 [Archival Materials on the Boxers], (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1979), vol. 2, pp. 1805-1806.

[196] Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 433-1, *Qin chai kenwu dachen dangan* 欽差墾務大臣檔案 [Imperial Commissioner of Reclamation Affairs Archives], 8 Jan 1902.

At the same time, the Court appointed Yigu 貽穀, a vice minister of the Board of War, to take charge of the reclamation affairs in western Inner Mongolia, with the avowed goals being "to provide for Mongols' livelihood, to increase the country's military funding, up from securing the borders, down to expanding the agricultural sector."[197] As the *qin ming duban Meng qi kenwu dachen* 欽命督辦蒙旗墾務大臣 (Imperial Commissioner for Reclamation Affairs in Mongol Banners), Yigu was responsible for opening the lands of the 13 *jasak* banners belonging to the region's two westernmost leagues of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu, the lands of the central Tumed plain around Guihua (designated as the Guihua Town, Tumed left and right banners) and the lands of the Chahar banners. Unlike the *jasak* banner of the two leagues, both the Tumed and Chahar banners were classified as "Court Mongolia" or *Nei shu Menggu* 內屬蒙古 because, for historical reasons, they were not ruled by their own hereditary *jasak-princes* but by imperial appointees. As a result, imperial orders were executed with less opposition in these banners.

Yigu set up his headquarters, subsequently known as *kenwuzongju* 墾務總局 (general bureau of reclamation affairs) in Guihua city, to be underpinned by several reclamation bureaus and sub-bureaus in different places of western Inner Mongolia, with each being responsible for opening the lands under its respective jurisdiction. According to Yigu's original plan, reclamation work would start with the *jasak* banners of the Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues, where the amount of reclaimable lands was more substantial. However, he met strong opposition from the Mongols of these two leagues. As a matter of fact, back in 1897, the banner princes of these two leagues had jointly foiled Hu Pinzhi's attempt to open their lands to agriculture on strength of a royal edict issued by Emperor Daoguang in 1835, which banned the reclamation of

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[197] Yigu 貽穀, *Yigu kenwuzouyi* 貽穀墾務奏議 [Yigu's Memorials on Reclamation], 1908 (reprinted Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1974), p. 17.

Mongolian lands by Han Chinese commoners. The grounds of their opposition, as stated in their petition to the Court, were worth quoting as they represented the standard arguments employed by the Mongols against state reclamation attempts. Their grounds were:

"Since then (1835), all our *jasak* banners have strictly abided by the Edit (of Emperor Daoguang). We dare not rent out our pasturelands privately, and we continue to make our living by herding rather than farming…..Should the Shanxi Governor's proposal be adopted, all the pasturelands would be transformed into farmlands, which is a practice now prohibited under the law, and the pasturelands would be occupied by Han commoners; the Mongols would not be able to make a living by raising herds and their livelihood would become difficult. Though someone says that rents would be payable to us, we cannot rule out that disputes would arise after some time…"[198]

However, judging from Huang Siyong's submission quoted above, some Mongolian lands of these leagues had already been rented out to Han Chinese commoners for tilling, despite the *jasaks*' denial. Also, considering the close proximity of these two leagues to Shanxi (where lots of Han farmers had already crossed the borders to farm on Mongolian lands), I find it difficult to believe the *jasaks*' claim.

In any event, confronted with strong opposition from the two leagues, Yigu had to change his plan by first opening the lands of the eight banners of Chahar, where substantial areas of lands had already been rented out to Chinese farmers privately even before Yigu's arrival. Yigu established a *kenwugongsi* 墾務公司 (reclamation affairs corporation) in Zhangjiakou to handle the work, and the capital of the corporation was shared equally between the State and merchants.[199]

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[198] Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 511-79, *Zhungeer Qi Zhasake yamen dangan* 准格爾旗札薩克衙門檔案 [Jungar Banner Jasak's Office Archives], 12 Sep. 1897.

[199] Another *kenwugongsi* was set up in Baotou to take charge of the reclamation work in the Ulan Qab

The first step in the reclamation process was the drawing up of a specific series of "*zhangcheng*" 章程 (regulations). Each of the reclamation offices set up by the General Bureau of Reclamation Affairs was to proceed in accordance with these regulations, which were devised to reflect the particular land relations of the area under its jurisdiction. These regulations specified the proportions of the proceeds of land sales to be allocated to the original Mongolian landholders, and covered various other provisions, such as eradication of profiteering and prevention of Mongolian impoverishment, etc. However, considering the widespread and strong opposition from the Mongols to the State's reclamation activities, it was obvious that these regulations failed to appease them.

Once the regulations were proclaimed, the next step was "*quanken*" 勸墾, which was to persuade, extort, or pressure Mongolian authorities with control over land (such as *jasak*, princes, head lamas of monasteries, etc.) to *baoken* 報墾, or report land for reclamation. This could be a lengthy process as it involved negotiations with the relevant Mongolian parties, surveying of potential land, accurate delineation of boundaries, and resolving competing land rights claims between different banners. In theory, a range of options could be worked out depending on the strength or weakness of the banner's position and established precedents. However, in most cases, the process would formally remove land from banner, temple, or individual Mongolian ownership and control and place it in the hands of the State to be sold off as virgin land.[200]

The next step following *baoken* was the establishment of a *dimu ju* 地畝局 (agricultural land office) in the area yielded by the banner, monastery, or individual Mongolian landowner for reclamation. This office was tasked with measuring and

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and Yeke Juu Leagues.

[200] Justin Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan: the politics of northwestern territory and development in early twentieth-century China* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 108.

assessing the agricultural quality of the reported land, and the disposal of the land-- a process known as *zhangfang* 丈放 (measure and dispose of land). The land would then be sold and the proceeds arising therefrom would be divided between the State and the relinquishing Mongolian party, who would also be entitled to proportions of the future land tax collected from the land.

In the case of lands that had already been rented out to Han tillers, the reclamation process would be much more complex and often involved *qingli* 清理, meaning to straighten out property rights and accurately measure acreage totals. This process was particularly resisted by both Mongolian landowners and Han tenants, as it represented an unwelcome intrusion into de facto system of property rights which had existed up to the time without state involvement. Mongols opposed it as it directly challenged their ownership of land or their customary rights to control the land, and Han tenants opposed it because, should they be unable to prove legal ownership, they would have to pay a second price for the land to continue using it, and such instances were many.[201]

Reclaiming Mongolian lands would bring in two kinds of revenue for the State's coffer : *yahuangyin*, 押荒銀 (land contract fee) and *shengkeyin* 升科銀 (annual land taxes). The former, also *known as huangjiayin* 荒價銀, was levied on a cultivator when he contracted a piece of *shengdi* 生地 (uncultivated land) for cultivation. Normally, he would pay *yahuangyin* for tilling the land for three years during which period he was exempted from paying any land tax. After the third year, the land was considered a piece of *shudi* 熟地 (mature land) and would be *shengke* 升科 (entered onto the tax register) upon which the cultivator would be required to pay *shengkeyin* to the state at a fixed rate annually thereafter.

In western Inner Mongolia, the basic unit of land measurement was *gong* 弓 (bow, equals to five *chi* 尺; one *chi* equals to 1/3metre). Three hundred and sixty *gong*

[201] Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan*, p. 109.

equaled to one *mu* 畝. One hundred *mu* equaled to one *qing* 頃. Five *qing* equaled to one *hao* 號. The contract fee was three *qian* 錢 per *mu*, with one third of which being set aside for administrative expenses. Of the administrative expenses, six *fen* 分 (equals to 0.1 *qian*) was given to the *kenwuju* and the remaining four *fen* to the banners. As for the *shengkeyin,* the annual rate was initially fixed at 1.4 *fen* per *mu*. Each time when land tax was collected, a sum of 0.5 *qian* was levied per *silver tael* as meltage fee. With the unfolding of reclamation works in other parts of Inner Mongolia, variations to the rates arose in accordance with the practical situations of the different locations. For example, in the Otog Banner in southwestern Inner Mongolia, the contract fee was rated at four levels, ranging from one to four *qian*, depending on the quality of the land in question.[202]

The reclamation in Chahar went off smoothly and was more or less completed by 1905. According to Yigu's reports, by late 1904, the land reclaimed and leased in the right four banners of Chahar amounted to 13,447 *qing*, with revenues totaling 268,941 *taels*.[203] By late 1905, the lands reclaimed in the left four banners of Chahar and the revenue collected therefrom were 18,053 *qing* and 361,075 *taels* respectively. [204] From 1906 till early 1907, over 627 *qing* of lands were further opened, bringing in additional revenues of 879 *taels*.[205]

As stated above, the league chiefs and *jasak*s of the Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu vehemently opposed Yigu's plan to reclaim their lands. Lhavangnorbu and Arbinbayar, the respective chiefs of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu, refused to journey to Guihua to meet with Yigu to discuss the State's reclamation plan in spite of the latter's invitation. They also petitioned the Suiyuan general-in-chief and the *Lifanyuan* against the inclusion of

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[202] Yigu, *Yigu kenwuzouyi*, p. 424.

[203] Yigu, *Yigu kenwuzouyi*, p. 467.

[204] Yigu, *Yigu kenwuzouyi*, p. 472.

[205] Yigu, *Yigu kenwuzouyi*, p. 510.

their lands into the official reclamation plan, arguing that "should the commoners from the Heartland be permitted to intermingle with the natives on the pasturelands, the Mongols' livelihood would be affected and disputes would inevitably arise."[206]

I would argue that the Mongols of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu did not oppose cultivation per se, because cultivation of their lands by Han Chinese tenants had been practiced in some banners of these two leagues for a long time.[207] What had caused their opposition was that that State's reclamation plan would affect their income from leasing their lands to tenant farmers privately since they could no longer manipulate the rents as they liked. In order to win over the Mongols' support, Yigu had offered to equally split the land taxes between the State and the concerned Mongolian banners, but the offer was rejected by the latter. [208]

More importantly, as discussed above, the acceptance of the State's involvement would effectively mean that ownership or customary control rights of the banner lands would henceforth be transferred from the banners to the State. Since land ownership had long constituted the foundation of the Mongolian banner system, the two leagues' opposition to the State's reclamation proposal was, arguably, an act in defense of the system.[209]

Similarly, the existing Han Chinese cultivators also worried that, under the State's ownership, they would be required to pay more than they did. They were also suspicious

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[206] Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 511-84, *Zhungeer Qi Zhasake Yamen Dangan* 准格爾旗札薩克衙門檔案 [Jungar Banner Jasak's Office Archives], 3 April 1902.

[207] According to Yigu's later confession, half of the "reclaimed" lands in Yeke Juu were in fact *shudi*; similar situation also existed in Ulan Qab -- Yigu, *Mengken chenshu gongzhuang* 蒙墾陳述供狀 [Depositions on Cultivation Affairs of Mongolia], quoted by Tian, *Qingmo neimenggu 'xin zheng' ji qi shehui ying xiang*, p. 10.

[208] Yigu, *Yigu kenwuzouyi*, p. 424.

[209] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (II), p. 603.

that the State would take their lands away and lease them to others who were willing to pay more for tilling the land. Subsequent developments proved that their worries and suspicions were not entirely groundless. This explains why some Han Chinese would join the Mongols in their uprisings against the State reclamation actions.

In the face of strong opposition from the two leagues, the Qing court granted Yigu the title of *shangshu* 尚書 (board president) of *Lifanyuan* in September 1902, and appointed him to double up as the Suiyuan general-in-chief (who in theory superintended the two leagues) in the following year, with a view to facilitating his work in these two leagues. Yet the opposition remained. Finally, at the behest of Yigu, the Court dismissed Arbinbayar from the post of league chief of Yeke Juu in December 1903. Other banners of the league rebelled against the reclamation but they were suppressed by Yigu with military force. Upon clearance of all the obstacles, the State started to open the lands of Yeke Juu and the reclamation work was basically completed by 1908, bringing in a total of 22,000 *qing* of land and 764,600 *silver taels* of revenue. The reclamation of the lands of Ulan Qab also started in 1906 after the strong intervention of the board president of *Lifanyuan* Prince Zhu, and a total area of 7,840 *qing* was opened by the spring of 1908.

Apart from reclaiming the lands of Chahar, Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab, Yigu also opened the horse farms of the Eight Banner troops stationed at Suiyuan (3,700 *qing*), the lands of Tumed Banners (9,985 *qing*), and the lands under the management of the Shahukou relay station (1,383 *qing*). According to some incomplete statistics, during the *xinzheng* period, the state had opened a total of 88,700 *qing* of lands in western Inner Mongolia and the *yahuangyin* collected therefrom amounted to 2,730,000 *taels.*[210]

In 1908, Yigu was dismissed and impeached on a series of charges including

[210] Hao Weimin 郝維民 ed., *Neimenggu jindai jianshi* 內蒙古近代簡史 [A Brief History of Modern Inner Mongolia] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia University Press, 1990), p. 23.

corruption and other misconduct. His downfall virtually brought the reclamation activities in western Inner Mongolia to a halt. Yet, the land reclamation process that Yigu created was to remain the basis for the further development of land reclamation in Republican Suiyuan.[211]

(ii) Eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria

Discussion of reclamation activities in eastern Inner Mongolia would inevitably touch upon Manchuria, which included fringes of the Mongolian steppe and was technically part of Inner Mongolia and vice versa. Since 1902 land reclamation had also started in earnest in Manchuria and three (Josotu, Juu Uda and Jirem) of the four leaguesof eastern Inner Mongolia. Unlike the operations in western Inner Mongolia, there was no central organization to take charge of the opening of lands in this area. Instead, reclamation work was undertaken individually by the imperial residents in the areas under their respective purview.

Private leasing of land for cultivation by Han Chinese farmers long existed in this area, especially in some banners of Josotu and Juu Uda Leagues, as evidenced by a memorial submitted by Zengqi 增祺, the general-in-chief of Shengjing, in 1904:

"Of late, with nomadism among the banners being in decline, it has become general knowledge that farming is profitable. As a result, Mongols often privately invite Han Chinese commoners to till their lands without following the rules, leading to the gathering of numerous Han Chinese commoners, and the secret reclamation of lands. When the Mongolian landlords' demands are not met, they will try to evict the Han Chinese farmers. However, the Han Chinese tenants are reluctant to leave and will gather together to cause disturbances. In recent years, lawsuits (over land disputes) have multiplied and they are very difficult to deal with."[212]

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[211] Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan*, pp. 112-113.

[212] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., *Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe* 光緒朝硃批奏摺

Unlike their western counterparts, the *jasak*s of eastern league banners were generally more cooperative with the State in the latter's reclamation operations. As a consequence, the reclamation process was relatively more peaceful and smooth. For the period from 1902 to 1905, some 490,940 *shang* 垧 (equals to fifteen *mu*) of lands were reclaimed at the Jalait Banner of Heilongjiang, representing four tenths of the whole banner's land.[213] By 1908, a total of 632,540 *shang* of lands were reclaimed in the Gorlos Rear Banner, or one fifth of its land.[214] Between the years of 1904 and 1906, the State had opened 386,250 *shang* of lands in the Durbert Banner, or three tenth of its land.[215] In Jilin, the State had reclaimed some 300,280 *shang* of lands in the Gorlos Front Banner. According to some incomplete estimate, the State had reclaimed over 3,300,000 *shang* plus 16,000 *qing* of lands from the two leagues of Jirem and Juu Uda alone.[216]

According to some estimate, over 100,000 *qing* of lands were reclaimed in Inner Mongolia during the *xinzheng* decade, and the amount of *yahuangyin* collected exceeded 8,000,000 *taels* of silver.[217]

(iii) Assessment

On the face of it, the volume of lands that had been opened in Inner Mongolia (and Manchuria) during the ten years of *xinzheng* appeared quite impressive. However, as the following discussion will show, this figure was grossly inflated. One of the reasons for

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[Imperially rescripted palace memorials of the Guangxu reign] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1995-97), vol. 93, "Nongye, tunkengengzuo" 農業・屯墾耕作 [Agriculture, Opening-up and Cultivation of Land], pp. 667-668.

213 *Zhengzhi guanbao* 政治官報 [Government Gazette on Political Affairs], (9 March 1910), No. 845.

214 *Zhengzhi guanbao*, (8 March 1910), No. 844.

215 *Zhengzhi guanbao*, (10 March 1910), No. 846.

216 Wang Bingming 汪炳明, "Qingmo xinzheng yu beibu bianjiang kaifa," 清末新政與北部邊疆開發 [Late Qing *Xinzheng* and Development of Northern Frontiers], in Bayilduyci, *Chengjisihan de yi chan*, p. 214.

217 Hao ed., *Neimenggu jindai jianshi*, p. 26.

this was that some of the "reclaimed" lands were in fact *shudi* that were already under cultivation at the time of opening. For lack of comprehensive statistics, it would be impossible to ascertain its actual extent. However, the following table on the opening of lands in some of the banners of Jirem League between 1902 and 1911 should give us an idea of the magnitude of the problem:

Banner	Reclaimed Land (*shang*)	*Shudi* (*shang*)
Jalait	578,062	29,690
Gorlos Rear	632,540. 946	1,204.73
Durbet	389,245.946	1,690
Horqin Right Front	993,088.464	42,899.9966
Horqin Right Rear	437,062.2	22,228.76

(Source: Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, p. 94)[218]

The same problem also existed in the banners of western Inner Mongolia. Yigu's explanation for the existence of *shudi* in "reclaimed" lands was as follows:

"Half of the lands reported by the banners for opening were privately leased *shudi.* If we did not open *shudi,* there would not be much land for us to reclaim. That the Mongols would report *shudi* as uncultivated land was because they dared not confess to having leased their lands privately……Private leasing (of lands) suited the interests of both the Mongol multitude and Han Chinese households. The Mongols would lodge complaints when we proceeded to open their lands. The Han Chinese households would also lodge complaints once we started to charge them for land contract fees. This was inevitable."[219]

The opening of *shudi* by the state undoubtedly caused strong resentment among the

[218] Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, p. 94.

[219] Yigu, *Mengken chenshu gongzhuang*, quoted by Tian, *Qingmo neimenggu 'xin zheng' ji qi shehui ying xiang*, p. 10.

Mongols and Han Chinese farmers alike since this would inflict heavy losses on both parties. As Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, who had twice been dispatched by the Court to tour eastern Inner Mongolia in 1905 and 1906 respectively, commented on the reclamation work,

"To my knowledge, in the eastern and western parts (of Inner Mongolia), the authorities always proceeded from extorting *yahuangyin* from cultivated lands. In reality, very few of the reclaimed lands were bona fide barren lands. (As a result of the State's reclamation program), the tenant farmers first had to pay the Mongols (i.e. landlords), and then the State authorities. The tenant farmers therefore suffered heavy losses. As for the Mongols, their rental income from lands prior to the payment of *huangjiayin* was surely high. The rental income would certainly be reduced once *yahuangyin* was levied on their land. The Mongols also suffered heavy losses as a result. As such, the reclamation operation currently under way can only be characterized as *shudilefei* 熟地勒費 (extorting fees from cultivated lands), not *huangdi yahuang* 荒地押荒 (levying land contract fees from barren lands). Therefore, whenever the Mongols and Han farmers heard of land reclamation, they turned pale as if they were talking of a tiger. This is why the reclamation operation has achieved very few results; conversely, it has caused harsh hardships (for the people), and this in turn gives rise to enormous resistances."[220]

That the authorities concerned would focus on *shudi* was because their primary concern was to make quick profits. As Xu Shichang 徐世昌, the governor-general of the Northeast Provinces (Manchuria) remarked in 1907,

"For the managers (of Mongolian land reclamation), money-raising was their principal concern. As a consequence, once a piece of land was measured up and a price was put on it, they did nothing else to follow up. They might even bully the Mongols

[220] Yao, *Chou Meng chu yi*, vol. 1, p. 24.

and embezzle the money……As to whether the reclamation would succeed or fail, or whether the Mongols would support or oppose (the reclamation), or whether the terrain (of a particular location) was hazardous or flat, these were none of the concerns that the authorities would seriously look into."[221]

Historical records show that the same problem persisted till the end of Qing dynasty as evidenced by a memorial submitted by a court official Dai Hongci 戴鴻慈 in 1908, which reads, "That the reclamation work has not improved is because the reclaiming authorities only concerned themselves with *huangjia*, not the success or failure of the reclamation."[222]

Furthermore, officials of the reclamation authorities often colluded with local *lantou* 攬頭 (speculators or monopolists) or land merchants in their pursuit of quick money. The former often sold the latter vast tracts of land at a low price, and the latter in turn subdivided the land and re-sold it to tenant farmers at a much higher price, thus making a handsome profit in the process. There were cases whereby a piece of land was re-sold for several times, each time fetching a higher price than before. The *kenwugongsi* set up by Yigu in western Inner Mongolia were made up of *lantou* and land merchants who were notorious for making profits through these means. For example, the *kenwugongsi* in Zhangjiakou would "re-sell a piece of land at an increased price after paying the specified *yahuangyin*, and the rate of increase ranged from two to three *fen* per *mu* to one *tael* and six to seven *qian;* in some cases, the rate of increase was as high as three

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[221] "Dongsansheng zhongdu fuzou Dongsheng neimeng kenwu qingxing, bing yuchou banfa zhe," 東三省總督覆奏東省內蒙墾務情形，並預籌辦法摺 [A Reply Memorial from the Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces on the Land Reclamation Situation in the Mongolian Areas within the Provinces, and the Future Planning], in Zhu Qiqian 朱啟鈐 ed., *Dongsansheng Mengwu gongdu huibian* 東三省蒙務公牘彙編 [A Collection of Official Documents on Mongolian Affairs of the Three Eastern Provinces], 1909 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1969), vol. 1, p. 15.

[222] *Xuantong zhengji* 宣統政紀 [political records of the Xuantong reign], 1932 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1986), vol. 18, p. 7.

tael and several *qian* per *mu.*"[223]

Since the authorities' sole concern was profit-making, they did not bother to take follow-up action to ensure that the lands reported for reclamation were actually taken up by farmers for cultivation. As a consequence, a lot of reclaimed lands remained barren many years after they had been measured and released for cultivation. For instance, of the 630,000 *shang* of lands in the Gorlos Rear Banner that had been reported for opening in 1908, less than 200,000 *shang* were actually under cultivation by 1910. At the end of the Qing dynasty, some 250,000 *shang* of lands were reported to have been reclaimed in the Durbet Banner, but the amount of *shudi* was merely some 150,000 *shang* several years into the Republican era. Similarly, of the 800,000 *shang* of "reclaimed" lands in the Horqin Right Front Banner, less than 200,000 *shang* had been converted into *shudi* during the early years of the Republican era. As for the 600,000 "reclaimed" lands of Horqin Right Rear Banner at the end of the Qing period, only 80,000 *shang* were *shudi.*[224]

Apart from lethargy on the part of the reclamation authorities, other factors such as soil quality, transport condition, and public security, etc. also affected the success or failure of a particular project. For example, a site 200 *li* south of Taonan *Fu* in Jilin remained uninhabited three years after it had been released for cultivation because its soil was poor and that the place was frequented by bandits.[225]

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[223] Gan Pengyun 甘鵬雲, *Diaocha GuiSui kengwu yijianshu* 調查歸綏墾務意見書 [Submission on the Inquiry into the Cultivation Affairs of Guihua and Suiyuan], vol. 3, quoted by Tian, *Qingmo neimenggu "xin zheng" ji qi shehui ying xiang*, p. 11.

[224] Wang Bingming 汪炳明, "Shi 'fangkenmengdi' haishi 'yiminshibian'?," 是"放墾蒙地"還是"移民實邊"? ["Releasing and Reclaiming Mongolian Lands" or "Moving People to Strengthen the Border"?], in Bayilduyci 白拉都格其, *Chengjisihan de yi chan* 成吉思汗的遺產 [The Legacy of Chinggis Khan] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People's Press, 2009), pp. 191-192.

[225] Xu Shichang 徐世昌, *Dongsansheng zhenglue* 東三省政略 [The Political Strategy for the Three Eastern Provinces], 1911 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1965), vol. 2, "Mengwu shang" 蒙務上 [Mongolian Affairs Part 1], "Mengqi bian" 蒙旗篇 [On Mongolian Banners], p. 1589.

(iv) Armed Resistance

Given the widespread opposition from Inner Mongols to the State's reclamation activities, the authorities had to resort to coercion in order to implement the program. As Yigu pointed out, "Measurement work had to be backed up by military force. This would speed up the process of reclamation and ensure peace at the local level."[226] However, coercion did not prevent the occurrence of sporadic uprisings from 1902 onwards in different parts of Inner Mongolia against the State's reclamation work. A summary of these uprisings is tabulated below:

Period	Location
1902-1905	Uxin Banner
1904	Jungar Banner; Ordos Left Centre Banner
1905	Hanggin Banner
1906-1909	Gorlos Front Banner
1907	Salaqi *ting* (county); Horinger *ting*; Hanggin and Dalad Banners
1907-1908	Jalait Banner
1907-1908	Horqin Right Front Banner

(Source: Tian, *Qingmo neimenggu 'xin zheng' ji qi shehui ying xiang*, p. 12) [227]

Apart from the Mongols affected by the land reclamation, some Han Chinese, probably tenant farmers, also joined the revolts in the Uxin Banner, Salaqi *ting* and Horinger *ting*. The disparate geographic locations of the trouble spots suggested that discontent was widespread in Inner Mongolia, though they had not evolved into a

[226] Yigu, *Mengken chenshu gongzhuang*, quoted by Tian, *Qingmo neimenggu "xin zheng" ji qi shehui ying xiang*, p. 13.

[227] Tian, *Qingmo neimenggu "xin zheng" ji qi shehui ying xiang*, p. 12.

region-wide movement that would threaten the Manchu rule in Inner Mongolia.

(v) Impact

An important impact of the ten-year *fangken mengdi* programme was the large-scale expansion of agriculture in Inner Mongolia. In western Inner Mongolia, the lands in the southern and central parts of Chahar banners were wholly converted into farmlands. The same occurred in the southern and central parts of the Yeke Juu League. In eastern Inner Mongolia, the seven banners in the northern part of Jirem League were also transformed into farmlands. In short, a strip of land starting from the Gorlos Front Banner of the Jirem League in the east, along the Willow Palisade and the Great Wall in the South, up to Hetao in the west became an area of intensive agricultural production.[228]

The expansion of agriculture and the attendant arrival of Han immigrants also led to rise of commerce and trade in Inner Mongolia. However, the agricultural expansion was achieved at the expense of nomadism, as more and more pasturelands were converted into farmlands. This led to further decline of nomadism in Inner Mongolia. As a consequence, livestock breeding ceased to be its sole subsistence economy, whilst agriculture assumed growing importance in the region's economic activities.

Moreover, with the rights to own and control land transferred from Mongol authorities (such as *jasak,* princes, head lamas of monasteries, individual landowners, etc.) to the State (who then sold the land to Chinese land merchants and tillers), the economic power base of Mongols was further eroded. This further undermined the authority of Mongol ruling elites (e.g. *jasaks* and princes) vis-à-vis the State.

As shown in the above quoted memorials by Qing frontier officials, large scale reclamation of Mongol lands was intended, apart from raising revenues, to encourage

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[228] Kuang Haolin 況浩林, "Pingshuo Qingdai Neimenggu diqu kenzhi de deshi," 評說清代內蒙古地區墾殖的得失 [Comments on the Merits and Demerits of the Reclamation Activities in Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era] *Ethno-National Studies* 民族研究 1 (1985), pp. 46-53.

large numbers of Han Chinese to migrate to the borderland, with a view to strengthening the frontier defense against Russian intrusion-- a process known as *yimin shibian* 移民實邊. While Mongol-Chinese historian Bayilduyci 白拉都格其 argues that the Qing government never executed *yimin shibian* as a Court policy despite appeals from frontier officials' and the press, the fact remained that migration of Han Chinese settlers to the northern frontiers accelerated since the late-nineteenth century.[229] Continued migration of Han Chinese into Inner Mongolia led to growth in population and Han Chinese settlements in Inner Mongolia, and changed the region's demographic composition. During his journey to eastern Inner Mongolia in 1906, Chen Zushan 陳祖善 noticed on his way the existence of many Chinese settlements and that they were "mostly populated by natives of Shandong, with some of them having settled here for several generations, whilst others just came here scores of years ago."[230]

The steady growth of Han Chinese immigrants was matched by a steady decline in the Mongolian population in Inner Mongolia. The following table on the number of Mongolian *zhuangding* 壯丁 (able-bodied man) in many of the banners in eastern Inner Mongolia between 1769 and 1911 should give a picture, though incomplete, of the decline of Mongolian population:

League	No. of Able-bodied Men (1769)	No. of Able-bodied Men (1911)
Horqin Left Centre	5,322	4,864
Horqin Left Front	237	620
Horqin Left Rear	3,636	3,807

[229] Wang, "Shi 'fangkenmengdi' haishi 'yiminshibian'?," p. 182.

[230] Chen Zushan 陳祖善, *Dongmenggu jicheng* 東蒙古紀程 [A Record of the Journey to Eastern Mongolia], 1914 (reprinted Hohhot: Yuan fang chu ban she, 2008), p. 137.

Horqin Right Centre	3,152 (in 1771)	1,055
Horqin Right Front	1,518	1,030
Horqin Right Rear	1,385	330
Jalait	1,432	416
Dubert	1,978	479
Gorlos Front	1,837	1,233
Gorlos Rear	2,570	757

(Source: Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, pp. 260-261)[231]

As a consequence of the steady decline of Mongolian population and large influx of Han Chinese immigrants, the demographic composition of Inner Mongolia was drastically transformed in that the Mongols had now become the minority ethnic group in some parts of the region, as illustrated by the following comparative table of the two ethnic groups in the three leagues of eastern Inner Mongolia during the early Republican era:

League	Mongols	% of Population	Han Chinese	% of Population	Total
Jirem	193,000	7.7	2,300,000	92.3	2,493,000
Josotu	209,955	21.6	760,000	78.4	969,955
Juu Uda	116,741	16.7	583,000	83.3	699,741
Total	519,696	12.5	3,643,000	87.5	4,162,696

(Source: Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, p. 268)[232]

The above changes not only had far-reaching impact upon the Mongols south of the Gobi, but they also caused alarm among their kinsmen north of Desert. These should

[231] Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, pp. 260-261.

[232] Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, p. 268.

help explain in part why the Mongols of Outer Mongolia would react so vehemently to the state's implementation of *xinzheng* on their lands, and this will be the subject of chapter 6.

B. Expansion of *jun xian zhi* 郡縣制 (Chinese-style Administration)

Closely related to the State's land reclamation programme in Inner Mongolia was the further expansion of *jun xian zhi* in the region. This was because, apart from the practical need to govern the growing Han Chinese settlements beyond the Great Wall, expansion of *jun xian zhi* was considered an effective system to exert central control over the borderlands. As Yao Xiguang noted, "Feng jian 封建 (feudalism) suits a nomadic society but not a unified one. *Jun xian* is suitable for governing an agricultural society as it facilitates the concentration of power in the centre."[233]

As discussed in Chapter 2, with the continuing migration of Han Chinese farmers to Mongolia since the early Qing period, the state found it necessary to set up Chinese style administrative units, namely *fu* 府 (prefecture), *ting* 廳 (sub-prefecture), *zhou* 州 (department) and *xian* 縣 (county), in the settlement areas to manage and control these migrants. In theory, administrators of these units, known as *lishi* 理事 (director or executive) , who were of relatively low ranking, were only responsible for governing the Chinese settlers under their jurisdiction, and were not allowed to meddle in the internal affairs of the banners.

Records show that the first of such Chinese-style administrative units in eastern Inner Mongolia—namely, two *ting*—were set up during the reign of the Yongzheng emperor, in Jehol (1723) and Kharachin (1729) respectively.[234] The network of *jun xian* continued to expand following the spreading of agriculture and Han Chinese settlements to different parts of the region. By the eve of *xinzheng* implementation, three *fu*, *one*

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[233] Yao, *Chou Meng chu yi*, p. 27.

[234] Jusaghal, *18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu*, p. 204.

zhou, eleven *ting* and eight *xian* were created in the Mongolian region.[235]

In addition to increase in the number of *jun xian*, the State also found it necessary to reform the management of these *kouwai* 口外 (beyond the pass) administrative units, with a view to enhancing the State's control over them. In October 1882, Shanxi governor Zhang Zhidong memorialized the Court, urging an overhaul of the administration of the Province's seven *ting*[236] beyond the pass:

"Guihua is the leader of the seven…Its land is fertile; its aspect is immense and magnificent. Civilians and Mongols lived side by side throughout the area, customs are rude, and official affairs are troublesome. Salaqi makes up the extreme northwestern borderlands of Shanxi….These two ting (Guihua and Salaqi) now experience matters involving foreign trade and churches……Fengzhen…is ringed with pastoral farms and crowded with *liumin* 流民 (transient); there are also many matters related to foreign churches…Land reclamation in Ningyuan increases by the day….. Tuoketuo is bounded by the Yellow River (on one side) where the boats of merchants from beyond the borders are driven downstream. It is the strategic throat of the waterway to ports in Shanxi…. Horinger is mountainous and customs are rough, the majority of grain growers in this area evade taxes. It is also the northern route to Guihua and Salaqi. (The boundary of) Qingshuihe follows the Great Wall, the people are disorderly…."[237]

In short, Zhang urged administrative reforms in these seven *kouwai* sub-prefectures with a view to tackling a host of problems arising from the presence of Han immigrants

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[235] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, p. 149.

[236] The seven *ting* were Guihua (1739), Qingshuihe (1736), Horinger (1728), Tuoketuo (1736), Salaqi (1741), Fengzhen (1751), and Ningyuan (1751). The figures in bracket denote their year of establishment.

[237] Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, "Chou yi qi ting gai zhi shi yi zhe," 籌議七廳改制事宜摺 [A Proposal on changing the administration of the seven *ting*], in Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quan ji* 張文襄公全集 [Complete Works of Zhang Zhidong], 1928 (reprinted Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1963), vol. 6, "Zouyi," 奏議 [Memorials], 6, p. 184.

and foreigners, such as lawlessness, incompetent bureaucrats, ethnic tensions, illegal renting of land, tax evasion, and security concerns posed by foreigners.

Of the different reforms proposed by Zhang, a significant one was his proposal to register the local Han population as native inhabitants, or *ru ji* 入籍. He pointed out that

"Although these people (Han immigrants) have lived (in this area) for several generations….they have no fixed names or official provenance." This led to law and order problems as "the good and the bad live side by side." He argued that official recognition of the Han immigrants as belonging to these sub-prefectures (by registering them as natives) would help revitalize the area's administration and tighten the government control over them, including proper collection of tax.[238]

Zhang proposed that the Han people living within the boundaries of these sub-prefectures should be classified into three categories: *liang hu* 糧戶 (grain tax payers), *ye hu* 業戶 (property holders) and *ji hu* 寄戶 (transients). The first two categories should be automatically registered as natives, whilst the third category should also be registered as natives provided that they had lived in the area for a long time and that they were willing to be so registered. Han living outside the boundaries of these *ting* on the adjacent Mongolian banner lands should be monitored and registered once a year.[239]

Zhang's reform proposals were subsequently approved by the Court despite oppositions from the Mongolian banners. In my opinion, the significances of Zhang's "nativisation" proposal were twofold. First, this was an official recognition of the changed status of Han Chinese migrants in the borderlands from one of "sojourners" (who stay in the borderlands for a short period of time to earn money and then return to home in China proper) to that of permanent settlers. Second, this was the first attempt of

[238] Zhang, "Chou yi qi ting gai zhi shi yi zhe," p. 185.

[239] Zhang, "Chou yi qi ting gai zhi shi yi zhe," p. 185.

the State to "domesticate" the extramural administrative units and turn them into *jun xian* of China proper.

Since 1902, provincial officials such as Cen Chunxuan, Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽, and Wu Tingbin 吳廷斌 repeatedly petitioned the Court for establishment of *jun xian* in the borderlands for better management and control of the Chinese settlements on the reclaimed lands. As Zhao Erxun memorialized in 1902,

"The addition or merging of *jun xian* has always been made in response to changes of the prevailing situation. Now that combating the crimes in different *ting* is of utmost importance, and that the number of lawsuits has grown several times over the normal, my proposals regarding the demerging of the *ting* and re-deploying of the administrators are therefore appropriate measures in light of the prevailing times and situations."[240]

In response to the appeals of these provincial officials, the Court approved the establishment of new *jun xian* in different areas of the Chahar banners, the Ulan Qab and the Yeke Juu Leagues. For the same reason, the *jun xian zhi* was also spread to the Eastern Mongolia to the banner lands within the leagues of Josotu, Juu Uda and Jirem. Unlike the pre-*xinzheng jun xian* (which were set up after the establishment of Chinese settlements), the *jun xian* of the *xinzheng* period were set up at the same time as, or even before, land reclamation activities began [241] All told, the state had set up three *dao* 道 (circuit), two *fu*, ten *ting* and thirteen *xian* during the period of *xinzheng*.[242]

Inevitably, the establishment of Han Chinese settlements in the midst of the Mongolian banners would lead to tensions between the two ethnic groups. However, the setting up of Chinese style administrative units in the settlement areas failed to solve the problems, in particular regarding the lawsuits that involved the two peoples. As Wu

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[240] Zhu comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu*, V, pp. 4828-4829.

[241] Hao ed., *Neimenggu jindai jianshi*, p. 390.

[242] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, p. 152.

Luzhen remarked,

"If a lawsuit is dealt with in the *zhou-xian*, the authorities will show partiality for the Han Chinese. If the case is tried in the Mongolian banners, the authorities will side with the Mongols."[243]

Moreover, the existence of these Chinese style administrative units among the banners greatly reduced and fragmentized the territories of the affected leagues and banners. As a consequence, the administrative powers of the Mongolian princes and nobles were significantly weakened. There were even cases whereby Qing officials overruled the decisions made by Mongolian princes, as the latter were often held at low esteem by the former. For example, the prince of Kharachin planned to connect Chifeng and Chaoyang with telegraphic lines. He approached the Beiyang direct for assistance without first consulting the *dutong* concerned because he considered the latter stubborn. However, in the end, the *dutong* stopped the work from proceeding on the ground that the prince was nothing better than a member of local gentry and, therefore, should not meddle in external affairs.[244]

In short, the expansion of *jun xian zhi* in Inner Mongolia undermined the powers of *jasak* princes, thus further eroded the Banner System, and paved the way for the provincehood of the region.

C. *Choumeng gaizhi* 籌蒙改制 (Reforming Mongolian Institutions)

In this section, I would discuss the institutional reforms introduced by the Qing state, at central and local levels, for the management of Mongol affairs during the *xinzheng* decade. These included proposals to provincialize the Mongolian region, and replacement of *Lifanyuan* by *Lifanbu* 理藩部.

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[243] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 206.

[244] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 207.

(i) Provincehood for Mongolia

Commenting on the Qing court's provincialization of Xinjiang and Taiwan (two of the empire's frontier regions that were under threat from Russia and Japan respectively) in 1884 and 1887, James A. Millward argues that provincialization of the frontier, with the concomitant promotion of Han migration and implementation of Chinese institutions in areas with sizable non-Han populations, was part of the beleaguered Qing dynasty's attempt to shore up its position on all frontiers.[245] Considering the fact that, in addition to the eighteen provinces in China proper, a total of five new provinces were created by the Qing state between 1884 and 1911, I think Millward's argument was well justified. And it comes as no surprise that the Court, in the face of Russian (and Japanese) intrusions into the Mongolian region, would explore provincializing the region as part of its *xinzheng* reforms.

Commencing 1903, the Qing court and frontier officials were involved in a heated debate whether Inner and Outer Mongolia should be turned into provinces of the empire, in the manner of their inland counterparts. Surely, this was a logical development following the expansion of *jun xian zhi* in the region, in Inner Mongolia in particular. The successful provincialization of Xinjiang in 1884 should also have positive impact upon the thinking of the proposal's proponents.

The debate was initiated by Zhao Erxun, the governor of Hunan province (formerly general-in-chief of Shengjing), who memorialized the Throne in 1903, arguing for provincializing the Mongolian region as a means to enhance effective control of the frontiers beyond the Great Wall. By comparing the different frontier administrations in Inner Asia between Han and Tang dynasties, Zhao argued that *jun xian* 郡縣 was superior to *jun fu* 軍府 (imperial residency), in that the *jun xian* established by the

[245] James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 137.

former continued to exist up to the Qing time whilst the *jun fu* set up by the latter had lost long ago. He then made reference to Zuo Zongtang's 左宗棠 provincialization of Xinjiang and argued that both Inner and Outer Mongolia should be made provinces.[246]

In view of the proposal's immense political and financial implications, the Court disseminated Zhao's memorial to various frontier officials for deliberation and recommendation. The proposal met with strong opposition from the frontier officials in Outer Mongolia, in particular the imperial residents of Urga, Uliastai, and Kobdo, on the grounds that provincialization of the region would be unworkable, and that this would contradict with the Qing traditional frontier policy of *yinsuerzhi* 因俗而治 that is, tailoring the frontier policy to suit local circumstances, local people, local customs and the occasion. For example, Ruixun 瑞洵, the imperial resident of Kobdo, memorialized the Court in the same year,

"Mongolia on the north route is a nomadic area. Making it a province will bring nothing but harm. First, the place is secluded. Second, the measure would cause disturbance. Third, the measure would give rise to suspicion and fear among the Mongols. Fourth, its implementation would be exacting and tiring".[247] The proposal should therefore not be pursued further.

Considering the little progress that had been made in Outer Mongolia in terms of land reclamation and implementation of Chinese-style administration, I would argue that Rui Xun's opposition to provincialization was realistic and justified. In any event, confronted with strong opposition from the imperial residents at the Mongolian

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[246] First Historical Archives ed., *Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe*, vol. 33, "Neizheng (Choubeilixian・Yangwuyundong・Wenshudangan・Qita)" 內政 (籌備立憲・洋務運動・文書檔案・其它) [Internal Affairs (Preparation for Constitution; Self-strengthening Movement; Documents Archive; Others)]; "Junwu (yingzhi)" 軍務 (營制) [Military Affairs (Barrack System)], pp. 19-22.

[247] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu* 大清歷朝(德宗)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Guangxu reign], vol. 519, p. 848.

frontiers, the Court temporarily shelved the proposal.

However, the proposal was revived again two years later and with much more intensity. The revival had much to do with the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, which was fought mainly on Chinese soil, with China being reduced to a helpless bystander throughout the whole episode. As Yao Xiguang noted in a submission in September 1905,

"The whole situation in the eastern and northern frontiers has changed since Russia's completion of the Siberian Railway. Since Japan and Russia squabbled, their victory or defeat, and their war or peace, have been of grave concern to us. And the whole situation changed again. …The four eastern Mongolian leagues are situated between the Capital City, Fengtian, and Jilin, just like the part of human body between the waist and arm. So, this (the Russian intrusion) was really a danger to the heartland, not a threat at the frontier…In the present circumstances, we should rouse ourselves to catch up; we should no longer dither and thus lose the opportunity (to strengthen the border security)…"

He then put forth his proposal to divide Inner Mongolia into two provinces (east and west), and Outer Mongolia into three provinces (east, west and north). Yao even optimistically envisaged that, within five years of the proposed provincialization, all the territories south of the Gobi would become prosperous and vibrant.[248]

In the same year, a court official Zuo Shaozuo 左紹佐 also memorialized the Throne:

"Under the old system, governors and governors-general managed the local administrative units (beyond the pass) whilst generals-in-chief and lieutenant generals managed Mongolian banners. Mongols and Hans could be at peace with each other when there was no communication between them. Now that Mongols and Hans are in

[248] Yao, *Chou Meng chu yi*, vol. 1, pp. 29-31.

contact with each other, and transactions between them are numerous. …. *Dao*, *fu*, *zhou* and *xian* deal with lawsuits but Mongols refuse to abide by their rulings. Generals-in-chief and lieutenant generals control the Mongolian banners but the local administrative units refuse to follow their orders. …..Should any mishap occur, the consequences would be too ghastly to contemplate….All this was caused by the lack of unity of authority……In my opinion, if we are to manage the Mongolian banners, unifying all the authorities would be of the topmost priority. In order to unify the authorities, the most important instrument is provincialization."[249]

Zuo's view was echoed by other officials, including Cen Chunxuan (governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces), Tingjie 廷杰 (lieutenant general of Jehol) (1907), Chengxun 誠勳 (lieutenant general of Chahar) (1907), Yigu (general-in-chief of Suiyuan) (1907), Cheng Dequan (acting governor of Heilongjiang) (1907), and Sando (acting lieutenant general of Guihua) (1909). Though they had offered different views on how the Mongolian region should be provincialized, it was clear that provincialization of Mongolia had now become the mainstream view of the official discourse.

The proposal to provincialize the Mongolian region was also the subject of debate in the public media of the time. For example, in 1905, an influential magazine, *The Eastern Miscellany* 東方雜誌 reprinted an article entitled "Arguments against Further Delay in Provincializing Mongolia" 論蒙古改設行省之不可緩 from *Sze Pao* 時報 (Times Newspaper), contending that Russia would surely plot to nibble Mongolia away from China following its defeat by Japan. Citing the successful provincialization of Xinjiang and the British invasion of Tibet (in 1888 and 1903) as examples, the article

[249] "Qian Geishizhong Zuo Shaozuo zou: Xibei bianbei zhongyao, yiqing sheli xingsheng zhe," 前給事中左紹佐奏: 西北邊備重要，擬請設立行省摺 [A Memorial from Former *Geishizhong* (censor) Zuo Shaozuo Proposing to Provincialize the Northwest Region because of its Importance in Border Defense], in Zhu ed., *Dongsansheng Mengwu gongdu huibian*, vol. 5, pp. 437-438.

called for the immediate provincialization of the Mongolian region. To add further weight to the argument, the article noted,

"What is causing more concern is that, our reporters have heard from time to time that the Mongolian vassals have been secretly seduced (by the Russians). Moreover, because of their poverty, the Mongols have frequently sold their lands to the Russians. Even the nearby Khalkha tribe is no exception….if we do not sort out the mess now, all the pasturelands of the six Leagues (in Inner Mongolia) will become the public properties of Russia in ten years' time…"

The article concluded that provincialization of Mongolia was the only viable option, and should not be delayed any further despite the huge costs involved. [250]

On 9 December, *The Eastern Miscellany* reprinted another article entitled "The Way to Govern Mongolia should be Clearly Constituted Now" 論今日宜明定統治蒙古之法 from *Nanfang Pao* 南方報 (The Southern News), which read,

"That we did not start to discuss how to manage Mongolia until today is a belated action. Still, being late is better than inaction…..For today's Mongolia, external relationship (with Russia) was a priority…..We should work out a plan on the governance of Mongolia as soon as possible, and announce it to the whole world, so that foreigners know clearly that Mongolia is our territory….Now that *jun xian* has been installed in *Xiyu* 西域 (the Western Regions, i.e. Xinjiang). China proper and the three Northeastern Provinces are under our control. The provincialization of the whole Mongolian territory should have been effected a long time ago."[251]

From the above articles, it was obvious that strengthening the Mongolian frontier

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[250] "Lun menggu gaishe xingsheng zhi buke huan," 論蒙古改設行省之不可緩 [Arguments against Further Delay in Provincializing Mongolia], *The Eastern Miscellany* 東方雜誌, vol. 2, no. 3, March 1905.

[251] "Lun jinri yi mingding tongzhi menggu zhifa," 論今日宜明定統治蒙古之法 [The Way to Govern Mongolia should be Clearly Constituted Now], *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 3, no. 1, Dec 1905.

against Russian intrusion was the primary consideration behind the provincialization proposal. Naturally, the proposal was not without dissenters. For example, in 1908, an article entitled "Private Views on Provincializing the Frontiers" 沿邊改建行省之私議, reprinted in *The Eastern Miscellany*, opposed the immediate provincialization of Mongolia and Tibet on the grounds that (a) the cash-strapped State was unable to meet the huge financials costs incurred in provincialization; (b) it was impossible to establish *jun xian* in Mongolia and Tibet, where the territory was vast but the population sparse; and (c) the ethnic tensions between Han and Mongols would make governance of these frontier regions very difficult.[252]

However, till the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Court took no steps to provincialize most parts of Inner Mongolia, with the exception of Manchuria, or *Dongbei* 東北 (the Northeast), which included fringes of the Mongolian steppe and was technically part of Inner Mongolia and vice versa.

The provincialization of Manchuria was effected in 1907. Under the new arrangement, Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang were raised to provincial status, now generally known as *Dong San Sheng* 東三省 (the three Northeast provinces), and their jurisdictions were enlarged to cover the newly established *jun xian* on banner lands as well as the Mongolian banners they formerly superintended. All the imperial resident posts were abolished and replaced by a viceroy and governors. With the creation of the three Northeast provinces, the total number of provinces in Qing China was increased to 22.

Historian Chang Chi-hsiung notes that the pro-provincialization camp was composed of civilian and military officials stationed in Inner Mongolia and the three Northeastern Provinces, as well as court officials, governors and governors-general in the heartland,

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[252] "Yuanbian gaijian xingsheng zhi siyi," 沿邊改建行省之私議 [Private Views on Provincializing the Frontiers], *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1907.

whilst those officials stationed in Outer Mongolia were unanimously against making the region provinces.[253] According to Chang's analysis, the Qing's inaction was mainly due to, among others, financial hardship. In other words, the cash-strapped Qing court was unable to raise enough money to provincialize the whole Mongolia.[254]

Chang's view was indeed a correct observation because, according to official estimation, the costs required to set up a new province (such as construction of offices, annual salaries for additional staff, etc.) would amount to no less than tens of millions *silver taels*.[255]

Judging from Japan's occupation of Taiwan in 1895 and its intrusion into *Dongbei* in the 20th century, I would argue that provincialization of the frontiers, though an effective instrument to extend the State's control to the borderlands, cannot guarantee the territorial integrity against foreign invasion.

(ii) *Lifanbu*

As discussed in Chapter 1, the *Lifanyuan* played a crucial role in connecting the centre and the Inner Asian peripheries politically, culturally, and economically during the early Qing period. However, the changing conditions in China's frontier regions since the late nineteenth century called for an overhaul of the State's traditional policy of indirect rule in these borderlands. And this policy shift also led to the replacement of the *Lifanyuan* by the *Lifanbu*.

In the early 20th century there were calls to reform the *Lifanyuan*. As the above-

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[253] Zhang Qixiong 張啟雄 [Chang Chi-hsiung], "Qingting dui zhengfu guanyuan menggu choubian lunshu de jueze—yi guangxudi zhupi zouzhe wei zhongxin," 清廷對政府官員蒙古籌邊論述的抉擇--以光緒帝硃批奏摺為中心 [Qing Dynasty Court's Decision over Government Official's Propositions regarding the Mongolian Frontier Issue—Focusing on Comments Written by Emperor Guangxu in Red with a Brush on the Memorials] *The Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly* 蒙藏季刊, 1 (2010), p. 34.

[254] Zhang Qixiong, "Qingting dui zhengfu guanyuan menggu choubian lunshu de jueze," p. 55.

[255] *Zhengzhi guanbao*, (26 Jan. 1908), No. 93.

quoted article from *Nanfang Pao* noted in 1905,

"Though we have the *Lifanyuan* taking charge of the governance of the frontier territories, it has long been so corrupt that no one can tell what its responsibilities are. If we are to shake it up, we must, first of all, clearly define what the rights and duties of the *Lifanyuan* have over the frontier territories."[256]

In 1906, the Qing court introduced large-scale reforms to the metropolitan administration, including the replacement of some of the venerable *liu bu* 六部 (Six Boards, namely Boards of Civil Office, Revenue, Rites, War, Punishment, and Public Works) by cabinet ministries, after the fashion of Japan and other parliamentary governments. For example, the *Hubu* 户部 (Board of Revenue) was replaced by the *Duzhibu* 度支部 (Ministry of Finance); *Xingbu* 刑部 (Board of Punishment) was transformed to *Fabu* 法部 (Ministry of Justice); *Bingbu* 兵部 (Board of War) was changed to *Lujunbu* 陸軍部 (Ministry of the Armies). New ministries, such as *Shangbu* 商部 (Ministry of Trade), *Xunjingbu* 巡警部 (Ministry of Police)[257], *Xuebu* 學部 (Ministry of Education) and *Youchuanbu* 郵傳部 (Ministry of Posts and Communications), were also set up to meet the new political, social, and economic challenges.

It was in the same exercise that *Lifanyuan* was reorganized as *Lifanbu*. Organizationally, the *Lifanbu* would continue to be headed by a *shangshu* 尚書, who was assisted by two *shilang* 侍郎, a number of *langzhong* 郎中, *yuanwailang* 員外郎 and other bureaucrats. Besides, the ministry would continue to be manned by Manchu and Mongol administrators.

However, the significance of the change lies in the new ministry's mission. In this connection, a blueprint entitled *Lifanbu guanzhi caoan* 理藩部官制草案 (Draft plan

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[256] "Lun jinri yi mingding tongzhi menggu zhifa," *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 3, no. 1, Dec 1905.

[257] Later to be re-constituted as *Minzhengbu* 民政部 (Ministry of Civil Affairs).

on the bureaucratic establishment of *Lifanbu*) was drawn up by the Court, outlining the organization and responsibilities of this new ministry. According to a detailed account attached to Prince Qing's memorial on the administrative reforms, the change was necessary because:

"Colonization (of the frontiers) is the key to counter international competitions, since it will achieve stability and defend the borders of Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai. As the administrative work involved is as important as those of the other ministries, *Lifanyuan* is therefore transformed to *Lifanbu.*"[258]

The statement suggested that the main task of the new *Lifanbu* would be the promotion of migration to the frontier regions in order to strengthen their defense, and this represented a sharp departure from the traditional Manchu policy of ethnic segregation. The new policy shift was actually the State's response to the public calls for colonizing the frontiers since the late nineteenth century.

For example, during the famous *Gongju Shangshu* movement 公車上書 in 1895, famous reformist Kang Youwei 康有為 submitted a petition urging the Court to implement different reforms, and one of the proposals he put forth was the colonization of the frontiers:

"In the northwestern provinces, lands are wasted and populations are scarce. This is more so in the three northeastern provinces, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. With population so small, the productivity of land cannot be developed. If we move people to these regions, we will open up new sources of benefit, and strengthen the border defense."[259]

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[258] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., *Qingmo choubei lixian dang'an shiliao* 清末籌備立憲檔案史料 [Historical materials from the archives on the preparations for the establishment of a constitution at the end of the Qing] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1979), vol. 1, p. 470.

[259] Jian Bozan 翦伯贊 et al. ed., *Zhongguo jin dai shi zi liao cong kan--Wu xu bian fa* 中國近代史資料叢刊--戊戌變法 [Chinese Modern Historical Data Series: the Hundred days' Reform Movement] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1957), vol. 2, p. 146.

The call for colonizing the frontiers became more urgent with the growing Russian intrusion into Mongolia. An editorial entitled "Moving People to Strengthen the Borders Cannot be Further Delayed Now" 徙民實邊為今日之不可緩 published in *The Eastern Miscellany* in 1907, read,

"Today, to move people to strengthen the borders is the most important strategy. Given the State's shortage of financial resources to develop the frontiers, moving the surplus population to fill up the frontier wastelands not only will save money in the development of the borders, but will also reduce the risks of having too many people with too little food in the heartlands. ….Although there are tens of thousands *li* of sand in Mongolia, fertile lands are not lacking (in the region). ….If we do not urgently plan for ourselves, the whole Mongolia will become Russia's preserve someday…"[260]

The call was echoed by another article entitled "Private Discussion on Moving People to Strengthen the Borders" 徙民實邊私議 published by *The Eastern Miscellany* in 1908, which read,

"In today's China, the most populous province was *Shu* 蜀 (Sichuan Province), whose population exceeds 80,000,000. This was followed by *Wu-Yue* 吳越 (Jiangsu-Zhejiang Provinces), *Chu* 楚 (Hunan-Hubei Provinces) and *Yue* 粵(Guangdong Province)…..With the continued growth of population, it would become ever more difficult to make a living. With making a living becoming ever more difficult, the quality of life would become ever more substandard…..If we turn our attention to the western and northern frontiers, (we will find) vast expanses of land that know no bounds. If we do not improve the people's livelihood by moving them from populous regions to regions where the population is scarce, our strong neighbor (Russia) will watch closely for every opportunity to bully us with violence, and we will be unable to

[260] "Ximin shibian wei jinri zhi bukehuan," 徙民實邊為今日之不可緩 [Moving People to Strengthen the Borders Cannot be Further Delayed Now], *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1907.

defend ourselves. What a pity!"[261]

From the above, it was clear that the calls for colonizing the frontiers aimed to achieve (a) to develop the frontier regions; (b) to relieve the population pressures in the heartlands; and (c) to strengthen the borders against Russian intrusion. What was also noteworthy was that these calls had mainly come from Han Chinese intellectuals. It was in pursuance with these goals that re-organization of the *Lifanbu* was to proceed.

If the newly established *Lifanbu* was to proceed with colonizing the borderlands, the greatest hurdles that had to be overcome beforehand were the absence of accurate statistical data about the frontier regions, as well as and the lack of relevant rules and regulations to guide the various reforms in the borderlands. It was against this background that two new bureaus, namely *Diaochaju* 調查局 (Investigation Bureau) and *Bianzuanju* 編纂局 (Editing Bureau) were created in the *Lifanbu* in 1907.

In 1910, in compliance with an instruction issued by the *Xianzheng Biancha Guan* 憲政編查館 (Office to Draw up Regulations for Constitutional Government) that all *yamen* 衙門 (government offices) in the country should set up their respective *Xianzheng Choubeichu* 憲政籌備處 (Preparatory Office for Constitutional Government) to prepare for the coming constitution, the *Diaochaju* and the *Bianzuanju* were combined to form a *Xianzheng Choubeichu*, with its responsibility being the preparation of constitutional reforms in the frontier regions. In the same year, in contravention of the traditional arrangement that the *Lifanyuan* should only be manned by Manchu and Mongol officials, the Court approved the posting of several Han officials, such as Cao Rulin 曹汝霖, Lao Naixuan 勞乃宣, Wu Tingxie 吳廷燮 and Wang Rongbao 汪榮寶, to the *Lifanbu* to assist in the planning and implementation of

[261] "Ximin shibian siyi," 徙民實邊私議 [Private Discussion on Moving People to Strengthen the Borders], *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 5, no. 1, Jan. 1908.

constitutional reforms in the borderlands.[262] Perhaps, a more significant reform to the *Lifanbu* would have been a proposal to set up the *Zhichansi* 殖產司 (Colonial Development Division) and *Bianweisi* 邊衛司 (Border Defense Division). According to the Court's planning, the former would be responsible for opening Mongolian lands; protecting forestry; coordinating livestock breeding, hunting, textile, fishery, mining and other industries; and constructing railways, whilst the latter would be responsible for training and deployment of Mongolian and Tibetan armies; setting up schools and relay stations, and handling border affairs and trade, etc. Undoubtedly, these two offices, if established as proposed, would become useful instruments in realizing the ministry's new goals of promoting migration and strengthening border defense. However, as evidenced by a court memorial of 1909, the authorities concerned were still investigating the feasibility of the proposal despite its importance and urgency.[263] While no reasons could be found in official documents for the delay, I guess shortage of funds, which was a common scourge in the implementation of reforms, should be one of them.

[262] *Zhengzhi guanbao*, (5 June 1910), No. 933.

[263] First Historical Archives ed., *Qingmo choubei lixian dang'an shiliao*, vol. 1, pp. 77-78.

Chapter 5 *Xinzheng* in Inner Mongolia (II)

In the preceding chapter, I have examined the Qing state's *xinzheng* reforms in the areas of land reclamation, imposition of Chinese-style administrative units, and reconstitution of Mongolian governing institutions in Inner Mongolia. In this chapter, I will deal with the remaining important reforms in the Mongolian region south of the Gobi, specifically in the areas of military, education, transport, communication and new enterprises.

Military Revitalization

Given the threats posed by Western powers and Japan to the territorial integrity of the Qing empire since the mid-nineteenth century, military revitalization, as highlighted in the famous Reform Edict of 29 January 1901, was naturally one of the top priorities of *xinzheng* reforms. In December 1903, the Court set up a *Lianbing Chu* 練兵處 (Commission for Army Reorganization) for planning the reorganization and modernization of its armies. In the following year, the *Lianbing Chu* submitted proposals to the Throne detailing the organization, pay, and creation of new armies, as well as the establishment of a whole hierarchy of military schools in the empire. These proposals were subsequently approved by the Court and became the guidelines for the military revitalization programs implemented throughout the empire.

The guiding principles of the Court's military revitalization program were set out by an imperial edict issued in August 1901, which reads,

"In our opinion, training of generals is the prerequisite of military revitalization, and this in turn relies on education. To this end, we must set up plenty of *wubei xuetang* 武備學堂 (military academies)….However, the effects of *wubei xuetang* cannot be

achieved overnight, and the number of trained personnel from the existing *xuetang* in different provinces cannot meet our needs. ….In the circumstances, we ask all the generals-in-chief, governors-generals, and governors in all the provinces to strictly cut down the garrisons under their purview, and select certain battalions to be trained as standing armies, reserves, and patrols with modern firearms. The training must be serious so that they will become powerful armies…"[264]

The same guidelines were applied to Mongolia, which, as discussed in previous chapters, had long served as a "screen" for China proper against external threats from the north. The growing presence of Russia and Japan in the region no doubt made the need to strengthen the regional defense all the more pressing. Referring to the military deployments of Russia and Japan in northeastern China following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Wu Luzhen remarked,

"Should they (Russia or Japan) invade Mongolia one day, the four eastern Mongolian leagues would have to bear the brunt. Hence, today's Manchuria is yesterday's Korea; tomorrow's four eastern Mongolian leagues will become today's Manchuria. Barring that China does not want to strengthen herself; if China does, it must step up its border defense. If China wants to step up the border defense, the gain or loss of Mongolia and Manchuria will be of utmost importance…If we manage not to lose Mongolia, we can gradually advance from there and stop their (Russian or Japanese) southern intrusion. Therefore, we operate in Mongolia not just for Mongolia's sake. We would use Mongolia as a defense base and as a precursor to the restoration of Manchuria."[265]

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[264] First Historical Archives ed., *Guangxu Xuantong liangchao shangyu dang*, vol. 27, pp. 72-73.

[265] Wu Luzhen, "Bingshi zhi biyao," 兵事之必要 [The Indispensability of Military Affairs], in Wu and Wu, *Jing ying Menggu tiao yi*, p. 236.

There were two approaches to strengthen the Mongol region's defense. The first one, naturally, was to train Mongolian soldiers, who had played an important role militarily during the early Qing period, but whose military prowess had declined since the nineteenth century. As Zhang Zhidong remarked,

"The Mongolian leagues stood together, through thick and thin, with the different reigns of our Holy Qing, and share weal and woe with China today. During the reigns of Yongzheng and Qianlong, the Mongolian tribes contributed their armies to the subjugation of the Zunghars and the Huis, and accomplished great meritorious services. Of late, the Mongolian vassals are penniless, and have become ever more poor and weak, thus giving the Russians a chance to come in."[266]

Zhang therefore suggested that the state should seek to revive nomadism in Mongolia, and train Mongolian soldiers with the profits accrued therefrom. As he noted,

"A strong Mongolia would serve as our scouts and sentinels. A weak Mongolia would become the fish and meat on their (Russian and Japanese) chopping board. The difference between these two scenarios was impossible to measure."[267]

Zhang's view was shared by some reform-minded Mongol *jasaks* and princes, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu of the Kharachin Right Banner, and Prince Guanchuksurong of the Horqin Banner. For example, Prince Gungsangnorbu argued that "Able-bodied Mongols are noted for their bravery, and have made a lot of praiseworthy contributions to the state since its establishment." He then urged the *Lujunbu* 陸軍部 (Ministry of Army) to help train Mongolian soldiers, and organize them into army units for the defense of the Mongolian borderlands.[268]

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[266] Zhang Zhidong, "Xiang choubian ji zhe," 詳籌邊計摺 [Memorial on Comprehensive Planning of Frontier Affairs], in Zhang, *Zhang Wenxiang gong quan ji*, vol. 1, "Zouyi," 奏議 [Memorials], 2, pp. 367-368.

[267] Zhang, "Xiang choubian ji zhe," p. 369.

[268] "Kalaqin junwang Gong Sang Nuo Er Bu jingchen guanjian zhe," 喀喇沁郡王貢桑諾爾布敬陳管見

Gungsangnorbu also set up a military academy, namely Shouzheng Wubei Xuetang 守正武備學堂, in his banner for the training of Mongolian military personnel.

External threats aside, Mongol princes and *jasaks* also found it necessary to turn the subjects of their respective banners into militias for their own protection against the bandits that plagued their banners. As Wu Luzhen noted in 1906,

"Of late, owing to the Boxer uprisings and the rampancy of *hufei* 鬍匪 (bearded bandits) in the region, all the banners started to train their own military forces along the lines of the militia system (in China proper)…"[269]

However, the effectiveness of such Mongolian militia was in grave doubt. As Wu Luzhen reported,

"However, from what I have heard, such military service was considered a type of feudal duties and, therefore, the militias were not very well provisioned. As a consequence, the militias were extremely tired and weak, and were deeply imbued with bad habits, with some of them being drug addicts. These militias were nothing but guards of honor created for the purpose of good public impression."[270]

The other aspects of Mongol military revitalization did not fare much better either. As Wu Luzhen added,

"A visit to the Academy (Shouzheng Wubei Xuetang) revealed that the number of students fell short of the available places. Their form and spirit were far inferior to that of Beiyang. The *Taijis* hung firearms on the wall of their homes but these were old models of more than one hundred years ago….Most of the newly acquired firearms were old-fashioned with wooden-butts, and they were only good for hunting, unable to defend against the *hufei* . …The horses of the cavalry were untrained and poorly

摺 [A Memorial Submitted by Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin Respectfully Presenting his Humble Opinions], in Zhu ed., *Dongsansheng Mengwu gongdu huibian*, vol. 5, p. 452.

[269] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 194.

[270] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 194.

fed….In short, it could be said that there was no military system in Mongolia." [271]

The second approach was to revitalize the existing Manchu (*Eight Banners*) and Han (*Green Standard*) garrisons in the region, and to create modernized armies according to Western standards. Despite the strategic importance of Mongolia to the security of the empire, the state garrisons in the region were also in very bad shape during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yigu, in his capacity as the Suiyuan general-in-chief, pointed out, "all the barracks were full of tired and weak soldiers who had been imbued with deep-rooted bad habits (i.e. opium smoking).[272]

Commenting on the newly recruited soldiers in eastern Mongolia, Wu Luzhen also noted, "The recruited soldiers are a motley group, with good ones and bad ones mixing together. Drills and exercises are rare. It cannot be ruled out that some of them have secret connections with bandits." [273] He also added that, "there was no coordination between different army corps as if there were great gullies separating them."[274]

The Court's military re-vitalization program was mainly composed of measures to re-train existing army units in westernized (and Japanese) drills, tactics, and weaponry; to establish new and modernized armies; and to establish *wubei xuetang* for the grooming of military personnel. In Inner Mongolia, the program was mainly undertaken by the imperial residents, namely the *jiangjun*, *dutong/fu dutong* 都統/副都統, of different Mongolian towns on a local basis.

The aim of re-training was to turn the dilapidated army units into a modern army of *changbeijun* 常備軍 (regular army). For example, in 1901, Xinke 信恪, the Suiyuan general-in-chief, was tasked to turn the Manchu garrison under his command into a

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[271] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 194.

[272] Yigu 貽穀, *Suiyuan zou yi* 綏遠奏議 [Memorials from Suiyuan], 1908 (reprinted Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1974), p. 25.

[273] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 195.

[274] Wu, *Dong si meng Menggu shi ji*, p. 195.

changbeijun and to establish a *wubei xuetang* in the city. According to the plan, he was to pick 300 men from the Banner troops to undergo a one-year military re-training program. After the first year, the re-trained soldiers would be placed on reserve and another batch of 300 soldiers would be selected for training. The same process would be repeated every year until all the Banner soldiers were re-trained. Meanwhile, 60 young men from the Mongol Eight Banners were recruited to study at the Suiyuan Wubei Xuetang 綏遠武備學堂, where they were taught westernized/Japanese drills. In 1906, the Suiyuan Wubei Xuetang was changed to Suiyuan Lujun Xiaoxuetang 綏遠陸軍小學堂 (Suiyuan Army Elementary School) in accordance with the *Lianbing Chu*'s regulations. In the first year, a total of 30 students from the nearby banners were enrolled, and the subjects being taught included *Guo Wen* 國文 (Chinese), English, history, geography, arithmetic, physics, moral education, drawing, drills, and military strategy, etc.[275]

Apart from the poor quality of the troops and recruits as discussed above, shortage of funding also severely handicapped these frontier officials' efforts to modernize their forces. As Yigu talked about the retraining program in Suiyuan,

"At the beginning (of the retraining program), we had to borrow the 10,000-odd *taels* of *majiayin* 馬價銀 (horse silver) in our inventory to meet the (inception) expenses. This sum has already been used up within these two years. We have yet to acquire flags, military uniforms, books, equipment, and other necessities. However, we have already run out of money and cannot afford to buy these items."[276]

According to Yigu's plan, recurrent expenditure for the re-training program and operation cost of the military academy was supposed to come from the *yahuangyin* and

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[275] Yigu 貽穀 and Gao Gengen 高賡恩 et al. comp, *Suiyuan quan zhi* 綏遠全志 [Complete Gazetteer of Suiyuan], 1908 (reprinted Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2012), vol. 6, pp. 334-335.

[276] Yigu, *Suiyuan zouyi*, p. 26.

land taxes arising from the opening of the horse-farms at Suiyuan. However, the soil quality in question was so poor that few Han Chinese farmers had shown interest in them. As a consequence, both the re-training program and the academy were on the verge of bankruptcy. Yigu had to make use of the revenues collected from coal and mining as well as other sources to meet the expenses.[277]

Similarly, due to shortage of funds, the size of the Tumed standing army had to be reduced from 300 to 200 troops, with the savings arising therefrom to be utilized to acquire uniforms and other provisions for the soldiers.[278] Also, because of shortage of funding, the cavalry of Chahar had to turn to the Beiyang Army 北洋軍 for the provision of firearms and ammunitions.[279]

The military revitalization program in eastern Mongolia was also plagued with the chronic problem of funding shortage. As Xiliang 錫良, the viceroy of *Dong San Sheng* reported in 1909 (or two years before the Qing dynasty collapsed):

"The *Lujunbu* had previously stipulated that each of the Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces should train one *zhen* 鎮[280] of (modernized) army within two years, and the deadline fell on the seventh month of this year. As things now stand, Fengtian has just re-organized six *ying* of infantry, and one *ying* of artillerymen…Jilin has trained one *xie* of infantry. Nothing has been done for the training of army in Heilongjiang. Since the situations of these three provinces are equally important, how can we delay action in Heilongjiang? This is because raising money is extremely difficult and as such we are unable to accomplish so many tasks simultaneously."[281]

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[277] Yigu, *Suiyuan zouyi*, pp. 58-59.

[278] Yigu, *Suiyuan zouyi*, pp. 58-59.

[279] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 509, p. 718.

[280] A division in of the Qing army. One *zhen* was composed of two *xie* 協; one *xie* was composed of two *biao* 標; and one *biao* was composed of three *ying* 營 (battalion).

[281] Xiliang 錫良, "Dong San Sheng lianbing zhe," 東三省練兵摺 [A memorial on the training of armies in Three Northeastern Provinces], in Xiliang; The Third Institute, Institute of History,

In the absence of real battles fought between Qing armies and foreign intruders during the *xinzheng* period, it would be difficult to measure the effectiveness of the military revitalization program in the Mongol region. However, judging from the quality of the Qing troops and Mongolian militias as evidenced by eyewitness reports of the time, and the chronic problem of funding shortage that had seriously handicapped the implementation of the reform, I have strong doubts about how much could be achieved in the revitalization program.

Educational Reforms

As highlighted in the Reform Edict of 1901, to secure *rencai* 人材 (men of real talent) was one of the top priorities of *xinzheng* reforms. The Edict declares,

"The first essential, even more important than devising new systems, is to secure men of administrative ability. Without new systems, the corrupted old system cannot be saved; without men of ability, even good systems cannot be made to succeed."[282]

Securing men of real talent was to be achieved through implementing educational reforms throughout the empire. In China proper, educational reforms included the establishment of a new system of civil and military schools; the incorporation of more practical questions in civil service testing; replacement of military examinations with training at new military schools; and the encouragement of study abroad.[283] Because of Mongolia's frontier status, the educational reforms implemented in the region were mainly confined to the establishment of modern schools, and the concomitant introduction of new curricula at these new schools.

Chinese Academy of Sciences 中國科學院歷史研究所第三所 comp, *Xiliang yi gao* 錫良遺稿 [Posthumous Memorials of Xiliang] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1959), vol. 7, p. 932.

[282] Zhu comp, *Guangxuchao donghualu*, IV, pp. 135-136, adapted from the translation of the edict in Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912*, pp. 131-132.

[283] Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912*, p. 133.

During the early twentieth century, both Han and Mongol elites repeatedly urged the Court to introduce educational reforms in Mongolia as they unanimously agreed that the Mongols were backward and ignorant. In their opinion, Lamaism was the chief cause of the Mongols' ignorance and hence the urgent need for educating the Mongols with modern knowledge. For example, in a memorial to the Throne, Zhang Qihuai 章啓槐, a *neige zhongshu* 內閣中書 (cabinet assistant), pointed out,

"All the people of Mongolia, regardless of their gender and age, engage in raising livestock. They have no schools and know nothing about education. As a result, the people are ignorant and education cannot be applied…..What is most inconceivable about the people of Mongolia is that they have blind faith in religion (i.e. Lamaism)….If we are to eradicate their superstitious belief, we must make education available to them all, and the way to educate the mass is through the establishment of many elementary schools."[284]

Similarly, a number of Mongolian *jasaks* and princes, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu, Prince Palta of Old Torgot Right Banner, Prince Guanchuksurong of Horqin Banner, and Prince Nayantu of Khalkha, and Duke Bodso of Horqin Banner, also appealed to the Throne for promoting education in Mongolia.[285] For instance, Prince Gungsangnorbu observed,

"In Mongolia, there has been no education except for the lamas. As a result, most people (Mongols) are simple-minded morons with little common sense. Surely, less than one or two out of 100 people understand the Han language; even the number of those

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[284] "Neige daizou zhongshu Zhang Qihuai qing zhengdun neiwai menggu zhe," 內閣代奏中書章啓槐請整頓內外蒙古摺 [A Memorial submitted by the Cabinet on behalf of An Assistant Zhang Qihuai on the Overhaul of Inner and Outer Mongolia], in Zhu ed., *Dongsansheng Mengwu gongdu huibian*, vol. 5, pp. 443-444.

[285] Bayilduyci, "Qingmo menggu wanggong tuqiang zouyi gailun," 清末蒙古王公圖強奏議概論 [A Survey of the Memorials Submitted by the Mongol Nobilities in Late Qing on Ways to Strengthen the Nation], in Bayilduyci, *Chengjisihan de yi chan*, p. 252.

who understand the Mongolian language is very small. Now that a strong neighbor (Russia) is watching us with evil intentions and is inciting (us) in various ways…The Mongols have blind faith in Lamaism. If foreigners take advantage of our faith, there will be no end of trouble for the future. In the circumstances, educating (the Mongols) is of the topmost priority today."[286]

Understandably, the most effective means to educate the Mongol mass was through the establishment of modern schools in the region. During the first decade of the twentieth century, a number of modern educational institutions were set up in Inner Mongolia. Broadly speaking, these institutions could be classified into three main groups: those set up by imperial residents, chiefly for the children of the Manchu Eight Banners and Mongols; those set up by *zhou*-, *xian*-governments, chiefly for Han children; and those set up by Mongolian *jasaks* and princes for the children of their respective banners.[287]

These schools were of different levels, such as *gaodeng xuetang* 高等學堂 (higher schools), *zhongxuetang* 中學堂 (middle schools), *gaodeng xiaoxuetang* 高等小學堂 (higher elementary schools), *xunchang xiaoxuetang* 尋常小學堂 (lower elementary schools), and *mengxuetang* 蒙學堂 (primary schools). In addition to educating Mongolian children with new knowledge, these modern schools had a more important mission, namely to strengthen the ties between the heartland and the frontiers through cultural assimilation. In other words, the schools were tasked to integrate Mongolia with China culturally and make the traditional nomadic Mongols, in the words of Christopher Atwood, into modernizing sedentary Chinese.[288]

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[286] "Kalaqin junwang Gong Sang Nuo Er Bu jingchen guanjian zhe," p. 451.

[287] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (I), pp. 436-437.

[288] Christopher P. Atwood, *Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia's Interregnum Decades, 1911-1931* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002), p. 44.

During the first few years of the *xinzheng* decade, *xuetang* of different levels and purposes were set up in the Mongolian region, with some of them being transformed from the existing old-style *shuyuan* 書院 (academy). The abolition of *Keju* 科舉 (civil service examination system) by the Court in 1906 further boosted the establishment of modern schools in the region. By 1911, in the Suiyuan-Guihua district alone, there were nine *xuetang*, including two *zhongxuetang*, three *gaodeng xiaoxuetang*, two *xunchang xiaoxuetang*, one *Man-Meng xuetang* 滿蒙學堂 (Manchu-Mongol school) and one *Huibu xuetang* 回部學堂 (Muslim school).[289]

The most representative of these modern schools was Guisui zhongxuetang 歸綏中學堂 as it was one of the earliest (set up in 1903) and well-established modern schools in the region. In 1906, the school premises were enlarged to admit over 100 students. It also adopted the new curriculum approved by the *Qinding xuetang zhangcheng* 欽定學堂章程 (Imperially Approved School Regulations). Under this *zhangcheng*, subjects like *xiushen* 修身 (Confucian ethics), *wenxue* 文學 (literature), *jingxue* 經學 (study of Chinese classics), *lishi* 歷史 (history), *dili* 地理 (geography), *suanxue* 算學 (arithmetic), *bowu* 博物 (natural science), *lihua* 理化 (physics and chemistry), *riwen* 日文 (written Japanese), *riyu* 日語 (oral Japanese), *yingwen* 英文 (English), *tuhua* 圖畫 (drawings), *yuege* 樂歌 (music and songs), and *ticao ke* 體操課 (physical exercise) should be taught at schools.[290] On the basis of this curriculum, I would argue that, whilst acquisition of modern knowledge was an important goal of the educational reform, the grooming of *junzi* 君子 (man of noble character) in accordance with Confucian tradition continued to be the top priority of the educational system, even in the empire's frontier regions.

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[289] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (IV), p. 1597.

[290] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (IV), p. 1597.

In theory, the same curriculum should be adopted by all modern schools throughout the empire whilst permitting necessary variations to suit different local situations. However, owing to the shortage of qualified teachers and suitable textbooks for new subjects such as arithmetic, foreign languages, *bowu*, etc., the curricular of many *xuetang* in Mongolia continued to be confined to the teaching of Confucian classics.[291] In my opinion, this should be a common problem encountered in most parts of the empire given the huge upsurge in the demand for western-trained teachers and new textbooks during the *xinzheng* period.

Apart from shortage of qualified teachers and suitable teaching materials, another hurdle to promoting education in Mongolia was the Mongols' apathy towards schooling. For example, as late as 1910, Puliang 溥良, the Chahar *dutong*, reported to the Court that "despite the unfolding of new atmosphere, most people still cling to old traditions, and were unaware of the benefits of schooling. As a consequence, education will not make much headway (in Mongolia)."[292]

Many leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia, such as the Kharachin Right and the Tumed Left Banners of the Josotu League, the Horqin Right Centre, the Jalait, the Gorlos Front, and the Durbet Banners of Jirem League, also set up schools of their own. In Outer Mongolia, there was one *mengxuetang* in each of its banners and one *xiaoxuetang* in each of its leagues.[293]

Among these reform-minded Mongol *jasaks* and princes, Prince Gungsangnorbu alone had set up two *xuetang* and one military academy, namely Chongzheng Xuetang

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[291] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (IV), p. 1597.

[292] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 04-01-38-0202-037, 'Chahaer chouban xingxue pian' 察哈爾籌辦興學片 [Note on Preparation for Promoting Education in Chahar], *Gongzhong dang zhupi zouzhe* 宮中檔硃批奏摺 [Palace Memorials Approved by the Emperor's Hand], 24 Dec. 1910.

[293] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, pp. 173-175.

崇正學堂, Yuzheng Nü Xuetang 毓正女學堂, and Shouzheng Wu Xuetang 守正武學堂 within his banner. Of these modern schools, Chongzheng Xuetang, established in 1902, was regarded as the first modern school in the Mongolian society.[294] Some of the Mongolian students trained in these schools were subsequently sent to study abroad (mainly Japan) and later became zealous participants in Prince Gungsangnorbu's political activities in Beijing during the fall of Qing dynasty.[295]

As stated above, apart from teaching the Mongols modern knowledge, these *xuetang* were also tasked to strengthen the ties between the heartland and the borderlands through Mongol-Han assimilation. In practical terms, the assimilation was to be achieved through teaching Mongolian children Chinese language, whose official language status was legalized by the State in 1904.[296] As Wu Luzhen remarked,

"Teaching the (Mongolian) children *Hanyu* 漢語 (oral Chinese) is important in elementary schools; in (Mongolian) higher elementary schools and middle schools, teaching the students *Hanwen* 漢文 (written Chinese) is important. This is because unification of language is always closely related to (unification of) the nation."[297]

Another reformist Yao Xiguang 姚錫光 also elaborated on the merits of Mongol-Han assimilation as he argues,

"In my humble opinion, there is no better way to reform Mongolian education

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[294] Ma and Cheng eds., *Qingdai bianjiang kaifa*, p. 355.

[295] Xiao Jun 小軍, "Cong Kalaqinqi xuexiao jianshe kan ershishiji chuqi neimenggu dongbu diqu jiaoyu," 從喀喇沁旗學校建設看二十世紀初期內蒙古東部地區教育 [A Study of Education in Eastern Inner Mongolian Region During Early 20 Century on the basis of School Construction in Kharachin Banner] *Modern Mongolia-Tibet Bimonthly* 蒙藏現況雙月報, 4 (2007), pp. 33-34.

[296] Yu Fengchun 于逢春 and Liu Min 劉民, "WanQing zhengfu dui mengguzu de guoyu jiaoyu zhengce," 晚清政府對蒙古族的國語教育政策 [The late Qing government's Mandarin education policy to Mongolian ethnic group] *China's Borderland History and Geography Studies* 中國邊疆史地研究, 2 (2008), p. 77.

[297] Wu Luzhen, "Jiaoyu zhi biyao," 教育之必要 [The Indispensability of Education], in Wu and Wu, *Jing ying Menggu tiao yi*, p. 249.

today than “Mongol-Han Chinese assimilation”, since this will bring this country, Mongolia and Han Chinese every advantage and no harm. ….If assimilated, the Mongols and Han Chinese will join hands as people of the same country in their resistance against foreign aggression……thus bringing the country every advantage and no harm. Mongolia was poor because its people do not know how to make a living. However, through Mongol-Han Chinese assimilation, the Mongols will be able to learn the know-how of farming, handicraft, trade, and other means of living of Han Chinese……thus bringing Mongolia every advantage and no harm. Previously, during the sixteenth and the seventeenth years of Emperor Guangxu’s reign, the riot of *Jindan* 金丹 bandits broke out in Jehol because of the accumulated rancor between the Mongols and Han Chinese, and the enmity between them still exists today……If the two peoples are assimilated, the enmity between the host (Mongols) and guest (Han Chinese) will vanish, thus bringing Han Chinese every advantage and no harm.”[298]

On a more practical level, some state officials also suggested that mastery of the Chinese language would facilitate, among others, the teaching of new knowledge and the implementation of *xinzheng*:

“The Mongols of the northwestern frontiers were simple and crude. Generally, apart from Mongolian, the Mongols would sometimes learn a little bit of Manchu. Only very few of them mastered the oral and written Chinese language. However, illiteracy of Chinese would seriously handicap the enlightenment of Mongols and the implementation of *xinzheng*. Since there are so many subjects to be taught in the general course these days, illiteracy of Chinese would cause a lot of contradictions in teaching. Hence, illiteracy of Chinese would inconvenient education. Moreover, *xinzheng* implementation involves so many items that the Mongols have never heard of. As they cannot read Chinese characters, they are very often suspicious and surprised. Hence,

[298] Yao, *Chou Meng chuyi*, p. 87.

illiteracy of Chinese would inconvenient the execution of policies…."[299]

With a view to achieving assimilation and modernization, the state vigorously promoted Chinese learning at Mongol *xuetang*. Whilst ancient Chinese classics, such as *Qing Wen Jian* 清文鑑 (Pentaglot Dictionary), *San Zi Jing* 三字經 (Three Character Classic), and *Sishu* 四書 (Four Books), etc., would continue to be used as textbooks for Mongolian students,[300] new *Guo Wen* (Chinese) textbooks were also introduced. In this regard, the introduction and distribution of *Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu* 滿蒙漢合璧教科書 (*Textbook in a combination of three Scripts: Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese*) as a textbook for Mongolian elementary schools in northeast China was illustrative of how *Guo Wen* education was implemented in Inner Mongolia (and Manchuria).

The Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu was a Manchu-Mongol translation of the Chinese textbook entitled *Zui Xin Chu Deng Gao Deng Guo Wen Ke Jiao Ke Shu* 最新初等高等國文科教科書 (*The Latest Primary and Higher Chinese Textbook*), which was published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai in 1904. In 1909, Xiliang, the viceroy of *Dong San Shen*, assigned a dismissed official Rongde 榮德 to take charge of the translation work. In his memorial to the Throne, Xiliang explained why it was necessary to translate Chinese textbooks,

"If we are to import new knowledge (into Mongolia), we must teach (the students) Chinese-written science subjects. The Chinese language is complicated whilst the

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[299] National Palace Museum (Taipei), 169393, 'Zouqing chixia xibei ge jiangjun dutong dachen yiti bianshe banri xuetang yikaimengzhi er guangjiaoyu you' 奏請飭下西北各將軍都統大臣一體遍設半日學堂以開蒙智而廣教育由 [A memorial to the court on the reasons for instructing all the *jiangjun*, *dutong*, and *dachen* in the northwest region to set up half-day *xuetang* to enlighten the Mongols and promote education], *Junjichulufuzouzhe* 軍機處錄副奏摺 [Records of Great State Council Memorials], 19 Jan. 1909.

[300] Yu and Liu, "WanQing zhengfu dui mengguzu de guoyu jiaoyu zhengce," p. 77.

Mongolian language is simple. Meanings and examples (in Chinese) therefore cannot be accurately translated (into Mongolian) without the aid of the Manchu language…If we are to strengthen the border defense, we must first of all set up schools; if we are to set up schools, we must first of all translate (Chinese textbooks)".[301]

In order to meet the needs of the *Xuebu*'s new curriculum, many new textbooks were published in China, both by the *Xuebu* and private publishers. However, the contents of many of the privately published textbooks were, in the words of a court official Zhang Shipei 張世培, "rebellious, absurd, and contradicting the Confucian ethical code" whilst the textbooks compiled under the aegis of the *Xuebu* were "overloaded with contents; not of the right level; with poor style and layout; with inappropriate expressions; poorly illustrated".[302] That the *Zui Xin Chu Deng Gao Deng Guo Wen Ke Jiao Ke Shu* was selected as the new textbook for Mongolian elementary schools was probably because its contents conformed to the specifications of *Xuebu* and met the needs of the time, and that its editorial standard was higher than other similar textbooks of the time.[303] All told, between 1909 and 1910, Xiliang had printed 20,000 copies of the textbook (of different volumes) and distributed them to different *xuetang* and Mongolian banners.[304]

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[301] Xiliang, "Xingli mengxue xuanyi Jiao Ke Shu yiqi bianmeng zhe," 興立蒙學選譯教科書以啓邊氓摺 [A Memorial on Educating the Frontier Folks by Establishment of Primary Schools and Translation of Textbooks], *Xiliang yi gao*, vol. 7, pp. 985-986.

[302] National Palace Museum (Taipei), 183939, 'Geishizhong Zhang Shipei Zouzhe' 給事中張世培奏摺 [A Memorial Submitted by Censor Zhang Shipei], *Junjichulufuzouzhe* 軍機處錄副奏摺 [Records of Great State Council Memorials], 27 Jan. 1910.

[303] Lin Shixuan 林士鉉 [Lin Shih-hsuan], "ManMengHan HeBi JiaoKeShu Yu Qingmo Menggu Jiaoyu Gaige Chutan," 《滿蒙漢合璧教科書》與清末蒙古教育改革初探 [*ManMengHan HeBi JiaoKeShu* and Mongolian Educational Reform in the Late Qing] *Fu Jen Historical Journal* 輔仁歷史學報 32 (2014), p. 134.

[304] Lin Shixuan, "ManMengHan HeBi JiaoKeShu Yu Qingmo Menggu Jiaoyu Gaige Chutan," pp. 143-144.

In addition to teaching the Mongols Chinese language, the *Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu* also served as an important vehicle for promoting *guo min jiao yu* 國民教育 (national education) as it was a textbook that started from the standpoint of *Guo Jia* 國家 (the nation)[305]. For example, one of its texts read,

"Our China is situated on the eastern part of Asia…..Five thousand years ago, its civilization started to flourish, and (China) is thus the most famous ancient country on earth. Since the time of our distant ancestors, we have lived in this country, clothed in this country, eaten in this country. This remains unchanged from generation to generation, up to our time. As we are the subjects of China, how can we not love China?"[306]

Given the fact that the *Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu* was only introduced in *Dong San Shen* shortly before the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the subsequent turmoil in the region, it would be difficult to ascertain the impact of Chinese language education upon the Mongolian children.

Moreover, the effect of another goal of the education reform in the region, namely Mongol-Han assimilation, was also highly doubtful as evidenced by the eyewitness report submitted by Yao Xiguang following his inspection tours of eastern Inner Mongolia:

"During last year and this spring (1905-1906), I have twice toured the frontier to inspect Mongolia, where I found *xuetang* set up by *zhou*, *xian* (governments) and Mongolian royal houses. Of the Mongolian *xuetang,* only the Kharachin royal house had set up one *mengxiaoxuetang* 蒙小學堂 (primary school), one *wubei xuetang* 武備

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[305] Lin Shixuan, "ManMengHan HeBi JiaoKeShu Yu Qingmo Menggu Jiaoyu Gaige Chutan," pp. 147-152.

[306] The Palace Museum (Beijing) 故宮博物院 ed., *ManMengHan HeBi JiaoKeShu* 滿蒙漢合璧教科書 [Textbook in a combination of three Scripts: Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese] 1909 (reprinted Haikou: Hainan chu ban she, 2001), "Zhongguo" 中國 [China], vol. 4, chapter 23.

學堂 (military academy), and one *nüxuetang* (women's school). There were no Mongolian students in *xuetang* founded by *zhou* and *xian*; nor were there any Han Chinese students in Mongolian *xuetang*. Obviously, there was no hope of Mongol-Han Chinese assimilation. Moreover, *zhou*-, *xian*-governments' chief motivation (of setting up schools) was to use this as a cover to extort money, and they had no intention to promote education. That they were corrupt was needless to say."[307]

However, of more concern to the Qing state was the situation in the Mongolian schools, as Yao went on to report:

"As to the Mongolian *xuetang*, they were unanimously interested in the promotion of military drills. The examples they cited in lectures or the talks they gave during their free time were all about the restoration of Chinggis Khan's enterprise, with a view to inspiring their three million fellow countrymen. There was no mention whatsoever of the military achievements of our imperial (Qing) ancestors. It would not be difficult to infer what their ulterior motive was…."[308]

Mongol-Chinese historian Zhou Jinghong 周競紅 remarks that the late Qing educational reform introduced during the *xinzheng* period had, to a certain degree, advanced the enlightenment of Mongolian consciousness[309]; in particular, its modern

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[307] Yao, *Chou Meng chuyi*, p. 88.

[308] Yao, *Chou Meng chuyi*, p. 88.

[309] According to Christopher P. Atwood's investigation of Mongolian historical writings, through the Qing period, the Mongols continued to see the Mongolian banners as collectively forming a single *ulus* (meaning country or realm), on a level with that of China, Tibet, or Korea. Each *ulus* had its own customs, language or traditions of rule. Neither political disunity within the *ulus* nor its incorporation into a larger empire disrupted this sense of a historically continuous domain. (Christopher P. Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers in the Chinese Revolution; Or, How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian?" *Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern China* 5 (1994), p. 44.) Hence, the Mongols' consciousness of being a member of the Mongolian *ulus* is Mongolian consciousness. In this connection, Zhou Jinghong 周競紅 argues that, since the late nineteenth century, the momentous changes in the world, in particular the breakdown of the Qing empire,

school education system had created the social conditions for the rise of new Mongolian social elites.[310] No doubt, the educational reform had somewhat changed the cultural scene of the Mongolian region, and exposed Mongolian youths to new thinking. For example, Yun Heng 雲亨, one of the Mongol leaders in the Suiyuan-Baotou uprising against the Qing court in 1911, joined the *Zhongguo Tongmenghui* 中國同盟會 (Chinese United League) during his study at Guihua-Suiyuan Zhongxuetang.[311]

Modern Transport and Communications

(a) Transport

During the *xinzheng* decade, the Qing state introduced measures seeking to improve the connection between China proper and the frontier regions. Closer connection not only would strengthen the centre's control over the peripheries, but would also reinforce the state's defense against foreign intrusion into the borderlands. One of these measures was the construction of railroads plying between the heartland and the frontiers.

In Qing China, the controversies surrounding railroad construction started in the early 1860s. Conservatives opposed the building of railway networks in China on the

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also greatly impacted the Mongolian region, starting, among others, the process of Mongolian consciousness evolving into Mongolian nationalism. (Zhou Jinghong, *Menggu min zu wen ti shu lun* 蒙古民族問題述論 [Commentary on Mongolian Issues in Modern China] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2011), p. 125). Seen in this light, Mongolian consciousness was the Qing precursor that paved the way for the Mongolian nation.

[310] Zhou, *Menggu min zu wen ti shu lun*, p. 128.

[311] Jing Gechen 經革陳, "Xianfu Ziheng xiansheng canjia xinhai geming shilue," 先父子衡先生參加辛亥革命事略 [A Brief Account of My Late Father Master Ziheng's Joining of the Xinhai Revolution], *Neimenggu xinhai geming shiliao* 內蒙古辛亥革命史料 [Historical Materials concerning the Xinhai Revolution in Inner Mongolia] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People's Press, 1962), pp. 191-193.

grounds that this would invite foreign penetration into the country, cause disturbance and panic among the people, and waste large sums of money. They even branded the railroad proponents, such as Li Hongzhang and Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳 as traitors. The Court vacillated between the two camps till 1889, when it finally came to the view that railroad building was important to the country's modernization and defense.[312]

For the Mongolian frontiers, some officials argued that railroad construction should be accorded top priority given the fact that the State's only rail link between China proper and the region at the time was the line between Shanhai Pass 山海關 and Fengtian,[313] whilst all the other railways in the region were controlled either by Russia or Japan, thus posing a serious security threat to the region. As Wu Luzhen observed,

"The effect of railroads is the greatest. Making good use of railways will enrich the country and benefit the people; if not, they will be used by another country as a tool of subjugation. For instance, with the opening of the Siberian Railway, Russia became the greatest power of the world. The completion of the Mid-East Railway was the real image of the loss of the three northeastern provinces, and it led to the great tragedy of Russo-Japanese War… The foreigners are operating the railways in the eastern part of our country because of their high stakes in Manchuria and Mongolia. (By constructing rail roads) we can take a leaf from them and beat them at their own game."[314]

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[312] Tang Yinian 唐益年, "Yin paiju er zhenglun wanqing xingxiu tielu jubu weijian," 因排拒而爭論 晚清興修鐵路舉步維艱 [Controversies arising from Resistance: The Difficult Start of Railway Construction in Late Qing], Culture.China.com.cn 文化中國-中國網, 15 June 2010, http://www.china.com.cn/culture/lishi/2010-06/15/content_20270366.htm.

[313] "Mengwuju duban shang Dongsanshen zhongdu choukan mengdi tielu shuotie," 蒙務局督辦上東三省總督籌勘蒙地鐵路說帖 [A Memorandum from the Administrator of Mongol Affairs Bureau to the Viceroy of the Three Northeastern Provinces on the Planning and Surveying of Mongol Railroads], in Zhu ed., *Dongsansheng Mengwu gongdu huibian*, vol. 1, p. 82.

[314] Wu Luzhen, "Tielu zhi jihua," 鐵路之計劃 [The Planning of Railroads], in Wu and Wu, *Jing ying Menggu tiao yi*, pp. 255-256.

Wu's view was shared by other frontier officials in the region, such as Cheng Dequan 程德全, then acting governor of Heilongjiang, who argued in 1906 for building railway networks to connect the Mongol areas,

"The first and foremost task is to improve transport service in order to open the frontiers. Of the Mongolian areas in the northwest, with the exception of Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar,…..all other areas are deserts and inaccessible places, and they were remote in distance and cold in weather. …..What should we do if we are to start (reforms) from the scratch? Without improving transport service to facilitate circulation, there would be no ways to introduce and implement reforms (in the region)."[315]

Even Mongolian *jasaks* and princes, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu and Prince Guanchuksurong also urged the Court to build railroads in the region.[316] For example, Gungsangnorbu stated in his memorial to the Court,

"The poor transport service between Mongolian banners has already handicapped new developments. Moreover, Russia's Siberian Railway running from the northwest to the southeast has encompassed the whole Mongolia. Since the (Russo-Japanese) War, Japan has been active in the southeast whilst Russia has turned its attention to the northwest. If we do not construct railroads urgently, it will be very difficult to resist (foreign) intrusion…"[317]

From the above discussion, it was apparent that Qing frontier officials and reformed-minded Mongolian chiefs finally come to realize the strategic importance of

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[315] "Qianshu Heilongjiang xunfu Cheng Dequan xunzhi yifu tongchou xibei quanju, zhuoyi biantong banfa zhe," 前署黑龍江巡撫程德全遵旨議覆統籌西北全局，酌擬變通辦法摺 [A Reply Memorial, Submitted in Compliance with an Imperial Edict, by Cheng Dequan, Former Acting Governor of Heilongjiang, to Comment on the Memorial "On the Overhaul of Northwestern Territories", and to Suggest Workarounds], in Zhu ed., *Dongsansheng Mengwu gongdu huibian*, vol. 5, p. 459.

[316] Bayilduyci, "Qingmo menggu wanggong tuqiang zouyi gailun," pp. 256-257.

[317] "Kalaqin junwang Gong Sang Nuo Er Bu jingchen guanjian zhe," p. 448.

railroad to the defense and development of the Mongolian region. However, considering the huge construction costs involved and the large areas of land that would be covered by a railroad project, it would be difficult for any individual official or banner chief to undertake such project on his own.

In theory, the *Youchuanbu* 郵傳部 (Ministry of Posts and Communications) set up in 1906 would centralize and coordinate all the railroad building projects throughout the empire. However, like other *xinzheng* reforms in the region, most of the rail lines in Mongolia were actually planned by individual imperial residents and frontier officials. One of the major railroad proposals was the link between Jinzhou and Aigun. The project was first mooted by Cheng Dequan (see above) in 1906, but it was subsequently revised to start from Jinzhou, via Chaoyang, Xilietu Hure Banner (also known as Little Urga), Liaoyuan, and Taonan, and terminates at Aigun. If the proposal had materialized, there would have been a rail line running through the three eastern Mongol leagues (Josotu, Juu Uda, and Jirem) of Inner Mongolia, thus bringing about significant benefits to the region in terms of transportation, commerce, and defense.[318] However, owing to funding difficulties and Japan's interference and obstruction, this project never materialized.[319]

The first successful example of Chinese financed rail line during the period was the Beijing-Zhangjiakou railway. Proposed by Yuan Shikai in 1905, the line connected China's capital city with the town of Zhangjiakou that borders Inner Mongolia. This railway commenced operation in 1909. In 1907, Yuan Shikai proposed to extend the Beijing-Zhangjiakou railway to Urga in Outer Mongolia, but obviously the proposal

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[318] "Mengwuju duban shang Dongsanshen zhongdu choukan mengdi tielu shuotie," p. 82.

[319] Xu Yi 徐曦 comp, *Dong san Sheng ji lüe* 東三省紀略 [General Account of the Three Eastern Provinces], 1914 (reprinted Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1915), vol. 9, "Tielu ji lüe xia" 鐵路紀略下 [A Summary of Railroads, Part 2], p. 578.

was not followed through.[320]

In the following years, other railway proposals were put forth by different officials with a view to connecting China proper with different cities or towns in Mongolia and Xinjiang. As late as early 1911, the Qing state still came up with plans to build three railways that would traverse the Mongol region: one from Zhangjiakou to Kyakhta that would connect the region from south to north; one from Zhangjiakou to Jehol that would link up Inner Mongolia; and one from Urga to Ili that would link up Outer Mongolia.[321] However, up to the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the only two completed railways in the region were the Beijing-Zhangjiakou railway and the Beijing-Fengtian railway (an extension of the Shanhai Pass-Fengtian railway), whilst all other proposals still remained at the planning stage.[322]

Apart from building railways, there were proposals to operate long distance coach service in the region. For example, in 1911, Sando, the *amban* of Urga, proposed to operate a coach service plying between Zhangjiakou and Urga. Again, there was no time to implement such a proposal before the fall of the dynasty.

(b) Posts and Communications

Another way to connect the heartland and the frontiers was through improving the postal and telecommunication services between the two. Since the 1870s, postal and communication services had been set up by reform-minded officials in the heartland, in particular at coastal cities and trade ports. In 1889, the State opened a telegraphic line between Jilin (through some Mongolian banners of the Jirem League) and the town of Heihe on the southern bank of Heilong Jiang (Amur River) in the north, and Beijing in

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[320] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 45, p. 6.

[321] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 46, p. 8.

[322] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (III), p. 1441.

the south. In 1897, the State started to lay another telegraphic line from Zhangjiakou to Urga in Outer Mongolia, and later extended it to Kyakhta in 1899.

During the *xinzheng* period, telegraphic offices were set up in different parts of the Mongolian region, such as Changtu, Liaoyuan, Taonan, Chifeng, and Guihua of Inner Mongolia, as well as Altay, Kobdo, Uliastai of Outer Mongolia. At the same time, Prince Gungsangnorbu also paved telegraphic lines linking the Kharachin Right Banner with Chengde and Beijing with his own resources.[323]

Most of the post offices in the borderlands were converted from the traditional relay stations. Since 1896, the State had set up post offices in places like Changtu, Chaoyang in Inner Mongolia. Following the establishment of the *Youchuanbu* in 1906, more post offices were established in various cities and towns of the Mongolian region, such as Taonan, Liaoyuan, Chifeng, Guihua, Baotou, Wuchuan, Wuyuan, Salaqi, Tuoketuo, and Horinger in Inner Mongolia, and Urga and Kyakhta in Outer Mongolia.[324]

Since the late nineteenth century, the Qing state finally realized the importance of modern transport and communication system to the country's territorial integrity and survival. In this regard, different proposals were advanced or implemented in order to connect the heartland and the frontiers through railway building and postal and telecommunication expansion. However, as can be seen from the above discussion, the effect was disappointing. This was, I would argue, mainly due to the State's financial insolvency, thus preventing the State from implementing many necessary reforms. The proposed Jinzhou-Aigun railway was a telling example. The importance of the line to the country's survival was well recognized by the State but, in the words of Xiliang, the

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[323] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (III), pp. 1449-1459.

[324] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (I), p. 432.

viceroy of *Dong San Sheng*, "The rail track would be lengthy and the fund required would be substantial….Even if we were to devote the whole country's resources to its construction, we would become bankrupt before its completion."[325] To Xiliang, the only way out was to raise loans with the United States and Britain, but the Throne was reluctant to do so, probably having regarded to the sovereignty issue involved. In the absence of necessary funding, the project eventually fell through.

Modern Enterprises

(a) New Industries

In order to revitalize the economy of the Mongolian region with a view to generating new revenues to tackle the challenge of debt and to finance the implementation of New Policy reforms, the Qing state also, in addition to undertaking large scale reclamation activities, promoted modern enterprises and mining in the region.

Following agricultural expansion and influx of large numbers of Han immigrants, handicrafts began to flourish in Inner Mongolia. However, in most of the nineteenth century, handicrafts in the region were relatively primitive. They were produced by small workshops and their mode of production remained manual. Most of the handicrafts were traditional trades, such as leatherworking, felting, woodworking, ironworking, etc., and they mainly existed in cities and towns. For example, by the end of the same century, there were some 30 leatherworking workshops, and 20-30 felting workshops in the town of Guihua.[326]

During the *xinzheng* decade, with the State's backing, modern businesses and

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[325] Xiliang, "Choujie waizhai yizhu tielu zhe," 籌借外債以築鐵路摺 [A Memorial on Raising Foreign Loans for Railroad Construction], in *Xiliang yi gao*, vol. 7, p. 960.

[326] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (I), p. 423.

industries began to emerge in Inner Mongolia. The most representative of these new concerns included the Maofang Gongyiju 毛紡工藝局 (Wool Processing Bureau) at Guihua, the Dabusu Zaojian Gongsi 大布蘇造鹼公司 (Dabusu Soda Manufacturing Company) at the Gorlos Front Banner, the Zonghe Gongchang 綜合工廠 (Multi-industry Factory) at Kharachin Right Banner, the Menggu Shiye Gongsi 蒙古實業公司 (Mongolia Industrial Corporation) headquartered in Beijing, and the Xiangyu Muzhi Gongsi 祥裕木植公司 (Xiangyu Logging Company) at the Greater Khingan Mountains. A brief survey of these concerns would give us an idea of the development of modern enterprises in Inner Mongolia in late Qing period.

The Maofang Gongyiju was a joint state-private business concern set up by Hu Fuchen 胡孚宸, the *bingbeidao* 兵備道 (rectifying official of armed forces) of Guihua-Suiyuan, in 1905. Its inception capital was made up of 4,000 *silver taels* from official offerings, and 1,000 *taels* from private shares. It employed and trained some 50 artisans in the trades of wool textile and dyeing. However, its mode of production was still manual operation with wooden machinery, and its operation scale was slightly larger than that of a workshop.[327]

The Dabusu Zaojian Gongsi was a joint venture between a Changchun soda manufacturer and the *jasak* of the Gorlos Front Banner. Established in 1909, the company employed over 1,000 workers in the processing of soda with indigenous method. It was not until after the Republican years that the factory started to manufacture with machinery.[328]

The Zonghe Gongchang was founded by Prince Gungsangnorbu around 1905. In this connection, four Mongolian youths of the Kharachin Right Banner had been sent to

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[327] Peng Zeyi 彭澤益 ed., *Zhongguo jin dai shou gong ye shi zi liao, 1840-1949* 中國近代手工業史資料, 1840-1949 [Historical Data of Modern Chinese Handicrafts, 1840-1949] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1962), vol. 2, p. 553.

[328] Peng ed., *Zhongguo jin dai shou gong ye shi zi liao, 1840-1949*, vol. 2, p. 388.

Tianjin to undergo training in trades like weaving, dyeing, soap and candle production, etc. before becoming artisans of the factory. A technician from Tianjin was also employed to teach workers carpet weaving. The finished products of the factory and commodities imported from Beijing, Tianjin, and other cities were sold at a department store also established by the prince.[329]

The Menggu Shiye Gongsi was set up in 1910 by a group of prominent Mongolian princes stationed in Beijing, such as Prince Amurlingghui of the Horqin Left Rear Banner, Prince Gungsangnorbu of the Kharachin Right Banner, and Prince Nayantu of Outer Mongolia, with its mission being to "multiply the Mongols' livelihood." While claiming an inception capital of over 500,000 *silver taels*, the actual capital it managed to raise was merely 60,000 *taels*. From its inception till the Qing collapsed in 1911, the corporation planned to launch several ambitious projects, such as the long-distance coach service between Zhangjiakou and Urga, some reclamation activities of the Gorlos Rear Banner, salt trade of the Ujimqin Banner, and the inland water transport of the Yellow River in west Mongolia. Probably due to its small amount of operational capital and short life span, none of these projects were ever realized before the corporation's final closure in 1914.[330]

The Xiangyu Muzhi Gongsi was founded by a Mongol Fu Desheng 阜德勝 and some Mongolian shareholders in 1905. It was reported to be a joint state-private enterprise with an inception capital of 16,000 *silver taels*. Operating at the Greater Khingan Mountains, the company was engaged in logging and exporting timber. One

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[329] Wu Enhe 吳恩和 and Xing Fuli 邢復禮, "Gong Sang Nuo Er Bu," 貢桑諾爾布 [Gungsangnorbu], in *Neimenggu wenshi zi liao* 內蒙古文史資料 [IMAR (Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region) Literary and Historical Materials] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People's Press, 1979), vol. 1, p. 109.

[330] Wang Bingming 汪炳明, "'Menggu Shiye Gongsi' Shimo," "蒙古實業公司" 始末 [The entire history of the "Mongolian Industrial Company"], in Bayilduyci, *Chengjisihan de yi chan*, pp. 132-133.

year after its inception, the timber sold by the company amounted to some 8,000 *silver taels*. Upon Fu Desheng's death, his son Fu Hai 阜海 opened another company and continued the logging business in Taoerhe (a tributary of Nenjiang River) area until the company's closure in the early Republican years.[331]

(b) Mining

Mongolia has abundant mineral wealth, such as gold, coal, silver, and others. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, extractive activities, mostly done by Han migrant workers, in the Mongolian region were officially banned because of the Mongols' aversion towards mining (which, in their view, would unleash curses and cause misfortunes) and the Manchu court's policy of ensuring Mongolia untainted by foreign influence.[332] As discussed in Chapter 2, the State had set up a number of Gold Watch-posts within the Mongolian region to prevent the exploitation of its mineral resources.

However, in 1852, owing to fiscal crises, the Court formally lifted the ban on mining throughout the empire, and private participation was also invited. As a consequence, extractive activities appeared in the Mongolian region for the first time. Important mines of the time included the silver-mine at the Haller Ancuta Mountain, the Honghuagou gold -mine, the Changhanggou silver-mine, the Tucao silver-mine, and the Xilapian silver-mine.[333] In 1889, the Court established its first state-run gold-mine in Mohe in northern Manchuria.[334] Relevant regulations were also drawn up to regulate such activities, with one of its provisions stipulated that, apart from payments of tax and

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[331] Wang, "Qingmo xinzheng yu beibu bianjiang kaifa," p. 227.

[332] M. High and J. Schlesinger, "Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold Mining in Mongolian Qing History," *Central Asian Survey* 29, no. 3 (2010), pp. 293-294.

[333] Ma and Cheng eds., *Qingdai bianjiang kaifa*, p. 349.

[334] High and Schlesinger, "Rulers and Rascals," p. 297.

share dividends, one tenth of the proceeds from mining would go to the concerned Mongolian banner. However, owing to poor management and heavy taxation, most of these mines were closed several years later.[335]

During the *xinzheng* era, mining ventures popped up in different parts of the Mongolian region as mining had now become, in the eyes of the Qing government, a profitable path for the generation of much-needed state revenue. The mines mainly concentrated in the Josotu and Juu Uda Leagues and Hulun Buir in eastern Inner Mongolia. Large mines included Zhuanshanzi gold-mine, the Tucao silver-mine, and the Ganhe coal-mine, etc.[336] *S*ome of the ventures were run by the State, some by private capital, and some jointly by State and private capital. Some of the mine operators, such as Han capitalist Xu Run 徐潤, imported mining machinery from the West and employed foreign experts to run the operation.[337]

In Heilongjiang, under the oversight of frontier officials, such as Cheng Dequan, Zhou Shumo 周樹模, extractive activities began to flourish. Important mines included the gold mines at Jilalin and Qiqian River, and the coal mine at Chagan Ula.

In addition to these large mines, numerous small-scale mines were opened in the region, but many of them eventually shut down because of backward technology and mismanagement.

From the above discussion, the effectiveness of the State's economic revitalization activities in Inner Mongolia was in grave doubt. For one thing, the scale of most of these new enterprises was small, the technologies they employed backward, and their

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[335] Hao and Chimeddorji eds., *Neimenggu tongshi*, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (I), p. 426.

[336] Zhao, *Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu*, pp. 164-165.

[337] Wang Jingyu 汪敬虞 ed., *Zhongguo jin dai gong ye shi zi liao* 中國近代工業史資料 [Historical Data of Modern Chinese Industries], (Beijing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1957), vol. 2, pp. 1137-1141.

modes of operation were conservative.

Another dominant feature of these new enterprises was the leading role played by the State, and this would inevitably handicap the development of entrepreneurship. A telling example was the gold-mine at Kelesi 克勒司 near the Russian border. According to Yanzhi 延祉, the *amban* of Urga, this gold mine "has yielded very little since its inception in 1908 and has incurred heavy losses. Under commercial practices, its operation should have been stopped. However, since the mine has been reported to the Court, we dare not stop its operation abruptly."[338]

Conclusion

Historically, the Manchu subjugation of Inner and Outer Mongolia during the seventeenth century terminated for good the long standing separation and military confrontations between the agrarian state in China proper and the nomadic tribes roaming north of the Great Wall. However, thanks to the Qing court's segregation policy, political, economic, cultural, and ethnic integration between the peoples on both sides of the Great Wall remained elusive for most parts of the Qing rule. As the discussion in the preceding chapter shows, the Qing court had long been caught in a dilemma over the maintenance of its segregation policy between the heartland and the Mongolian frontier. On the one hand, the Manchu rulers tried to protect their Mongolian ally by denying Han Chinese migration to the north. On the other hand, as ruler of the different national constituencies, the Manchu emperors had to find ways to relieve hardship in impoverished regions in China proper, and this sometimes required them to condone or even encourage migration of Han Chinese to the northern territories. As a

[338] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 04-01-36-0115-004, 'Kelesi jinchang rengzan kaiban pian' 克勒司金廠仍暫開辦片 ["Gold Mine at Kelesi is still in operation" note], *Gongzhong dang zhupi zouzhe* 宮中檔硃批奏摺 [Palace Memorials Approved by the Emperor's Hand], 11 April 1909.

result of these conflicting pressures, Beijing shifted back and forth, lacking commitment to any single goal. It was not until the *xinzheng* decade that the Court finally and formally abandoned such policy ambiguities and firmly encouraged the political, economic, cultural, and ethnic integration between Han Chinese and the Mongols.

The Qing court implemented *xinzheng* reforms in the Mongolian region with a view to combatting the twin challenges of debt and threat. In this regard, I think *fangken mengdi* was a telling example of how the Court sought to accomplish the dual tasks. Not only would the reclamation of pasturelands for cultivation generate much needed revenue for the State to repay its enormous war debt (and to finance the reforms), the encouragement of Han Chinese to migrate and settle on the reclaimed Mongolian frontier (*yimin shibian*) would, in theory, also help the State to strengthen its border defense against foreign (Russian) threat.

As *fangken mengdi* amply shows, this so-called "New Policy" was neither new nor innovative, in that this merely represented a continuation and institutionalization of expedient measures that the State had previously introduced to meet circumstantial needs throughout the empire. The same can be said of the expansion of *jun xian zhi* and the provincialization of the three northeastern provinces in Manchuria, which actually followed examples either in the Mongolian or other frontier regions.

One noteworthy feature of the *xinzheng* in Inner Mongolia was the warm, if not zealous, support shown by its Mongolian princes and *jasaks* for many of the reforms. This was markedly different from the hostility towards the reforms displayed by their counterparts north of the Gobi. One explanation, in my opinion, can be found in the different levels of social and economic developments between Inner and Outer Mongolia, which made these Inner Mongolian elites more open to new ideas and renovations.

On the face of it, the Qing court's execution of *xinzheng* reforms in the Mongolian

region was an attempt to modernize (or Westernize) its management and control of the region. However, a closer examination would reveal that the implementation of *xinzheng* in Mongolia (and other Inner Asian frontiers) was more an attempt to Sinicize than to Westernize the region. I would argue that this was a logical development following the meteoric rise of Han officials in the Manchu court's policy-making process since the mid-nineteenth century, and the consequential change of mindset of the ruling Manchus. Instead of clinging to their Inner Asian instinct of guarding against Han Chinese commercial and agricultural penetration into Inner Asia, the Manchus had now obtained a new insight whereby they positively recognized that the mobile commercial and agricultural elements of sedentary of Han Chinese society would be the most effective forces in sustaining the Manchu court's internal and external sovereignty in the vast and largely nomadic land of Inner Asia.[339] By converting Mongolian pastureland en masse into farmland, populating the region with large numbers of Han Chinese immigrants, and expanding Chinese-style civil administration in the region, the Manchu court was in fact advancing Han-Chinese interests, with which the Court's interests were now closely entwined, in its Inner Asian frontiers. Finally, the abolition of cultural barriers that separated the Mongols from Han Chinese, and the attempt to promote Mongol-Han assimilation through *guowen* education threatened to replace Mongol culture with that of Han Chinese. All these had caused serious alarm among the Outer Mongol elites, leading to their attempt to declare independence in 1911.

[339] Liu Xiaoyuan, *Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 13.

Chapter 6

Xinzheng in Outer Mongolia

On 29 December 1911, a group of Khalkha noblemen proclaimed (Outer) Mongolia's independence from the Qing dynasty and the elevation of the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, now bearing the title of Boghd Khan (the Great Khan), as head of their new state—the Yeke Mongghol Ulus (Great Mongolian Nation). Earlier on, in a petition dated 29 July 1911 signed by the Khutuktu and these Khalkha nobles to the Russian Tsar seeking the latter's assistance in their struggle against the Manchu rule, its authors claimed,

"Over the past two hundred years the Mongolian khans and ruling princes have been the rulers of their commoners, enjoying their native products and living peacefully, but in recent years high-ranking Chinese (Manchu) officials have become powerful and begun to meddle in our national affairs. In particular, the worst thing is their violation, in the name of the 'New Policy', of the old traditions by taking over land to use for farming….."[340]

From the above statement, the Khalkha nobles pinpointed, among other things, the *xinzheng* reforms as one of the principal grievances that had given rise to their independence movement. However, as Mei-hua Lan has pointed out, relatively little of the Qing court's New Administration was accomplished in Outer Mongolia due to desperate financial condition, time limitations, and the Mongols' opposition.[341] This raises an array of questions: what were the *xinzheng* reforms that Qing officials had introduced in Outer Mongolia? How had such reforms impacted the Outer Mongols? If the *xinzheng* reforms were not the sole cause of the independence movement, what else

[340] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 10.

[341] Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," p. 51.

had caused the Outer Mongols to break away from the crumbling Qing empire, to whom they had submitted for over two hundred years? This chapter seeks to answer these questions.

Limited *Xinzheng* Reforms in Kobdo and Uliastai

Located north to the Gobi Desert and far away from the Chinese heartland, Outer Mongolia was still relatively underdeveloped by early twentieth century. As at 1910, the total number of households of the four *aimags* in Outer Mongolia was merely 49,191.[342] Nomadism was still the principal means of living of its inhabitants, and agriculture was negligible. Though the region was rich in mineral resources, mining activities were relatively rare because of local opposition. Transport and communication links between Outer Mongolia and China proper was inadequate as there were neither railroads nor highways connecting them. It was said that the telegraphic line between Zhangjiakou and Kyakhta installed around 1898 was the only modern facility in Outer Mongolia.[343]

The *xinzheng* reforms in Outer Mongolia were primarily undertaken by the imperial residents stationed in the region, namely the *jiangjun* (general-in-chief), *dutong* (general), and *dachen* (minister) of Uliastai, Kobdo, and Urga on their own initiatives with the limited local resources that were available. Given Outer Mongolia's economic and social conditions as described above, it was readily apparent that implementation of *xinzheng* reforms would be a daunting, if not impossible, undertaking. Relatively

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[342] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 1523-233, 'Kulun banshi dachen zisong suoshu tuche liangmeng sha huaeshang shubiao' 庫倫辦事大臣諮送所屬圖車兩盟沙華俄商數表 [List submitted by the *Amban* of Urga on the number of Chinese and Russian Merchants in the Tiisiyetii and Sechen Khanate *aimags* and the *Shabi*s under his jurisdiction], *Lifanbu Dangan* 理藩部檔案 [Archives of the Board Ruling the Outer Provinces], 6 April 1910.

[343] Fan Mingfang 樊明方, "Qingmo Waimeng xinzheng shuping," 清末外蒙新政述評 [A Review of the New Policy Exercised in Outer Mongolia at the End of Qing Dynasty] *The Western Regions Studies* 西域研究, 1 (2005), p. 36.

speaking, the reforms implemented in Uliastai and Kobdo were limited in terms of scale and impact, whereas those introduced by Sando 三多, the last *amban* (*dachen*) of Urga, were regarded by many Chinese contemporaries and historians as the trigger for the Khalkha Mongols' independence movement in 1911.[344]

Kobdo

Geographically, Kobdo was close to Russia and, as a consequence, the number of foreign merchants there was higher than other places in Outer Mongolia.[345] This fact implied that there was a pressing need for the town to step up its defense. However, because of the underdeveloped state of its economy, the town had to rely on *Xiexiang* 協餉 (annual financial assistance) from inland provinces such as Shanxi and Henan to support its administration. Whenever such financial assistances fell in arrears, the Kobdo government had to turn to merchant loans to keep it going. In 1902, the Kobdo government was too bankrupt to repay its merchant loans (that were borrowed to pay the local garrison) that it had to appeal to Beijing for assistance.[346] In the circumstances, resources were hardly available for the implementation of *xinzheng* reforms.

As early as January 1902, Ruixun 瑞洵, the *canzan dachen* 參贊大臣 of Kobdo, memorialized the Court saying that he planned to train a new army at a yearly cost of 120,000 *silver taels*, open lands for cultivation at a cost of 40,000 *taels*, and promote

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[344] Yin Shuqiang 尹書強, "Xinhai geming shiqi menggu diqu weiji de yuanyin chutan," 辛亥革命時期蒙古地區危機的原因初探 [A Preliminary Study on the Causes of the Crisis in the Mongolian Region during the Xinhai Revolution] *Inner Mongolia Normal University Journal (Philosophy and Social Science page)* 內蒙古師範大學學報 (哲學社會科學版), 6 (2007), pp. 141-144.

[345] Ruixun 瑞洵, "Michen bianfang chizhong banshi weinan pian," 密陳邊防吃重辦事為難片 [Secret submission on the arduous frontier defense and the difficulties in doing things], in Ruixun, *Sanmuju zougao* 散木居奏稿 [Memorials of Sanmu studio], 1939 (reprinted Beijing: The National Libraries Documents Microfilm and Reproduction Centre, 2004), p. 25.

[346] Ruixun, "Qianxiang wuzhuo kenen tixu chibu heshi zhe," 欠餉無著懇恩體恤敕部核示摺 [Memorial seeking court's directive on back pay for soldiers], in Ruixun, *Sanmuju zougao*, p. 275.

animal breeding at 50,000 *taels* yearly (for buying Mongolian herds) in the areas under his jurisdiction.[347] In response, the Court advised Ruixun, "You should first raise money for the reforms, then implement them by stages, in order to achieve concrete results."[348] In December 1903, Ruixun again memorialized the Court requesting to put all the proposed reforms on hold on grounds of difficulties in raising the necessary funds.[349] Actually, the only "reform" that Ruixun had introduced in Kobdo during these two years was renaming the *Jichaeshangju* 稽查俄商局 (Inspection of Russian Merchants Bureau) as *Yangwuju* 洋務局 (Foreign Affairs Bureau).[350]

In 1907, owing to shortage of funding, the Court had to ask the Beiyang Army 北洋軍隊 to assign some of its firearms to the newly established cavalry in Kobdo.[351]

Uliastai

The situation in Uliastai was no better. For example, in the years of 1902 and 1904 respectively, Lianshun 連順, the *jiangjun* of Uliastai, had twice petitioned the Throne to exempt the town from raising new taxes on the ground that its inhabitants were too poor to afford them, and his requests were acceded to.[352]

In February 1910, Kunxiu 堃岫, the *jiangjun* of Uliastai, reported that he planned to build a primary normal school in the town, expand the local police force, set up a bureau to help people quit opium-smoking, set up a chamber of commerce, and establish an office to take charge of the *xinzheng* reforms. He requested a provision of 20,000 *silver taels* from the central government as an annual subsidy for implementing

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[347] Ruixun, "Tuochou jingfei zhe," 妥籌經費摺 [Memorial on properly raising money], in Ruixun, *Sanmuju zougao*, pp. 373-376.

[348] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 491, p. 8.

[349] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 523, p. 2.

[350] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu,* vol. 501, p. 1.

[351] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 572, p. 16.

[352] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu,* vol. 498, p. 4; vol. 530, p. 3.

the reforms.[353] However, the Court did not give immediate approval for Kunxiu's proposals and merely referred them to the relevant ministries for further deliberation.[354] Given that all the proposals put forth by Kunxiu were common reforms that had actually been implemented in many parts of the empire, I could only surmise that the Throne's inaction was due to its financial difficulties.

Xinzheng Reforms in Urga before 1910

Generally speaking, the implementation of *xinzheng* reforms in Urga could be divided into two stages: from 1901 till 1910, and from 1910 till the collapse of the Qing dynasty one year later, with Sando taking up the post of the *amban* of Urga as the watershed. The pace of reform during the first stage under Sando's predecessors was rather moderate, but it began to gather momentum in the later stage until the Qing officials were ousted from Outer Mongolia.

An important "achievement" of the *xinzheng* in Urga during the first stage was the exploitation of natural resources, in particular gold mining, of Outer Mongolia. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a Russian-Belgian Joint Stock company, Mongolor, was established in 1900 to exploit the concessions for mining gold in the territories of Tiisiyetii Khanate and Sechen Khanate *aimags*. However, the Mongols opposed gold-mining from the outset. In May 1900, they sent a letter to the *Lifanyuan* to express their opposition. In this letter they said that gold-mining was harmful both to their way of living and to their land.[355] Despite the Mongols' opposition, the cash-strapped Qing

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[353] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 29, pp. 6-7.

[354] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 29, p. 8.

[355] Quoted from *Mongolyn ard tunmii 1911 ony undesnii erkh choloo tusgaar togynolyn toloo tomtsel, barimt bichgiin emkhtgel (1900-1914) (Mongolian people's struggle of 1911 for national freedom and independence, a collection of documents (1900-1914))*(Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn Khewleliin Gazar, 1982), p. 10, see Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," p. 46.

Court, after much vacillating, finally gave its approval in 1906 for the gold in the two *aimags* to be mined, with a Russian, Baron Victor von Grot, who had previously participated in the operation of Mongolor, as the manager. Nominally a Sino-Russian joint enterprise, the company was granted concessions to mine gold for twenty-five years. It was stipulated in the relevant regulations of the company that 13.5% of the gold extracted annually would go the Qing court's coffer, while another 3% would go to the banners concerned. During the five years between 1906 and 1910, the revenue received by the Qing government from this source worth over 460,000 *taels* of silver, and that received by the banners concerned was over 100,000 *taels*.[356]

At the same time, the Manchu authorities faced strong opposition from the Outer Mongols on their proposal to open lands for cultivation. In a letter of 28 June 1906 to Yanzhi 延祉, the Manchu *amban* of Urga, the head of the Sechen Khanate *aimag* stated that there was no land in his territory available for agriculture because of geological and climatic unsuitability, and that the limited suitable land available was already being used to breed the herds. He continued by stating that the Mongolian tradition was to use good pasture land to breed animals, not to cultivate land and build villages; that the pasture land for animal husbandry would decrease if Han Chinese people came to cultivate and build houses and shops, and that land opening would inevitably cause trouble and conflict because Han Chinese people did not understand the Mongolian language and customs. He concluded by requesting the Manchu *amban* to exclude their land from cultivation. In August, the nobles of the Tiisiyetii Khanate *aimag* also sent a similar letter to the Manchu *amban*.[357] In the face of the Mongols' strong opposition, Yanzhi

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[356] Lu Yiran 呂一燃, "QingE hezuo kaicai waimenggu jinkuang chutan," 清俄合作開採外蒙古金礦初探 [A Preliminary Study of the Qing-Russo Joint Exploitation of Outer Mongolian Gold Mines] *China's Borderland History and Geography Studies* 中國邊疆史地研究 4 (1992), p. 9.

[357] Quoted from *Mongolyn ard tunmii 1911 ony undesnii erkh choloo tusgaar togynolyn toloo tomtsel, barimt bichgiin emkhtgel (1900-1914)*, pp. 32-41, see Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in

sent a memorial to the Manchu court expressing his support for the Mongols:

"Their (the two *aimags*') northern part borders on Russia and is an unimpeded sweep of barren sand. No grass is grown in the southern part where cultivation is difficult. The middle part is rather fertile but cultivation would decrease pasture land. On balance, building railways and opening gold and coal mines would do more good than harm to the region."[358]

On receipt of Yanzhi's submission, the State took no further action to open the lands of the Sechen and the Tiisiyetii Khanates.

Notwithstanding the above, the *ambans* of Urga managed to carry out several, albeit small, reforms in the area. For example, a school was set up in September 1908 to teach 40 students from the two eastern *aimags* the languages of Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese.[359] In June 1909, an Office of Vaccination was established to tackle smallpox, and another office was set up to help people quit smoking.[360] In July 1905, Pushou 樸壽, then *amban* of Urga, obtained permission from the Court to establish a New Army battalion with the revenue collected from various commercial taxes. At the same time, a patrol force of 77 men was also set up to help maintain law and order.[361]

Sando's Modernization Drive in Urga

Sando, a Sinicized Mongol, was appointed to succeed Yanzhi (who was relieved of his duties because of illness) as *amban* of Urga on 26 November 1909. Upon his arrival in Urga in March 1910, Sando started to change the moderate tempo of his predecessors' reforms to a more aggressive one.

Mongolia," p. 45.

[358] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 568, p. 60.

[359] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu,* vol. 595, p. 8.

[360] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 7, p. 20.

[361] *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 546, p. 8.

Sando was a zealous *xinzheng* supporter. In August 1909, while serving as *fudutong* in Guihua, Sando proposed that the whole Mongolian region be reorganized into four *aimags*, with one minister heading twelve subordinate bureaus (General, Investigation, Police, Land Reclamation, Business Promotion, Finance, Army Training, Culture, Judiciary, Traffic, Negotiation, and Consultation) in each *aimag* to take charge of its administration. He further proposed that a sum of 1,200,000 *silver taels* be allocated to each *aimag* to finance its administration in the first year, but the allocation would be reduced gradually and, after five years, the administration would have to be wholly financed by the Mongols themselves. Although this proposal was not approved by the Manchu court, it clearly shows Sando's ambition in promoting drastic, extensive reforms in Mongolia and, as the following discussion will show, his aggressiveness in implementing the *xinzheng* reforms made him highly unpopular among the Khalkhas. During Sando's short tenure (one year and nine months) in Urga, he introduced/proposed to introduce the following reforms:

One of the first reforms Sando introduced upon arrival in Urga was to strengthen law and order of the town by recruiting 100 patrolmen and an additional 44 Mongolian policemen, and placed them under the management of a newly set-up *Yingwu Chu* 營務處 (Bureau of Military Matters). This was considered necessary because the only state garrison stationed in the area, namely a cavalry battalion of the *Xuanhua Army* 宣化軍 (stationed in Urga since 1888), was already stretched to its limits as it was required to defend Urga, Kyakhta, and the gold mines in the area against foreign incursions and domestic bandits.[362]

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[362] Sando 三多, "Zhaomu xunfang budui tianlian menggu xunjing dui," 招募巡防步隊添練蒙古巡警隊 [Note on recruitment of patrolmen and expansion of the Mongolian patrol team], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao* 三多庫倫奏稿 [Memorials of Sando from Urga]. In Wu Fengpei 吳豐培 ed., *Qing mo Menggu shi di zi liao hui cui* 清末蒙古史地資料薈萃 [Collected Historical and Geographical Materials of Mongolia at the End of the Qing] (Beijing: The National Libraries

In May 1910, Sando requested to raise the salaries of the some 30 state officials stationed in Urga from a total monthly amount of some 10,200 *silver taels* to 22,300 *taels*, with a view to lightening the Mongolian commoners' heavy financial burden that had been caused by the hefty *tanpai* 攤派 (exactions) imposed, often illegally, on the banners by these officials.[363] Later in the same year, Sando also prohibited the illegal extortions of Mongolian commons by officials of the *Shabi Yamen.*[364]

Sando also reorganized the Office of Vaccination established in 1905 into the Office of Sanitation (with a branch office set up in Kyakhta), and expanded its business to cover medication and combatting opium-smoking.[365]

In addition to setting up two half-day schools to teach illiterate Mongols to read, Sando also chose six Mongolian students to learn the Russian language at the school set up by the Russian Consulate, with a view to training them as Russian-Mongolian translators.[366]

In the area of communication, Sando proposed to set up, in addition to the post offices in Urga and Kyakhta, a *Wenbaoju* 文報局 in Beijing to expedite the delivery of

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Documents Microfilm and Reproduction Centre, 1990), pp. 268-269.

[363] Sando, "Juanchu jibi jiagei xinjin zhe," 蠲除積弊加給薪津摺 [Memorial seeking salary increases in order to relieve excessive burdens caused by age-old malpractices], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 285-290.

[364] Sando, "Xunli jubao tuche liangmeng ji shahua dimian qingxing zhe," 循例具報土車兩盟暨沙華地面情形摺 [Memorial reporting on the two khanates of Tiisiyetii and Sechen, and the *Shabi* in accordance with the established routine], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 383-385.

[365] Sando, "Sheli weishengju pian," 設立衛生局片 [Note on establishing a sanitary bureau], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 295-296.

[366] National Palace Museum (Taipei), 187835, 'Zouwei cha kulun sheli mengyang xuetang yisuo dengyou (zhepian)' 奏為查庫倫設立蒙養學堂一所等由 (摺片) [Memorial on an inquiry into the establishment of an elementary school in Urga], *Junjichulufuzouzhe* 軍機處錄副奏摺 [Records of Great State Council Memorials], 10 June 1910.

official communications between the capital and Urga.[367] In a telegram to Beijing, Sando reported that he had already set up, among others, two newspaper-reading areas in Urga and Kyakhta; and that he had sent out people to investigate natural resources and collect information for railway construction and cultivation.[368]

In January 1911, Sando established a *Bingbei Chu* 兵備處 (Army-Training Office) to replace the *Yingwu Chu* as the organization responsible for the training of a New Army in Urga. Under the leadership of a Japan-trained officer Tang Zaili 唐在禮, the *Bingbei Chu* would supervise all the *Xuanhua* troops, patrol battalions, the Mongolian militias of the Sechen and the Tiisiyetii *aimags*, as well as officials and soldiers of the relay stations and watch-posts of the area. The tax drawn from gold-mining would be used to fund army training.[369] During that summer, Sando and Tang began to organize the New Army, recruiting Mongols into the cavalry, as well as local Chinese people and Banner soldiers from Suiyuan into the machine gun battalion.[370] However, for reasons to be discussed in the following paragraphs, not a soldier of the New Army was trained up to the end of Qing rule in Outer Mongolia.

In February 1911, Sando reported that new taxes on timber, coal, carriages, and camels would be collected in order to subsidize the future law courts in Urga and

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[367] Sando, "Yijaijing sheli Wenbaoju youdi wenjian pian," 擬在京設立文報局郵遞文件片 [Note on a proposal to set up a *Wenbaoju* in Beijing for transmission of documents], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 303-304.

[368] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 1523-160, 'Kulun duiyu Lifanyuan madian chaxun mengqi xingge shiyi fudian' 庫倫對於理藩院馬電查詢蒙旗興革事宜復電 [Urga's reply telegram to *Lifanyuan*'s "Ma" telegram Inquiry about the reforms in Mongolian Banners], *Lifanbu Dangan* 理藩部檔案 [Archives of the Board Ruling the Outer Provinces], 4 Aug. 1910.

[369] Sando, "Choulian xinjun pai Tang Zaili zhongban pian," 籌練新軍派唐在禮總辦片 [Note on training of New Army and appointment of Tang Zaili as its supervisor], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 373-376.

[370] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 56, p. 17.

Kyakhta. Further new charges would also be levied to replace customary fees and to subsidize the implementation of *xinzheng*.[371]

In August 1911, Sando established a *Kenwuju* 墾務局 (Bureau of Cultivation Affairs) and its sub-offices to take charge of the opening of the land in the Tiisiyetii Khan *aimag* for cultivation. According to his plan, land taxes would be collected from 1912 onwards.[372]

As to the preparation for constitutional rule (which constituted the centerpiece of *xinzheng* reforms of the Qing empire after 1906), Sando's predecessor Yanzhi had reported that there were no qualified Mongols available to form any self-governing body in Urga. Though Sando was in agreement with Yanzhi's view, he did not hesitate to carry out the relevant preparation work, saying "Now that the people lack the capability to exercise self-rule, the officialdom should, within its own capacity, endeavor to catch up and set up the standards."[373] To this end, apart from promoting education, Sando conducted various investigations and produced reports on population and household statistics, revenues and expenses, and prepared an administrative budget.[374] The investigation and production of statistics, like proposals to provincialize the region, no doubt caused suspicion among the Mongols, in particular the Mongolian

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[371] Sando, "Sheli shenpanting sheju shoushui yizuo jingfei pian," 設立審判廳設局收稅以作經費片 [Note on setting up a bureau to collect taxes for financing the establishment of law courts], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 397-400.

[372] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 56, p. 17.

[373] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 1523-183, 'Neige fachao Sanduo zoubao kulun choubei xianzheng qingxing' 內閣發鈔三多奏報庫倫籌備憲政情形 [Copy distributed by the Cabinet of Sando's memorial concerning the preparation of constitutional government], *Lifanbu Dangan* 理藩部檔案 [Archives of the Board Ruling the Outer Provinces], 22 Feb. 1911; Sando, "Sheli xianzheng choubei chu pian," 設立憲政籌備處片 [Note on establishment of a Preparation Office for Constitutional Rule], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 349-350.

[374] Sando, "Kulun choubei xianzheng bingan huibao zhe," 庫倫籌備憲政併案彙報摺 [Memorial making a comprehensive report on the preparation of constitutional rule in Urga], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 365-369.

religious and political elites, about the Manchu court's real intentions.

Sando's aggressiveness in steamrolling the reforms not only was due to his personal ambition, but also was due to Beijing's pressure. As Chen Lu 陳籙, who headed the Chinese delegation to the Kyakhta Conference in 1914 to discuss Outer Mongolia's independence, reported,

"Not long after Sando had come to Urga, letters and telegrams from different organizations of the Central Government, especially the Cabinet and the *Junzi Fu* 軍諮府 (General Staff Council), kept pouring in, repeatedly urging him to carry out the various *xinzheng* reforms immediately."[375]

Such great urgency in pressing for reforms in Outer Mongolia was most likely the Manchu court's response to the increasingly difficult situation in Mongolia, in particular the growing Russian (and Japanese) presence in the region.

On the basis of the above discussion, it was obvious that the *xinzheng* reforms that had been implemented in Outer Mongolia were limited in scope and scale as compared with those introduced in Inner Mongolia. Moreover, the reforms that had been proved controversial in Inner Mongolia, such as reclamation of lands for agriculture, large scale migration of Han Chinese settlers, introduction of Chinese-style administration, etc., were almost absent in Outer Mongolia. Indeed, Sando had proposed to introduce or had actually imposed a number of new taxes and fees to finance the reforms. It was estimated that, in Urga alone, the amount of *baojuan* 包捐 (miscellaneous taxes) paid by its merchants and commoners reached 24,000 *silver taels* per year.[376] Sando also

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[375] Chen Lu 陳籙, *Zhishi biji* 止室筆記 [Notes taken in the study called Zhishi], (1917). In Lu Yiran 呂一燃 ed., *Bei yang zheng fu shi qi de Meng Gu di qu li shi zi liao* 北洋政府時期的蒙古地區歷史資料[Historical Materials of the Mongolian Region during the Era of the Beiyang Government] (Harbin: Heilongjiang Educational Press, 1999), p. 252.

[376] Hai Chunliang 海純良, "Qingmo xinzheng yu waimenggu duli," 清末新政與外蒙古獨立 [Late

repeatedly made the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu and the Khalkha noblemen to donate large sums of money to finance the *xinzheng* reforms.[377] This was in addition to the contributions already made by the Khutuktu and Khalkha noblemen for the purchase of bonds issued by the State—*Zhaoxin gupiao* 昭信股票 as a means to finance the reforms: the Khutuktu alone had contributed 60,000 *silver taels* to such purpose.[378] Though all these additional financial burdens had no doubt aggrieved the Khalkhas, I do not think they should be the root causes of the Outer Mongols' breakaway from the empire. Clearly, the New Policies by themselves were not sufficient causes of the Khalkhas' independence movement, and the real causes had to be found elsewhere.

Khalkha Mongols' Reaction to *Xinzheng*

Although Sando himself was a Mongolian Bannerman, he became very unpopular among the Khalkha Mongols soon after his taking up the post of Urga *amban*. On 6 April 1910, a conflict between the Han Chinese and Mongols in Urga broke out after a couple of lamas from the Gandan (the largest temple in Urga) had quarreled over prices with a clerk at a Chinese lumber shop called Deyiyong 德義勇. When Sando and a party of soldiers arrived on the scene to investigate, they were stoned by the Mongols.

Qing *Xinzheng* and the Independence of Outer Mongolia] *Inner Mongolia Ethnic University Journal* 內蒙古民族大學學報, 1 (2009), p. 37.

377 Sando, "Taiji Buyinwaqier baoxiaoyin er kenyu jiangxian zhe," 台吉布音瓦齊爾報效銀而懇予獎銜摺 [Memorial seeking commendation with title for Taiji Buyinvacir for his donation of silver], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 305-306; "Chechenhan Akewangna baoxiao yinliang geijiang xieen zhe," 車臣汗阿克旺訥報效銀兩給獎謝恩摺 [Memorial submitted on behalf of Sechen Khan Navaanneren expressing gratitude for the award granted to him for his donation of silver], in *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 405-406; "Zhasake Duoerjichelin baoxiaoyin er yuanli kenqing geijiang xieen zhe," 札薩克多爾濟車林報效銀而援例懇請給獎謝恩摺 [Memorial submitted on behalf of *Jasak* Dorjiselin expressing gratitude for granting him an award under the regulations for his donation of silver], in *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 406-408.

378 *Da Qing lichao Dezong shilu*, vol. 438, p. 14.

Sando handled the incident harshly, ordering the lamas to pay for the damage done to the Chinese lumber shop, and recommending the dismissal of Badmadorji, the chief administrator of the *Shabi Yamen*, for failing to control the lamas.[379] In May 1910, the two eastern *aimags* and the *Shabi Yamen* wrote the *Lifanbu*, accusing Sando of twisting the facts of the Deyiyong incident by listening to only one-side of the story and requested his discharge.[380] This incident was a clear manifestation of the explosive ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and the Outer Mongols, and Sando's high-handed response further aggravated the situation.

Sando's unpopularity among the Outer Mongols made the implementation of *xinzheng* reforms under his charge more controversial, and the Mongols expressed their opposition against the reforms openly and repeatedly. For example, they considered the ideas of setting up a self-government assembly and conducting an election unsuitable for the Mongolian society, since most Mongols were nomadic and had not settled in defined places. Naturally, they opposed the opening of pasture land. In March 1911, the two eastern *aimags* suggested to the *amban* that each of them would offer 2,000 *silver taels* annually to the State if the latter agreed to stop opening Mongolian land for cultivation.[381] However, as discussed above, this was of no avail as Sando subsequently set up a *Kenwuju* to reclaim Mongolian lands.

Moreover, as discussed above, Sando's aggressiveness in pushing the reforms

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[379] Sando, "Gangdeng lama xujiu xingxiong juzhong jubu zunzhi chengban zhe," 崗登喇嘛酗酒行凶聚眾拒捕遵旨懲辦摺 [Memorial on punishing the Gandan Lamas for committing violence under the influence of alcohol, mobbing, and resisting arrest], in Sando, *Sanduo kulun zougao*, pp. 272-275.

[380] Quoted from *Mongolyn ard tunmii 1911 ony undesnii erkh choloo tusgaar togynolyn toloo tomtsel, barimt bichgiin emkhtgel (1900-1914)*, pp. 32-41, see Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," p. 50.

[381] Quoted from *Mongolyn ard tunmii 1911 ony undesnii erkh choloo tusgaar togynolyn toloo tomtsel, barimt bichgiin emkhtgel (1900-1914)*, p. 95, see Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," p. 50.

imposed a heavy financial burden on the Mongols. According to Chen Lu, Sando created more than twenty government agencies in Urga during his short tenure and all of these new organizations were to be financed by the Mongols. He noted;

"In Urga city alone, over twenty new organizations had been created. All the seed monies of these organizations, as well as their regular supplies of fuel, utensils, bedding, horses and miscellaneous expenses, were to be charged on the Mongols. The Mongolian officials exacted the money from the Mongolian commoners. Unable to bear the burden, the Mongolian commoners fled. As a result, all the banners adjacent to the city were empty of people."[382] This appeared ironic when we compared it with Sando's earlier proposal to lighten the Mongolian commoners' financial burden by raising the Urga officials' salaries.

Of all the new agencies created in Urga, the *Bingbei Chu* under the leadership of Tang Zaili was most hated by the Mongols. According to Tang's own opinion, this was because "the *Bingbei Chu* in Urga was resolute in moving ahead (with the reforms), thereby causing jealousy among the Mongols and the Manchu officials."[383] However, independent observers, like Chen Lu, gave a different version of the story: Tang arrived in the city with his family and bodyguards, over 100 people in all. They were undisciplined and haughty, causing resentment among the Mongols. Moreover, Tang had a new office and large military barracks constructed for the *Bingbei Chu*. This further burdened the Mongols since the expenses of the new office buildings and the military barracks and food and firewood were to be paid by them.[384] Finally, because of

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[382] Chen, *Zhishi biji*, pp. 252-253.

[383] Tang Zaili 唐在禮, *Menggu fengwen lu* 蒙古風雲錄 [Record of the Drastic Change in Mongolia], (1912), in Lu Yiran 呂一燃 ed., *Bei yang zheng fu shi qi de Meng Gu di qu li shi zi liao* 北洋政府時期的蒙古地區歷史資料 [Historical Materials of the Mongolian Region during the Era of the Beiyang Government] (Harbin : Heilongjiang Educational Press, 1999), p. 21.

[384] Chen, *Zhishi biji*, p. 253.

strong opposition from the Mongols and the Russian Minister at Beijing, the *Bingbei Chu* was abolished in late November 1911 and Tang was forced to leave Outer Mongolia.[385]

Mongolian Secret Mission to Russia

In the summer of 1911, under the guise of a religious ceremony held in Urga for conducting the yearly presentation of their vow to the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, a group of Mongolian princes and high lamas held a meeting with a view to hammering out a united response to the *xinzheng* reforms, but the participants were divided over what they should do. About one month later, a second meeting was secretly convened in the neighboring Bogda Khan Mountain, and it was attended by the four khans, Prince Khandadorji, Da lama (Chief Abbot) Tseringchimed, and several other leading figures. The participants concluded that the *xinzheng* reforms were unbearably oppressive, and decided to request Russian assistance to stop them. Khandadorji, Tseringchimed, and an Inner Mongolian activist Khaisan were chosen as envoys to Russia. The delegation left secretly and individually for Russia in July, arrived in St. Petersburg on 15 August 1911 and presented to the Tsar the joint petition dated 29 July 1911 referred to at the beginning of this chapter.

In their petition, the Mongolian leaders, in addition to voicing their grievances about the *xinzheng* reforms, also criticized the Qing court's changed attitude towards Lamaism:

"(S)ince our first Jebtsundamba the Holy Lama, we have been worshipping in the yellow-sect of the religion and have respect for the Manchu khaans……We, the four Khalkha *aimags*, …respectfully submitted to the Manchu khans earlier, because they had worshipped in the Buddhist religion and spread the blessings. But it remained in

[385] *Xuantong zhengji*, vol. 65, p. 10.

name only and now is no longer true. On the contrary, the suffering created by them is clearly increasing….."[386]

Apart from the joint petition to the Tsar, one of the representatives of the Mongolian delegation, Sh. Sandag, also submitted to the Russian Foreign Ministry a memorandum in which a host of complaints against the Manchu rule were listed. What was noteworthy was that the memorandum says, among other things, the Khalkhas' desire for independence with Russia's assistance:

"We, the Khans and ruling princes, shall elevate unanimously the most universally respected Bogd as the Great Khaan. Then we shall establish a nation of our own. We shall rely on your great country and have faith in your assistance."[387]

The contents of the petition and the memorandum have caused confusion among historians as to the real goal of the Mongolian delegation's mission: whilst the former seems to suggest that the Mongols were merely seeking Russian assistance to stop the Manchu court's *xinzheng* in Mongolia so that the region could return to its status quo, the latter shows that the Mongols' real goal was, with the help of Russia, to establish an independent state of their own. In this regard, Nakami Tatsuo argues that the goal of the majority of Mongolia's leaders during the summer of 1911 was merely to return to the *status quo ante,* whilst the memorandum was the work of individual members of the delegation, some of whom, such as Khandadorji, Tseringchimed, and Khayisan, were supporters of Mongolian independence.[388] However, considering the paramount importance of the issue of national independence, I find it inconceivable that individual delegation members would act on their own initiative without the prior approval of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu and other leaders.

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[386] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 10.

[387] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 13.

[388] Nakami Tatsuo, "Russian Diplomats and Mongol Independence 1911-1915," in Kotkin and Elleman eds., *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century*, p. 73.

The Tsarist government was divided over how to deal with the Mongolian request for assistance. Some (such as A. A. Neratov, the acting Russian Foreign Minister) suggested that it should be ignored on the ground that the Russian government was not yet ready to exploit the agitation for their own interests, whilst others (such as V. N. Kokovtsov, the acting Russian Prime Minister) argued that the Mongolian approach would offer Russia an opportunity to influence the Qing government's Mongolian policy. Finally, at a special conference held on 16 August under the chairmanship of its prime minister, P. A. Stolypin, the Russian government concluded that it would be undesirable for it to actively intervene in the Mongolian question since it would weaken Russian influence in the West and deflect attention from the more urgent Near and Middle Eastern questions. At the same time, the conference also considered that support for the Mongols in their desire to resist the Qing government's colonial (i. e. active promotion of Han Chinese migration) activities would fully correspond to Russian interests.[389] The conference concluded:

"…..it would best correspond to our political tasks as well as to the present political situation, if the Imperial Government, without active intervention in the Mongolian question, without taking responsibility upon itself of giving armed support to the Khalkha Mongols in their intended separation from China, would step forward as a mediator between them and, through diplomatic means, support the aspiration of the Mongols to preserve their distinctiveness without breaking with their suzerain, the emperor of the Great Qing dynasty."[390]

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[389] Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, p. 84.

[390] Komissiia po Izdaniiu Dokumentov Epokhi Imperializma ed., *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperialism: dokumenty iz arkhiviv tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel'stva (1878-1917) (International relations in the epoch of imperialism: documents from the archives of the Tsarist and Provisional governments (1878-1917))* (Moscow: 1933-1938), ser. 2, v. 18, pt. 1, no. 329, p. 341. Translation from Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, pp. 84-85.

In line with the above conclusion, the Russian government instructed its minister in Beijing, Ivan Y. Korostovets, to serve a diplomatic note on the Qing court expressing its concern about the *xinzheng* reforms in Outer Mongolia. Meanwhile, it also advised the Mongolian delegation that their aspirations for complete independence from China were not practical, but the Mongols could expect Russian support in their struggle to maintain the original Khalkha system. In order to protect the returning Mongolian delegation and to emphasize the Russian wish to preserve the Khalkha system, the conference urged that immediate reinforcement of the Russian consular guards in Urga with two Cossack squadrons.[391]

Sando was totally unaware of the delegation's activities until he was notified by the Court in early September that the Russian minister in Beijing had received a telegram from the Tsarist government urging the Qing court "to stop the New Policy immediately in order to end the fears of the Mongols".[392]

A terrified Sando then issued a sternly worded order to the league chiefs of the two eastern *aimags* and the chief of the *Shabi Yamen*, demanding them to submit a report on the case within five days. In the order, Sando insisted that the New Policies in Mongolia were "in no way subject to interference by foreigners (Russians)" and that the Mongols should "make reports to the Imperial Resident about the New Policy" and "not turning to foreigners for help". He demanded an urgent report "as to what exactly the Mongols grudge and fear, why the princes within our jurisdiction have said nothing truth from start to finish…."[393]

Sando's warning vividly showed how he (and many Qing officials in Beijing) was out of touch with the real situation in Urga. Instead of seeking the Mongols'

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[391] Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, p. 85.

[392] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 7.

[393] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, pp. 8-9.

understanding and support, Sando resorted to reproaching them for enlisting Russian assistance, which was consistent with his governing style as demonstrated by his handling of the Deyiyong incident. Understandably, Sando's high-handed manner failed to get any cooperation from the Mongols, who merely gave him evasive answers, denying the dispatch of any delegation to Russia.

On the other hand, under the pressure of Russia for abandonment of its reforms in Outer Mongolia, the Qing court finally blinked. In September 1911, the Court gave approval for the suspension of *xinzheng* reforms in Urga. As stated above, in November of the same year, the controversial military organization *Bingbei Chu* was disbanded, and Tang and his officers were recalled.

Mongolia Proclaimed Independence

Although the Mongolian delegation failed to obtain any firm commitment from the Russian government regarding their quest for independence, the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising 武昌起義 on 10 October 1911 and the subsequent revolts in other parts of China proper had turned the situation more favorable for the Mongolian independence movement. On 28 November 1911, a group of Mongolian noblemen and high lamas submitted a joint memorial to the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu:

"….now great turmoil happened suddenly in the south. There is plenty of the news regarding the matter that new regimes have been established and independent countries have been formed in many provinces. Also, the authority of the Manchu imperial family has greatly weakened. We offered the mandala, begging you to instruct clearly what we Mongols now ought to do exactly."[394]

The Jebtsundamba Khutuktu replied that the time was ripe for the Mongols to form

[394] Ulsyn Tuukhiin Tov Arkhiv (UTTA, The Central Historical Archives of Mongolia), FA1 kh/N-1, in L. Zhamsran comp, *Mongolyn tuukhiin deezh bichig (Mongolian historical anthology)* (Ulaanbaatar: Surakh Bichig, Khuuzhdiin Nomyn Khevleliin Gazar, 1992), vol. 4, p. 8. Translation quoted from Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, p. 88.

an independent state of their own. To this end, a "General Administration Office in charge of Khalkha Affairs", composed of seven important Mongolian personages, was formed to rule the country as a provisional government. It discarded the Qing dynasty reign title Xuantong in favor of "Gongdai" 共戴 (Elevated by All). It also ordered the mobilization of 4,000 soldiers from the neighboring banners to Urga on the pretext of sending the army to Beijing to protect the Qing emperor from Chinese revolts, but its real intention was to secure the Mongolian-Chinese borders.

On 1 December 1911, the provisional government issued a proclamation to the Mongols, Russians, Tibetans, Chinese and all ecclesiastical and secular commoners:

"At present we often hear that in the southern land (China) the Manchus and Chinese are creating disturbances and are about to precipitate the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Because our Mongolia was originally an independent nation, we have decided, after consultation, to establish a new independent nation, based on our old tradition, without the interference of others in our own rights."[395]

Apparently, the provisional government sought to justify the Mongolian independence movement on the imminent collapse of the Qing dynasty, and the need to protect Mongolia from Han Chinese interference. This clearly shows that, in the views of the Mongols, Mongolia had been an independent country before its subjugation by the Manchus and that, after subjugation, Mongolia was only part of "Manchu China", not "Chinese China". With the demise of Manchu rule, there would be no reasons for them to remain within the Qing empire or its successor state.

On the same day, Sando received an official letter issued in the name of Mongolian nobles and high lamas demanding him to provide the above-mentioned 4,000 troops with weapons and provisions as they had been, falsely, raised to protect the Manchu emperor, and he was required to reply within three hours. Sando did not reply. On the

[395] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 15.

same evening, the Mongols gave Sando an ultimatum, demanding him, his civil and military officials, and soldiers to leave Mongolia in three days. Sando considered the military forces under his command (130 poorly-equipped Chinese soldiers) would not be strong enough to engage the joint Russian-Mongolian forces. He therefore gave up and left Mongolia for China on 4 December 1911 under Russian protection. Sando's expulsion from Mongolia effectively marked the end of Manchus' domination of Outer Mongolia.

Why Outer Mongolia?

As can be seen from the above discussion, owing to the desperate financial condition of the State, time limitations for the reform implementation, and the Khalkhas' opposition to the individual measures, relatively few of the New Policies had been accomplished in Outer Mongolia, as compared with those undertaken in Inner Mongolia. Theoretically, the Khalkha Mongols were much less affected by the reforms than their brethren south of the Gobi. Why then did the Khalkha Mongols, unlike their southern kinsmen, seek independence from the Manchus, to whom they had submitted over two hundred years?

Judging from the fact that the Khalkhas had approached Tsarist Russia before the commencement of New Policies in Outer Mongolia for assistance in their attempt to break away from the Qing empire, it is evident enough that the implementation of *xinzheng* was not the sole cause of the Mongolian independence movement. In this regard, I would argue that the *xinzheng* was able to trigger the actual declaration of independence was mainly because it had deepened the anti-Manchu (and anti-Chinese) feelings that had been brewing among the Mongols for many years.

Chen Lu argues that corrosion of the Qing frontier administration and exploitation of the Mongols by Han Chinese merchants were the root causes of the Mongolian

independence movement of 1911. He writes,

"The corruption of the frontier administration in the Northwest region had begun since the middle of Emperor Daoguang's reign. The selection for appointment as the *banshi*-, *canzan-dachen* stationed in Mongolia was regarded as an opportunity to discharge the (bad) staff of *Lifanyuan*. Most of those selected (for appointment) were Manchu officials of inferior quality. Under their lead, vagrants of the Eight Banners tyrannized the Mongolian people. To the Mongolian princes and noblemen who came to Beijing for title inheritance or annual *chaojin*, the *Lifanyuan* would concoct all sorts of regulations so that it could suck their bloods by various means. For the Shanxi merchants and people in Mongolia, moneylending was their principal business, and they exploited (the Mongols) by exacting high interest rates, and turned their lives a hell of darkness. The (Mongolian) commoners were helpless and were subject to oppression. For more than 200 years, all these malpractices had become customary. As a consequence, the Mongols at all levels were, without exception, hostile to the Chinese officials …."[396]

Indeed, Chen Lu was not alone in spotting the problem. In a confidential note to the Throne, Ruixun, the *canzan dachen* of Kobdo, also pointed out,

"Kobdo borders with Russia and, therefore, the number of foreigners (Russians) trading in our banners is higher than other places. For more than one day, the Russians have lured the Mongols with promises of gains, goods, and loans. To make things worse, my predecessors had not been taking good care of the Mongols; they blackmailed the latter under all pretexts. As a result, the Mongols have lost faith in us. …..The merchants and commoners from the heartland often say that foreigners were not a cause of concern for the merchants; what worried them most was that the Mongols would exploit any opportunity and rise in revolt. In order to protect their properties,

[396] Chen, *Zhishi biji*, p. 160.

many of the merchants are planning to leave Kobdo…"[397]

As a matter of fact, Chen Lu's and Ruixun's observations were echoed by many of the complaints listed in the Mongolian representative Sh. Sandag's memorandum submitted to Russian Foreign Ministry in 1911, as illustrated by the following grievances:

(a) There are many ruling princes, non-ruling princes and high and low-ranking officials who have not inherited their titles because they could not pay a large amount of silver to Manchu-Chinese officials and thus their inheritances had been delayed for many years.[398]

(b) Manchu officials robbed Mongolian princes and noblemen of their legal awards.[399]

(c) There were many cases of disputes between Chinese and Mongols. The Mongols were always being oppressed and their property confiscated, and they were unjustly executed or forced into exile. There is no place where justice can be obtained. On the other hand, if the Chinese create trouble, they can get away without punishment.[400]

(d) As a result of unjust oppression, innocent Mongols are escaping from their banners, and the banner chiefs were blamed and punished for the exodus of Mongolian commoners.[401]

(e) The greedy Han Chinese merchants' moneylending and economic exploitation had been sucking the Mongol people dry.[402]

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[397] Ruixun, "Michen bianfang chizhong banshi weinan pian," p. 25.

[398] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 10.

[399] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 10.

[400] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 11.

[401] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 11.

[402] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 11.

As for the *xinzheng* measures implemented in Outer Mongolia, it seems that, apart from imposition of all kinds of new taxes, the Khalkhas were most concerned about the State's new strategy of *yimin shibian* 移民實邊 (moving large numbers of Han Chinese farmers to Mongolia to "fill up" the border region), as evidenced by Sh. Sandag's complaints:

"The decision to move a large number of Chinese to the territory of the northern banners of Khalkha means, first, the destruction of the nomadic life and, secondly, proves that they intend to strengthen the northern frontier."[403]

Interestingly, the Mongols rightly recognized that the *xinzheng* reforms would further the interest of Han Chinese at the expense of the Mongols:

"The Chinese have discussed moving a large number of Chinese into Mongolia and making Mongolia a province of China. They want to give great powers to the Chinese officials to reduce the power of ruling Mongolian princes."[404]

Understandably, large-scale Han Chinese settlement, coupled with the Qing court's on and off debates over the proposed provincialization of the Mongolian region (as discussed in chapter 4), would invoke fears among the Khalkha noblemen and lamas that they would eventually lose their traditional quasi-independence status and that their land would become part of China proper in the same manner as the provinces in the heartland. Sando's reform measures, such as the centralization of all military matters under the management of the *Bingbei Chu*, the proposed opening of Mongolian land for cultivation, the collection of population and household statistics, etc., would deepen the Khalkhas' suspicion. And the Manchu court's decision in 1910 to dismantle all barriers in the interactions between the Mongols and Han Chinese (by allowing Han-Mongolian marriages, adoption of Chinese names and learning of Chinese by the Mongols, etc.)

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[403] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 11.

[404] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 11.

further confirmed the Mongols' fears of losing their culture and traditional way of life:

"This is not only breaking the old laws but is an example of the wicked intentions (of the Chinese). How can we Mongols submit to this kind of ignorant government?"[405]

In addition to detailing the Mongols' grievances against the Manchu state and Han Chinese immigrants, Sh. Sandag's complaints also demonstrates the Mongols' conceptualization of their independence. As Uradyn E. Bulag remarks,

"In this document, and indeed in subsequent documents, the Mongols claimed that they had been an independent *ulus* (country) prior to submitting to the Manchu emperors in 1691, and that their acceptance of a place within the Manchu empire was predicated on the latter's respect for Buddhism. The Mongol-Manchu relationship was conceptualized as an alliance rather than conquest."[406]

In this regard, Mei-hua Lan also notes,

"According to the custom in the steppe, clans gathered around a capable leader in times of success and deserted him if he failed or when he died; a nomadic state was a confederation under a charismatic leader for common interest, and it was to be dissolved when the reasons for their early alliance ceased to exist. The Mongols considered their relations with the Manchus one of alliance. Therefore, if the Manchu state appeared incompetent or its actions failed to benefit them, the Mongols certainly were not reluctant to break relations with them."[407]

As for the different responses of the Inner and Outer Mongols to the New Policies, this can be attributed to their different political and economic priorities. As discussed in chapter 2, owing to their geographical and historical differences, Inner and Outer

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[405] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 12.

[406] Uradyn E. Bulag, "Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 1911 Revolutions," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, no. 3 (2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.

[407] Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," p. 52.

Mongolia had gradually developed diverse political, social and economic conditions during the two hundred years under Manchu rule and, consequently, their priorities were different from each other. This in turn called for different application of policies from the State. Clearly, Sando and the Qing court failed to heed the advice of Zhongrui, the *banshi dachen* of Kobdo, when they pushed fervently ahead with the reforms that, in their opinion, had been so successfully implemented in Inner Mongolia:

"Inner Mongolia can be considered plentiful and populous; therefore, the task there is to *jiao* 教 (educate). However, Outer Mongolia is extremely exhausted, and its prowess weakened. The task there should be to *yang* 養 (nurture). Since they are different, how can the policies towards them be the same?"[408]

Last but not least, the overtly Han nationalist agenda adopted by the Chinese revolutionaries during the early stage of 1911 Revolution, namely "*quchu dalu huifu zhonghua* 驅除韃虜，恢復中華" (Drive out the barbarians and restore China) would no doubt deepen the Mongols' suspicion and harden their desire to break away from China. An example was Wang Zongluo, a Mongolian student at the Army Nobles' School. Even before 1911, Wang met secretly with Mongolian schoolmates at the Yonghegong Lamasery in Beijing, and spread revolutionary thoughts, in particular on Mongolia's independence. In Wang's opinion, "in today's China, no matter which party comes to power, it will carry out the Han program of 'expelling the northern barbarians,' which offers no benefit to the Mongolian people". Thus, in order to defend Mongolia's interest, "once he heard that Outer Mongolia had declared independence and the

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[408] First Historical Archives [中國第一歷史檔案館] (Beijing), 1509-155, 'Kebuduo banshi dachen Zhongrui ziming juzou zuncha mengqi shidi qingxing chenming yeyi chouban geshiyi bing jinshu guanjian' 科布多辦事大臣忠瑞咨明具奏遵查蒙旗實地情形陳明業已籌辦各事宜並謹抒管見 [A memorial by Zhongrui, the *Banshi Dachen* of Kobdo, reporting on the findings of his investigation into the actual situation of Mongolian Banners in compliance with the court's instruction, listing the tasks he has planned and implemented, and submitting his humble opinions], *Junjichulufuzouzhe* 軍機處錄副奏摺 [Records of Great State Council Memorials], 15 Sep. 1910.

Jebtsundamba had become the emperor, he resolved to go to Outer Mongolia to join the national independence movement."[409]

Conclusion

In his study of the Mongols' country-consciousness, Christopher P. Atwood has made the following observation about the Qing Mongols:

"The switch of ultimate sovereignty from a Mongol Khaan to a Manchu emperor thus seems to have little direct impact on the country-consciousness of the Mongols. Through the Qing period, the Mongols continued to see the Mongolian banners as collectively forming a single realm, one on a level with that of China, Tibet, Korea, and so forth."[410]

In my opinion, Atwood's observation about Qing Mongols' country-consciousness (Mongolian consciousness) is instructive to our understanding of Outer Mongolia's independence movement in the early twentieth century. It makes sense as to why the Outer Mongols refused to remain as part of the Han-Chinese dominated Republic; and why some of the Inner Mongolian elites chose to join the Khalkhas despite the close political, social, and economic links between Inner Mongolia and China proper.

At the same time, the two states that emerged from the ruins of the Qing empire, namely Republican China and the newly established Mongolian state, held conflicting conceptions about their national identity and geographical domains. As Xiaoyuan Liu aptly remarks, when two nations' interests based on real or imagined geobodies (i.e. a man-made territorial definition which creates effects on people, things, and

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[409] Quoted in Feng Jianyong, "The 'political game' and 'state-building': Outer Mongolia during the 1911 Revolution", in Joseph W. Esherick and C. X. George Wei eds., *China: How the Empire Fell* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), p. 253.

[410] Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers in the Chinese Revolution; Or, How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian?" p. 44.

relationships) come into conflict, one's willful pursuit of a self-defined national identity becomes the other's apocalyptic omen.[411] How would the Chinese and Outer Mongols seek to resolve their conflicting conceptions of national identity and geographical domains during the early twentieth century?

On the other hand, with their land geographically sandwiched between China proper and Outer Mongolia, how would the Inner Mongols position themselves in the ensuing conflicts between their northern and southern neigbours?

The above questions will form the subject of the following chapter.

[411] Liu, *Reins of Liberation*, p. xviii.

Chapter 7

Parting Ways

On 29 December 1911, the Khalkha Mongols declared their independence from the Qing empire or, in the words of Mongolian historian Bulag, restored their independent *ulus* prior to submitting to the Manchu emperors in 1691.[412] From the outset, the Urga government sought to form a state comprising all the Mongols from Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Tangno Uriyangqai, and Hulun Buir. However, this Pan-Mongolian movement, the first of its kind in the twentieth century, ended up in failure because, among other things, the Inner Mongolian elites refused to join their brethren in the north and chose to remain in the newly established Republic of China that succeeded the Qing empire.

Moreover, the Mongolian independence movement of 1911 engineered by the Urga government proved to be short-lived as the signing of the tripartite agreement between Republican China, Tsarist Russia, and Outer Mongolia at Kyakhta on 7 June 1915 effectively put an end to it. Under the agreement, Outer Mongolia agreed to recognize China's suzerainty, whilst China and Russia in turn recognized its autonomy.

This chapter mainly examines why the state-building process of the Khalkha Mongols ended up in failure. Specifically, I would examine why the Inner Mongolian elites, despite their enthusiastic support for the independence cause during early 1912, chose to remain in the Chinese Republic in the end. For the purpose of this study, I will leave aside the Mongols in other parts of the region.

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[412] Bulag, "Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 1911 Revolutions," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.

Han Chinese Views on the Frontier Ethnic Groups

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Wuchang uprising in October 1911 and the subsequent independence movements (which in effect meant secession from the Qing court in Beijing, not standing alone as independent states) that broke out in many provinces of China proper were launched under the banner of Han nationalism. It was a racial revolution undertaken by the Han people, who generally considered themselves as conterminous with the Chinese nation, seeking to overthrow the Manchus because of the latter's ineffective resistance to imperialist encroachment on China since the mid-nineteenth century. There was little role, in the views of Han nationalists, for the non-Han ethnic groups to play in the new Chinese state that was to succeed the Qing empire.

Han racial nationalism, no doubt, would cause great anxiety among the non-Han groups, such as the Mongols, Tibetans, and Huis (i.e. the Muslims in Xinjiang). For instance, in a letter to the *Minbao* 民報, a group of young Mongolian intellectuals lamented, "The Han gentlemen were only concerned about the grievances caused by the (Manchus') devastation of their own race, they never gave any thought to those (grievances) suffered by the Mongols."[413] On the basis of this complaint, it was apparent that these young Mongolian intellectuals, who were no doubt exposed to Western ideas introduced into China during the late 19th century, also felt aggrieved by the Manchu subjugation of their race and were eager to join hands with the Han revolutionaries in their struggle against the Qing rule, for they went on to say in the same letter,

"Now that we and the Han race share weal and woe, life and death together in our common pursuit of the great enterprise (against the Manchu dynasty), in future the Han

[413] "Menggu yu hanzu jiehe gongshen taoman fuchou dayi zhi xuanyanshu," 蒙古與漢族結合共伸討滿復仇大義之宣言書 [Declaration of the Mongols and Han Race joining hands in the vengeance campaign against the Manchus], *Minbao* 民報, 25 April 1908.

race and we will share the same good fortune and happiness, enjoy equal status, jointly establish one republican government, apply the same republican constitution. All we know is that we are subjects of one nation, not two races…….We hope that the Han gentlemen will not despise and abandon us on the grounds that we are unlearned, poor and, therefore, not capable of joining the great enterprise."[414]

Notwithstanding the young Mongols' appeal, Han nationalists of the time did not consider the non-Han ethnic groups part of the Chinese nation. Nor did they think highly of these peoples, as evidenced by the writings published in Chinese press during the late Qing/early Republican era. For example, an article in the leading revolutionary newspaper *Minlibao* 民立報 stated,

"Although China is composed of five peoples, actually only the Han have national consciousness and political understanding. The Manchus and Huis lag behind. The Mongols and Tibetans are like a herd of animals, primitive, simple-minded, and isolated. They have no idea what national politics are all about."[415]

Influential Chinese thinkers of the time also took a disparaging view of the frontier peoples, though they might be more open-minded than the Han nationalists over the question whether these peoples should be included in the new nation state or not. For example, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 agreed that the Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans had, from the beginning to end, never been a part of the *Zhonghua minzu* 中華民族. However, considering that these peoples had long lived within the borders of China, he believed that the absorptive power of Han culture would eventually be capable of assimilating them as well.[416]

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[414] "Menggu yu hanzu jiehe gongshen taoman fuchou dayi zhi xuanyanshu," *Minbao*, 25 April 1908.

[415] "Zhonghua minguo zhiding xin xianfa zhi xianjue wenti," 中華民國制定新憲法之先決問題 [Problems that must be solved before deciding on a new constitution for the Republic of China], *Minlibao* 民立報, 27 Jan. 1912.

[416] Liang Qichao 梁啟超, "Lishi shang Zhongguo Minzu zhi yanjiu," 歷史上中國民族之研究 [A

Another thinker Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 argued that "the lands of *Zhongguo* 中國 are the counties and prefectures of the Han dynasty and the people are called the *Hua* 華 people. If we only take the borders of the Han, then Mongolia, the Hui areas, and Tibet are not on the maps…We should let these people stay or leave as they choose." On the other hand, Zhang added, though the Mongols were *yu* 愚 (ignorant), the Han merchants who traded with them could help transform them. He therefore concluded that Mongolia (as well as Xinjiang and Tibet), though not originally part of China, could be incorporated into the nation if their peoples could be properly assimilated.[417]

Given the divergent views among Han Chinese about how to deal with the ethnic groups in the borderlands, a debate emerged shortly after the Wuchang uprising between proponents of the Greater China principle (namely, the new republic should encompass the five major ethnic groups—Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Huis) and those of the China proper position (namely, the top priority of the new republic was to preserve China proper whilst the rest could be included or not). Eventually, it was the Greater China principle that prevailed.[418] For example, the above-quoted *Minlibao* stated in a front page editorial in early November 1911, "Once we have wrought our revenge and the republic is established, then we must combine the Huis, Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus into one state with equal rights."[419]

However, as Esherick notes, the arguments that favored the integration of the five

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Study of the Chinese nation in history], (1922), in Shen Peng 沈鵬 et al. eds., *Liang Qichao quanji* 梁啟超全集 [The complete collection of Liang Qichao's work] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), vol. 6, p. 3455.

[417] Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, "Zhonghua minguo jie," 中華民國解 [Explaining the Republic of China], (1907), in *Zhang Taiyan quanji* 章太炎全集 [The complete collection of Zhang Taiyan's work] (Shanghai:Shanghai People's Press, 1985), vol. 4, pp. 252-262.

[418] Joseph W. Esherick, "How the Qing became China," in Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayali and Eric Van Young eds., *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 243-244.

[419] "Minguo qingzhu wen," 民國慶祝文 [In celebration of the Republic], *Minlibao*, 7 Nov. 1911.

races into a single nation had two prominent themes: the loss of the frontiers would expose China proper to partition; and the Mongols and Tibetans were too weak and backward to protect themselves from foreign control, so they should be assimilated and modernized under Chinese leadership.[420] In this respect, the views of the Han intellectuals of the early Republican period were no different from those of the Qing officials who implemented *xinzheng* reforms in the borderlands, or the Qing emperors since Kangxi. That is, Mongolia (and other frontier regions) must be retained as China's screen against foreign invasion. These arguments are best summarized by the following:

"Mongolia, the Hui lands (i.e. the Eastern Turkistan or Xinjiang), and Tibet have long been included in our territory. Together they formed China's *pingfan* 屏藩 (border screen). If Mongolia were lost, it would be impossible to protect the lands north of the Yellow River. If the Muslim frontier were lost, then the *Guanzhong* 關中 area (literally meaning "Inside the Passes", referring to the region between Shaanxi and Henan provinces) could not rest in peace. If Tibet were lost, the southwestern provinces could not sleep easily. If we wish to defend China proper and the northeastern provinces, we must first defend Mongolia, the Hui lands, and Tibet. But in terms of race, religion, and customs, these lands are different from us. If we do not first promote the ideal of nation-state and explain the relationship of the races, once the old regime is overthrown and the new state is established, the Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans may secede from our country and follow some foreign powers."[421]

With the "Greater China" principle prevailing, the concept of a new Chinese nation that would encompass the five races replaced Han racial nationalism as the underlying principle of the new republic, and groups that sought to promote the concept of *Wuzu*

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[420] Esherick, "How the Qing Became China," p. 247.

[421] "Lianhe Han-Man-Meng-Hui-Zang zhuzhi mindang yijianshu," 聯合漢滿蒙回藏組織民黨意見書 [Memorandum on uniting the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans in a People's Party], *Minlibao*, 21-22 March 1912.

yijia 五族一家 (five races as one family) sprang up in China, such as *Gonghe tongyi hui* 共和統一會 (Republican Unity Society), *Zhonghua minguo datong hui* 中華民國大同會 (Republic of China Great Harmony Association), *Wuzu guomin xiejin hui* 五族國民協進會 (Society for the Progress for the Citizens of the Five Races) and others. However, none of these organizations could put forth any convincing arguments as to why the five races should be united to form a new state. Moreover, considering the disparaging views expressed in the Chinese press about non-Han ethnic groups and, in particular, the Mongols (it was commonplace in the Chinese press to refer to the Mongols as *YuMeng* 愚蒙 (ignorant Mongols)), no wonder that these peoples would find the promises of equal citizenship in the new republic empty slogans.

For some Mongolian elites (most of whom were from Inner Mongolia) stationed in Beijing, their distrust of Republicanism and the concept of *Wuzu yijia* was strong. In order to take concerted action to protect their interests against the upcoming monumental changes, these Mongolian elites formed a *Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui* 蒙古王公聯合會 (Federation of Mongolian Princes and Dukes) in the capital city on 24 October 1911. They first sought to support the Manchu royal house against the republic and when this failed, some of them, including the reform-minded Prince Gungsangnorbu, even threatened to declare Inner Mongolia's independence from China.[422]

China Seeks to Woo the Mongols

Initially, most Chinese did not take Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence in 1911 seriously as they were under an illusion that Mongolia (and Tibet) would,

[422] Wang Bingming 汪炳明, "Qingchao fuwang zhiji zhujing menggu wanggong de zhengzhi huodong," 清朝覆亡之際駐京蒙古王公的政治活動 [The Political Activities of the Mongolian Princes and Dukes stationed in Beijing during the Collapse of the Qing Dynasty], in Bayilduyci, *Chengjisihan de yi chan*, pp. 150-151.

sooner or later, join hands with other rebellious provinces in the heartland to form the new Chinese state. As a consequence, there was not much public outcry when the Khalkha Mongols declared their independence. However, when the Chinese government subsequently realized that the Mongols were committed to separating from China and to establishing their own state, it tried to woo the Mongols back by means of coercion and persuasion. In addition to threatening military suppression of Mongolian uprisings for the independence cause, one of the measures of persuasion, taken by the Chinese Republican government, first the Provisional government in Nanjing and later the government in Beijing, was the promotion of the concept of *Wuzu yijia*.

On New Year's Day 1912, Sun Yatsen, the provisional president of the newly established Republic of China, declared,

"The foundation of the state lies in its people. Uniting the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and the Tibetan regions in one state, and the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan nationalities as one people—this is national unification."[423]

On 12 February 1912, the Nanjing Provisional Government announced seven clauses of favorable treatment to the Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans. According to these clauses, the four non-Han ethnic groups were to enjoy a status equal to that of the Han Chinese, receive protection of private property, hold original inherited degrees of nobility, obtain assistance for impoverished princes and nobles, and be free to practice traditional religious beliefs.[424]

The provisional government's call for uniting the five races was echoed by the

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[423] *Zhonghua Minguo Linshi Da Zongtong Xuanyan Shu* 中華民國臨時大總統宣言書 [The Declaration of the Provisional President of the Republic of China]. See translation in Bulag, "Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 1911 Revolutions," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.

[424] *Linshi Zhengfu Gongbao* 臨時政府公報 [Gazette of the Provisional Government], 13 February 1912 (reprinted Taipei: Party History Compilation Committee of the Chinese KMT Central Committee 中國國民黨中央委員會黨史史料編纂委員會, 1968).

Manchu court, as evidenced by a document attached to the Imperial Edict of Abdication issued by the new Empress Dowager in the name of the boy-emperor Xuantong on the same date. The document, entitled *Conditions of Treatment for the Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan Races* 滿蒙回藏各族待遇條例 read,

"They (the Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans) enjoy equal status with Han Chinese; their existing private properties are protected; the hereditary titles of these princes and dukes remain unchanged; (the State) would help those princes and dukes whose livelihoods are in distress; ….. Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans are free to practice their existing religious beliefs." [425]

This was followed by an order issued by Yuan Shikai, who assumed presidency of the Republic of China after reaching a compromise with the revolutionaries in southern China. The order stated,

"Now the (Chinese) State is a republic of five nationalities. Since Mongolia, Tibet and Manchuria are part of China's territory, and the Mongolian, Tibetan and Manchu peoples are all citizens of the Republic of China, usage of the imperial term "*fanshu*" 藩屬 (vassal state) should be discontinued. Now we should prepare a comprehensive plan to unify administration of the Mongolian, Tibetan and Hui areas with the goal of *minzu zhi datong* 民族之大同 (Great unity of all peoples)."[426]

Notwithstanding the Republican government's repeated propagation of concepts such as *wuzu yijia* and *minzu datong*, etc., it was highly doubtful whether the non-Han peoples really enjoyed a status equal to that of Han-Chinese in the new state. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, Han Chinese had long held a disparaging view about the frontier peoples, and that the latter's inclusion into the new Chinese state was

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[425] Bohaishouchen 渤海壽臣 ed., *Xin hai ge ming shi mo ji* 辛亥革命始末記 [The Whole Story of the Xinhai Revolution], 1912 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1969), p. 1154.

[426] "Linshi da Zongtong Yuan Shikai mingling," 臨時大總統袁世凱命令 [Provisional President Yuan Shikai's order], *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 8, no. 12, June 1912.

premised on their assimilation of Han culture. No wonder that Mongolian-Chinese scholar Zhou Jinghong has argued that the various policies executed by the Republican government showed that *wuzu yijia* and *minzu datong* were, in essence, a national assimilation led by the Han race, not a *datong* under the principle of national equality.[427]

To back up its words, the Republican government started to strengthen the civil administration of Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. On 12 April 1912, Yuan Shikai issued an order to the effect that Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang should no longer be treated as vassals and, hence, the *Lifanyuan(Lifanbu)* should be abolished and its responsibilities taken up by the Interior Ministry. A *MengZang Shiwuchu* 蒙藏事務處 (The Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs) was established on 8 May 1912 under the Ministry. On 9 July 1912, the Office was reorganized into the *MengZang Shiwuju* 蒙藏事務局 (Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs) under the direct supervision of the prime minister, with a view to demonstrating the importance the central government attached to the management of Mongolia and Tibet.

To allay the uneasiness of the Mongols about the new republic, the Beijing government, in addition to the seven clauses of favorable treatment to the four non-Han ethnic groups, further emphasized its intention to preserve the rights and privileges of the old Mongolian ruling classes by issuing the *Regulations of the Treatment of the Mongols* 蒙古待遇條例 on 21 August 1912. This was probably made in response to the requests submitted by the *Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui*. The Regulations stipulated that the Mongolian tribes would no longer be treated as vassal states but as a part of *neidi* 內地 (the inner provinces) and, hence, documents from the central government to Mongolian offices should not use terms like *lifan* 理藩 (managing vassals), *zhimin* 殖民 (establishing a colony), or *tuozhi* 拓殖 (colonizing); the ruling power of the Mongolian princes and nobles would remain intact; the Mongolian princes

[427] Zhou, *Menggu min zu wen ti shu lun*, p. 166.

and nobles would inherit titles and ranks, and enjoy privileges in their banners as before; the titles of the Mongolian khutuktus and lamas would remain the same; while only the central government had the right to negotiate with foreigners and to take charge of foreign affairs regarding Mongolia, it would ask local administrative organs to discuss important issues of their jurisdictions with the concerned banners and to carry out the resolutions; the hereditary salary of the Mongolian princes and nobles would be paid liberally; etc.[428]

With the promulgation of the Regulations, the Republican government, by means of legislation, assured the Mongolian noblemen and lamas of the preservation of their traditional privileges and rights, and the protection of their ruling power. It also defined the relationship between the State and Mongolia. Moreover, the Regulations sought to refute the Outer Mongols' propaganda that the new Chinese government was out to destroy Mongolian political system, traditions, and religion. An indication of the success of the Regulations was that, on 9 September in the same year, Prince Gungsangnorbu accepted the Republican government's appointment as the Director of *MengZang Shiwuju*,[429] an act that symbolized the trend that the Inner Mongols had finally opted to return to the Chinese regime in their pursuit of greatest interests.[430]

The above regulations were, in Bulag's words, part of the Chinese Republican government's "going imperial" strategy that sought to appease the Mongols by tapping

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[428] *Zhengfu Gongbao* 政府公報 [Gazette of the Government], no. 103, 21 Aug. 1912 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1968), pp. 104-105.

[429] "Linshi da Zongtong ling," 臨時大總統令 [Provisional President's Order], *Sheng-ching Shih-pao* 盛京時報, 11 Sep. 1912.

[430] Huang Lisheng 黃麗生, *Menggu yi shi yu Zhongguo ren tong de jiu ge : min chu wai Menggu du li yun dong yu nei Menggu de fan ying* 蒙古意識與中國認同的糾葛：民初外蒙古獨立運動與內蒙古的反應 [An Entanglement between Mongolian Consciousness and Identification with China: The Independent Movement of Outer Mongolia and the Reaction of Inner Mongolia during Early Republican Period], (Taipei: Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 2002), pp. 63-64.

into the heritage of the former Qing empire's techniques of rule in the service of nationalism, even though such measures violated the very sensibility of nationalist ideology.[431] During 1912-1913, the Chinese government, like its Manchu predecessor, repeatedly conferred titles and material benefits to Mongolian noblemen, *jasaks*, and lamas who supported the Republic, and this practice continued until 1915. For example, the sixth Janggiya Khutuktu, who was the most senior lama in Inner Mongolia, was awarded the title of "*Hongji guangming da guoshi*" 宏濟光明大國師 (Great State Master with Complete Benediction and Radiance) and a yearly salary of 10,000 yuan, and his family members were awarded nobility titles in recognition of his allegiance to the Republic. It was reported that, between 1912 and 1915, a total of 240 khutuktus and lamas, 135 princes and dukes, and 301 *taijis* had been conferred titles and material benefits by the Republican government.[432]

In addition, Beijing also moved to familiarize the Inner Mongols with the idea of a republic. In November 1912, as a measure to counteract Urga's appeal for national unification of Outer and Inner Mongolia, the Republican government started to send out representatives as Comforting Emissaries 慰問使 to Inner Mongolian leagues to explain the meaning of the republic. The message was that president of the republic was chosen by the people for his talent and virtue and, under the principle for equality of the races, an appropriate and qualified Mongol could become president as well.

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[431] Uradyn E. Bulag, "Going Imperialism: Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism and Nationalisms in China and Inner Asia," in Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young ed., *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 260-262.

[432] Tian Zhihe 田志和 and Feng Xuezhong 馮學忠, *Minguo chunian mengqi "duli" shijian yanjiu* 民國初年蒙旗"獨立"事件研究 [A Study of the "independence" incident of the Mongolian Banners during the early Republican years] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People's Press, 1991), p. 192.

Inner Mongols' Response

The various measures taken by the Republican government to placate the Inner Mongols appeared to have worked. Between 28 October and 1 November 1912, the ten banners of the Jirem Leagues held a conference at the Changchun city of Jilin, which was also attended by representatives of the Chinese government. At the conference, the state representatives repeatedly assured the Mongolian banners of the validity of the Regulations of the Treatment of the Mongols and the concept of *wuzu gonghe*. Finally, upon the State's promise that the banners would be maintained (i.e. no further expansion of cultivation on Mongolian land) and no establishment of provinces, the Inner Mongolian representatives agreed to accept the various proposals put forth by the Republican government, including, among others, the stationing of State garrisons at strategic points in the Mongolian frontiers; Mongolian princes and *jasaks* would not borrow foreign loans without the Central government's permission; Mongols would not mortgage their properties to foreigners so as to protect (the nation's) territorial integrity; Mongols' implementation of *xinzheng* reforms must be approved by the State; Mongols should abide by the laws of the Republican government; etc.[433]

Judging from the agreements reached at the Changchun conference, it was clear that the Inner Mongolian elites were further drawn to the orbit of Republican China. In other words, they were distancing themselves from the Urga government.

Apart from the repetitive assurances given by the Republican government to the Inner Mongolian banners, the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement on 3 November in the same year no doubt had the effect of further estranging the Inner Mongols from the Khalkhas. While details of the agreement will be discussed in the

[433] Li Zhenhua 李振華 ed., *Jin dai Zhongguo guo nei wai da shi ji* 近代中國國內外大事記 [A Record of the Important Internal and External Events of Modern China] (Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1979), pp. 2511-2512.

following paragraphs, suffice it to say that the ambiguity of the terms used in its text (such as naming "Mongolia" instead of "Outer Mongolia" as its signatory) had given rise to an impression among the Inner Mongols that the Urga government was selling out their interest to Russia without their consent. On 23 November 1912, the *Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui* issued the following statement:

"The *Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui* considers that the Russo-Urga Agreement was the work of a few persons in Urga. The whole Mongolia has long supported republicanism. We neither recognize the Urga government, nor its right to sign agreements with foreign governments. The signed agreement is therefore void."[434]

This statement was followed by resolutions reached by the four eastern Inner Mongolian leagues of Xinligol, Jirem, Juu Uda, and Josotu, which unanimously condemned the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and vowed to resist Russia's invasion of Inner Mongolia.[435] Moreover, Prince Gungsangnorbu, in his capacity as the director of *MengZang shiwuju*, told a group of foreign reporters that Mongolia was part of China's territory, and that the Mongols would firmly resist Russia's occupation of Mongolia and its infringement on their freedom.[436]

Soon after the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, the Urga government began to launch military campaigns into Inner Mongolia in early 1913. In this connection, it appealed for Inner Mongolian banners' cooperation in resisting the armies of Republican China. In their response to Urga's appeal, the Yeke Juu Mongols refused to cooperate on the grounds that,

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[434] "Zhongguo dashi ji," 中國大事記 [Important Events of China], *The Eastern Miscellany*, vol. 9, no. 7, Nov. 1912.

[435] "Menggu fengyun lu: neimeng yizhi ju E," 蒙古風雲錄: 內蒙一致拒俄 [A Record of the turbulent events in Mongolia: Inner Mongolia Unanimously Rejects Russia], *Minlibao*, 25 Nov. 1912.

[436] "Mengjing huibao: Gongsang zongcai zhi tanhua," 蒙警彙報: 貢桑總裁之談話 [A Report on the Mongolian Alarm: Director Gungsangnorbu's talk], *Minlibao*, 25 Nov. 1912.

"In the areas adjacent to the Great Wall, we and Han cultivators have long mixed together and, as such, it would be difficult to differentiate the good from the bad. Moreover, since our League has long engaged in nomadism, our land is bordering (China) on the south, and our strength is feeble, it would be quite difficult for us to protect ourselves (against China)."[437]

On 23 January 1913, the banners of the Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab leagues in western Inner Mongolia held a conference at the Suiyuan town. Lasting over three months, the conference passed five resolutions, namely: (a) (they) support republicanism; (b) they do not recognize the Russo-Urga Agreement, and would dissuade Urga from declaring independence; (c) they would request the Republican government to dispatch troops to protect important places of the western leagues, and the expenses would be borne by the State; (d) plans should be drawn up to improve the Mongols' livelihood, and the misrule resultant from years of reclamation activities should not be repeated; and (e) promotion of the Mongols' education.[438]

The two leagues also published a joint statement, which, in my opinion, best summarized the reasons as to why the Inner Mongols opted to side with the China:

"Mongolian territory and Chinese heartland are mutually dependent on each other as if they were lips and teeth. For hundreds of years, Han and Mongols have long been one family. …Now that the Republic has just been set up, that the five races are one family, and that there are no quarrels between the South (China) and the North (Mongolia)….We Mongols, as a member of the Chinese nation, should contribute our effort to sustain the Republic….

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[437] Xi meng wang gong zhao dai chu 西盟王公招待處 [Reception Bureau for the Noblemen of Western Mongolian Leagues] ed., *Xi meng hui yi shi mo ji* 西盟會議始末記 [The Whole Story of the Western Leagues Convention], in *Minguo jing shi wen bian* 民國經世文篇 [Collected Writings on Statecraft of the Chinese Republic], 1913 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1971), p. 2332.

[438] Xi meng wang gong zhao dai chu ed., *Xi meng hui yi shi mo ji*, pp. 2333-2352.

Since the establishment of the Republic, the State has treated us kindly by abolishing all the harsh rules and regulations previously in force, and granting us all kinds of preferential conditions. Moreover, our traditional customs, such as nomadism, religion, etc., are preserved. We are now free of all shackles and enjoy freedom together. When we take in money from all over the country, our desolate and cold lands will become rich and populous…..Should we seek to secede (from China) and form a state of our own because we have already declared independence, we should first look at our present situation very carefully: we lack households and manpower everywhere; our finance is deficient and our revenue is meagre; we have long engaged in nomadism and have never had any military training or war. We are incapable of defending ourselves just for the sake of self-esteem. Should the Republican government dispatch an army to punish us, what can we rely on to defend ourselves?

One may suggest that we can temporarily turn to the Russians for assistance if we are unable to defend ourselves. This is something that most frightened and upset the princes and dukes of these leagues, something that would be inadmissible in any event. The Russians have plotted to annex our land for a long time….Once our land becomes part of their (Russian) territory, all our real powers will fall into the Russians' hands. When we become Russia's vassal, will it be too late to repent?" [439]

Simply put, the Inner Mongols opted to remain in the newly established Republic of China because: (a) Inner Mongolia's close proximity with China geographically; (b) the Chinese government's undertaking to preserve the Mongolian elites' traditional privileges and rights, ruling power as well as Mongolia's culture, customs and religion; (c) staying with China would bring Mongolia prosperity and wealth; (d) Mongolia was too weak and poor to defend itself against China; and (e) their distrust of Russia's scheme in Mongolia.

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[439] Xi meng wang gong zhao dai chu ed., *Xi meng hui yi shi mo ji*, "Fulu" 附錄 [Annex], pp. 2354-2355.

Amid the battles fought between Outer Mongolian expeditionary forces and Chinese armies in Inner Mongolia, the noblemen of Jirem League and Chinese state representatives convened another conference at Changchun between 13 and 16, October 1913. In addition to appealing Hulun Buir to give up its independence claim, the conference also passed, among others, a resolution on the common defense between the four leagues in eastern Inner Mongolia. As such, the six leagues of Inner Mongolia were now acting in unison with the Republican government against Outer Mongolia's unification movement.

China's Unsuccessful Attempt to Woo Outer Mongolia

On 30 December 1911 the Mongolian provisional government in Urga sent a telegram to the Qing court to formally notify its proclamation of independence. In the telegram, the Khalkhas reiterated their reasons for breaking away from the Qing empire:

"But during the last few decades, the (Manchu) government has lost its high principles, the ministers in charge of frontier affairs and high-ranking officials of the ministries have violated laws and regulations. … This has been especially apparent on the pretext of developing the so-called 'New Policy'…….and it is crystal clear now that they want to ruin our religion and destroy our nation through their so-called 'New Policy'."[440]

Apparently, the Khalkhas continued to attribute their independence movement to Manchu officials' misrule and the *xinzheng* reforms, which they claimed were threatening to ruin their religion and nation, while concealing their earlier attempts to break away from the Qing empire.

In early 1912, the newly established Republican government of China sent three telegrams to Urga successively trying to dissuade the Khalkhas from proclaiming

[440] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 59.

independence, by informing them of the establishment of the Republic, and promising them equal status for the five races in the new regime, and abolition of all the old oppressive laws and unjust governing in Mongolia, but to no avail. In their reply telegram dated 12 March 1912 to the Chinese government, the Mongolian government pointed out,

"(B)ut we Mongols have different traditions, language and literature from those of the Chinese. Our Mongolian and Chinese cultures are as far apart as heaven and earth…. If we, the Mongols, should live with the highly cultured Chinese as a family, it may create conflicts between us."[441]

As discussed in the previous chapters, this was the same reason that the Mongols had repeatedly put forth against the Qing State's reclamation and Han migration activities in the region.

Seeing that persuasion failed to achieve the desired result, the Chinese government decided to use intimidation, as evidenced by President Yuan Shikai's telegram to the Boghd Khan (formerly the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu), which read,

"Although Mongolia occupies a large territory, the population is so small. Even if all the Mongols were put together, the number is smaller than the population of one province of the Inner Land (China). Furthermore, Mongolia is economically backward, and its natural income is very small. …

It is hard to believe that you are about to begin a war with China without preparation. Your political institutions are based on the feudal system, and your administrative and judicial institutions cannot be compared to those of the strong countries of the world. Therefore it is very hard for you to be independent."[442]

In response to Yuan's veiled threat, the Boghd pointed out, "China is separated by

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[441] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 62.

[442] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 63.

the Gobi from Mongolia, and thus Mongolia is beyond her reach. Even if China had a huge army and many people, she might not find an opportunity to use them.[443]

Like the Qing court's reaction to the news of Outer Mongolia's independence declaration, Yuan Shikai offered to send a special emissary to Urga to negotiate the question of Outer Mongolia's abrogation of independence, but the offer was turned down by the Boghd, who suggested that the negotiation should be conducted through Russia instead.[444]

The Boghd's reply effectively brought an end to the debate between the two sides over the independence issue. Moreover, the above exchanges also revealed both sides' negotiation positions. From China's perspective, Outer Mongolia was weak and small and, therefore, needed China's protection. As such, Yuan had seriously under-estimated the Khalkhas' military prowess and their determination to break away from China. As later events would show, during early 1913, Chinese troops were unable to repulse the Mongolian expeditionary forces sent to liberate their southern brethren, thereby causing serious destruction in Inner Mongolia.

On the other hand, the Boghd's replies also revealed the Outer Mongols' attitudes towards Russia and China. As discussed in Chapter 1, Russia had been, at least for some Khalkha noblemen, an effective counterweight against China's domination. As a matter of fact, as late as 1980s, many Mongolian reformers still had ambivalent feelings about Russia (the USSR). For example, Tomor–orhiryn Erdenebileg, a Mongolian reformer who had majored in Chinese studies at university, told Morris Rossabi during an interview held on 21 June 1998, that he believed that Russia (the USSR) had saved Mongolia from continued Chinese rule, and that failure of the Mongolian independence movement in 1911 was due to, among others, internal divisions, the interventions of Chinese warlords,

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[443] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 64.

[444] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 64.

and Mongolian noblemen.[445]

Moreover, the reply also revealed the so-called logic of "collaborative independence", which, as Bulag notes, has developed into Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy as a means to retain its independence and initiative at the borders of two powerful states in the twenty-first century. "Collaborative independence" was predicated on the weak state (Mongolia) forming an alliance with a powerful neighbor (Russia) to ward off the threat of another powerful neighbor (China). However, this collaborative alliance was different from classical model of pitting one against another, in that the Mongols sought Russian assistance in defense against China's aggression, they did not serve Russia's interest against China.[446]

Khalkhas' Consolidation of Outer Mongolia

Immediately following its establishment, the Mongolian provisional government in Urga took steps to consolidate the whole region of Outer Mongolia by sending troops to take Uliastai and Kobdo, as these two cities were still under Qing rule. The Mongolian forces faced little resistance in Uliastai. On 12 January 1912, Kuifang 奎芳, the military governor of Uliastai, surrendered to the Mongolian forces without a fight, and the remaining Manchus left five days later.

On the other hand, the provisional government faced tough resistance in Kobdo. The Mongolian forces started to attack Kobdo in May 1912 but it was not until 20 August 1912 when the city finally fell, after fierce fighting and destruction of many shops and killing of many Chinese. With the conquest of Kobdo, the Khalkhas finally consolidated Outer Mongolia and started to look southwards with a view to uniting with

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[445] Morris Rossabi, *Modern Mongolia, From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 30-31.

[446] Bulag, "Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 1911 Revolutions," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.

Inner Mongolia to form a larger state of Mongols.

Khalkhas' Overture to Inner Mongolia

Since their declaration of independence, the Khalkhas continuously kept their brethren in Inner Mongolia informed of the developments in Outer Mongolia and encouraged them to join the new Mongolian state. One of the documents dispatched from Urga to the Southern Mongols accused Chinese officials of "unjustly managing their internal affairs, exploiting the Mongolian masses, destroying their religion, and ignoring their old traditions."[447]Apparently, the Urga government was appealing to the Inner Mongols by exploiting the Mongolian consciousness that was based on their common traditions, religion, and ethnicity. Moreover, like the Chinese government, Urga also resorted to "going imperial" measures to woo Inner Mongolian nobility by promising titles and material benefits to those who were willing to pledge allegiance to it. It seemed that Urga's appeal was quite successful because, according to one source, 38 out of the 49 Inner Mongolian banners had expressed their wish to join the newly independent Mongolian state.[448] There were also reports that the Jalait Banner of Inner Mongolia had secretly purchased firearms from Germany with an intention to expulse the Han Chinese settlers out of their territory.[449]

The following submissions by Inner Mongolian banners should give us a glimpse as to why they chose to join the Khalkhas' independence movement. For example, a

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[447] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 36.

[448] Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu*, p. 195.

[449] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 75-573, 'Jilin xinanlu fenxunbingbeidao Meng Xianyi zhi Zhao Erxun han' 吉林西南路分巡兵備道孟憲彝致趙爾巽函 [A Letter from Meng Xianyi, *bingbeidao* (rectifying officer) of Jilin Southwestern Circuit to Zhao Erxun], *Zhao Erxun dangan* 趙爾巽檔案 [Archives of Zhao Erxun], 12 Aug. 1912.

petition from the Avga Nar banner of the Xilingol League (which was close to Outer Mongolia geographically) expressed their worries about the erosion of Mongolian tradition and religion under the new Chinese regime:

"In the sixth month of this year, we were frightened after receiving an order from the government of Yuan Shi-kai to cut our pigtails if we have them….and the lamas were ordered to grow their hair and become laymen on the pretext that Buddhism is useless…"[450]

It should be pointed out that I cannot find any independent source that would substantiate the above allegation. Also, judging from the measures taken by the Republican government that sought to woo the Inner Mongols, I am inclined to disbelieve the complaint. I have quoted this complaint merely as an illustration of the grave concerns harbored by many Inner Mongols about the risks of losing their religion and traditional way of life under the Republic.

Another commonly cited ground put forth by the Inner Mongols for submitting to Urga was their memory of their glorious past under Chinggis Khan, as evidenced by the petition of the Jasagtu banner of the Jirem League, which claimed

"We treasure the sacred heritage of the Great Chinggis Khaan who was the founder of Yuan dynasty. We have decided to submit to our former ancestral nation and we shall pray for the everlasting fortune of this nation."[451]

Generally speaking, the banners adjacent to Outer Mongolia (such as those in the Xilingol league) were more eager to join the new state than those neighboring China, especially the leagues (e.g. the Josotu league) that had been swamped by Chinese farmers because of their close proximity with China proper. Some Inner Mongolian noblemen, such as Rashminjuur, even went to Urga in person, bringing their subjects

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[450] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 35.

[451] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, p. 31.

along with them, to support the independence movement.

As a matter of fact, some of the staunchest supporters and eager activists of the independence cause, such as Khaisan and Togtoh, were from Inner Mongolia. Khaisan was one the members of Khalkha delegation dispatched to Moscow in July 1911, whilst Togtoh was a fugitive wanted by the Manchu court for organizing armed resistance to the state's reclamation activities in the Gorlos Front Banner. An Inner Mongolian nobleman Udai, the *jasak* of the Horqin Right Front Banner, together with the *jasaks* of Jalait and Horqin Right Rear Banners, declared independence of their banners in response to Urga's appeal in August 1912, and attacked Taonan in eastern Inner Mongolia, causing a lot of damage to the local Mongols. According to a letter from Zhao Erxun to President Yuan Shikai on 3 September 1912,

"Udai rebelled and repulsed the State's soldiers at Taonan, where he burned, killed, and plundered with a lot of cruelty and savage. If we do not suppress the Mongolian bandits in Taonan as a warning to others, all the banners will follow suit, then all the *zhou-xian* in Manchuria will fall into enemy hands, and the hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese who live in these *zhou-xian* will lose their lives and properties…"[452]

From Zhao's letter, we can tell how precarious the situation in Inner Mongolia was, and how much distrust existed between Han officials and the Inner Mongols.

Russo-Mongolian Agreement

In early 1913, following the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, Russia started to provided Outer Mongolia with money and weapons, with which the Khalkhas began to launch military campaigns in Inner Mongolia with a view to liberating their

[452] First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 75-575, 'Fengtian dudu Zhao Erxun zhi Yuan Shikai hangao' 奉天都督趙爾巽致袁世凱函稿 [A Letter from Zhao Erxun, Governor of Fengtian, to Yuan Shikai], *Zhao Erxun dangan* 趙爾巽檔案 [Archives of Zhao Erxun], 3 Sep. 1912.

kinsmen from the Chinese rule. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Agreement caused much resentment among the Inner Mongolian elites and therefore should be looked at more closely.

The Agreement was a diplomatic agreement initiated by Russia as a means to put pressure on China for its refusal to recognize Russia's interest in Outer Mongolia. From the outset, the negotiations between Russia and Outer Mongolia were acrimonious. On the one hand, Urga insisted on full independence of the new state, and its inclusion of Inner Mongolia (and Barga). However, Russia explained that it was unable to support the Mongolian request for full independence as it was obliged to keep its promise to respect China's territorial integrity. Regarding the Mongolian request for inclusion of Inner Mongolia, I. Y. Koroskoveta, the Russian plenipotentiary representative, explained, "Uniting all Mongolian nationalities is not in the policy of the Russian Government. Since it is very important for Outer Mongolia to attain a self-rule first, it is (in) appropriate to consider that issue now."[453] The Mongols were given a choice between cooperating with Russia and the preservation of their existing autonomy and a return to their previous status. Eventually, the Mongols had to accept Russia's terms in order to secure the latter's financial and military aid. In addition, a rumor that the negotiations between China and Russia over Mongolia were going smoothly in Beijing also helped force the Khalkhas to compromise. In return, the Russian representative also made compromises in the texts of the agreement, such as agreeing to the use of the term "Mongolia" instead of "Outer Mongolia" (without any provision on its territory) in the Russian text, and the use of "Mongolian nation" in the Mongolian text.

The agreement was signed on 3 November 1912. Article 1 of the agreement provided that Russia would help Mongolia to uphold its autonomy, to maintain its national army, and to prevent the penetration of Chinese troops and immigrants into its

[453] Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu*, pp. 232-233.

territory. (The Mongolian version of the agreement contained a provision that the two sides mutually recognized each other's government, thereby implying the new Mongolian state was independent and internationally recognized.) Article 2 provided that Mongolia would give Russian subjects all the privileges enumerated in the attached commercial protocol, and would not let people of another country enjoy more privileges than the Russians. Article 3 provided that Mongolia was obligated not to conclude with China or other countries any treaty that would infringe upon or modify the clauses of the agreement and its attached protocol without Russian concurrence.

The commercial protocol annexed to the agreement provided Russian subjects privileged economic position in Mongolia, granting them the right to move freely from one place to another throughout its territory, to engage in every kind of commercial, industrial, and other business, to enter into agreements of various kinds, to import and export without payment of custom dues, and to freely develop their private business and Russian credit institution and open branches. No wonder that a Russian scholar E.M. Darevskaya observed that the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912 had provided the Russians a complete freedom to expand their activities in Mongolia, "leading to the rummaging and domination of Mongolia in many ways."[454]

On the basis of the above, no wonder that Inner Mongolian elites should come to the conclusion that Urga was selling out their interests to the Russians without their consent. As a consequence, the Agreement helped convinced many undecided Inner Mongolian elites that siding with the Republic of China would be in their best interests.

Military Campaigns in Inner Mongolia

At the initial stage, the campaign was generally victorious. However, by the autumn of 1913, shipments of weapons, ammunitions, and provisions to the Mongolian

[454] Quoted from Batsaikhan, *Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu*, p. 243.

troops, which were supplied solely by Russia, almost completely ceased, and this made further military operations nearly impossible. Soon some of the Mongolian soldiers began to flee. In late October, Chinese troops began to mount counter-attacks after more reinforcements had arrived. By late 1913, they had recovered most of the lands previously lost to the Mongolian army.

The military conflict between the Mongolian forces and Chinese troops had seriously ravaged various parts of Inner Mongolia in terms of human life and property. In a letter to the Chinese Senate, the *Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui* noted,

"Since Urga's declaration of independence, Inner and Outer Mongolia have been ravaged by successive wars for two years. Of late, telegrams from Baotou, Chahar and Jehol warned that an area stretching several thousand *li* from east to west has been infested with bandits. The lives and properties of our Mongols are being devastated every day."[455]

The extent of the damage in Inner Mongolia was so great that the local people characterized the military conflict as "the disturbance of year of the cow".[456] Rather than uniting Inner and Outer Mongols into a new state, the Khalkhas' military campaigns had the opposite effect of pushing their southern kinsmen further into the arms of China.[457]

Conclusion

Mongolian consciousness began to grow steadily in the late nineteenth century, as evidenced by the Mongols' widespread anti-Manchu and anti-Chinese sentiments. The *xinzheng* reforms no doubt further fostered its growth by inadvertently fanning the

[455] "Beijing dianbao," 北京電報 [Telegram from Beijing], *Minlibao*, 20 June 1913.

[456] Lan, *The Mongolian Independence of 1911*, p. 164.

[457] Huang, *Menggu yi shi yu Zhongguo ren tong de jiu ge*, p. 78.

Mongols' resentment against the Manchus and Han Chinese with measures that infringed upon the Mongols' political and economic interests (such as large-scale land reclamation activities and imposition of Chinese style administrative units) and other measures that sought to assimilate the Mongols (e.g. educational reforms).

Hence, for the Republican government who sought to succeed the territories and peoples of the Qing empire, its chief task was how to pacify the sentiments of the Mongols and make them accept their new identity as a member of the Republic. To this end, the Republic government discarded Han nationalism in favor of *Wuzu yijia.* In addition, the Republican government also implemented practical measures to woo the people of Mongolia, including "going imperial" ones and repeatedly assuring Mongolian elites of the protection of their vested interest. Understandably, some of the Inner Mongolian elites were still suspicious of the conception of *Wuzu yijia* and a Han-dominated republic. Consequently, many Inner Mongolian banners responded enthusiastically to Urga's independence initially. On this point, Makoto Tachibana notes that there were Inner Mongolian nobles showing obedience both to the Republic of China and the Boghd Khan government simultaneously in order to wait and see how the situation would develop. He therefore argues the number of banners that expressed submission to the Boghd Khan government (38 out of 49 banners) does not reflect the actual reaction of Inner Mongolia.[458] His view was borne out by the fact that many Inner Mongolian princes and *jasaks*, who had initially pledged their allegiance to Urga, subsequently gave their support to the Republic Government. For example, Prince Gungsangnorbu sent a representative in early 1912 to discuss the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia and, for this reason, he was appointed by the Urga government as the Chief Minister in charge of the affairs of the forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia.

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[458] Makoto Tachibana, "The 1911 Revolution and 'Mongolia'," *The Journal of Contemporary China Studies* 3, no. 1 (2014), pp. 84-85.

However, Prince Gungsangnorbu later shifted his allegiance and joined the Chinese government and became president of *MengZang Shiwuju* in September 1912.

The shifting of allegiance of the Inner Mongolian elites could be attributed to several contingent factors. First, the repeated assurances given by the Republican government to the Inner Mongolian noblemen of the preservation of their traditional privileges, rights and ruling power had convinced the latter that siding with the Chinese Republic would serve their best interest. Second, the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and its commercial protocol had antagonized the Inner Mongolian elites, who feared that Urga had sold out their interest to the Russians. Third, the military campaigns launched by the Khalkhas and Udai, and the destructions resultant therefrom further alienated the Inner Mongols.

However, I would argue that a more fundamental cause of the eventual split between Outer and Inner Mongols was the great differences in social and economic developments between them. The differences were undoubtedly the result of the Manchu court's differential policy towards the Outer and Inner Mongolia, but the disparities between the two were further aggravated by the *xinzheng* reforms implemented during the first decade of the twentieth century. Historically, Inner Mongolia, being close in proximity to China proper, was closer to China politically, economically and socially than Outer Mongolia. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the reforms introduced in Inner Mongolia were much more intensive and extensive than those in Outer Mongolia. In particular, the spectacular growth in the number of Han Chinese settlers and proliferation of Chinese-style administrative units among the Inner Mongolian banners during the *xinzheng* decade would make it much more difficult and risky for the Inner Mongols to seek either independence or unification with Outer Mongolia. Intellectually, the Inner Mongolian elites, because of their personal experiences, were more susceptible to new ideas than their Khalkha counterparts. As a

result, they were much more receptive to the New Policy reforms than their northern brethren. Some of them, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu, even introduced reform measures in their own banners. The differences in outlook between Inner and Outer Mongolian elites would certainly make it difficult for the two to cooperate, even in matters involving Mongolian unification. In this regard, W. W. Rockhill, an American diplomat and sinologist, correctly observed that the Inner Mongols would not recognize the rule of the Khalkhas because the development and culture in Inner Mongolia were considerably higher than in Outer Mongolia.[459]

[459] Quoted in Lan, *The Mongolian Independence Movement of 1911*, p. 238.

Conclusion

Background

Since its subjugation by the Manchus in the seventeenth century, the Mongolian region had constituted a strategically significant part of the Qing empire's Inner Asian frontiers. The Manchu policy towards the Mongols was to utilize them as a mobile military reserve to defend the empire's northern borders, and to suppress uprisings within the boundaries of the empire.

To manage and control the Mongols, the Manchus had devised a banner system with a view to preventing the Mongols from uniting under a powerful leader. The Court also sought to secure the loyalty of Mongolian nobility with a system of hierarchical ranks, titles, rewards, salaries, and marriage alliances. In addition, the Manchu court patronized Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism), to which the Mongolian tribes bore allegiance, to ensure the loyalty of Mongolian subjects. In line with its divide–and–rule strategy, the Court promoted the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu in Outer Mongolia, and the Janggiya Khutuktu in Inner Mongolia, with a view to countering the Dalai Lama's influence in the Mongolian region.

A central feature of the Qing policy towards its Inner Asian peripheries was to restrict the contact between these frontier peoples and Han Chinese in China proper, or the penetration of Chinese trade and agriculture into these regions. During the early Qing period, this policy was strictly enforced in the Mongolian region. However, the segregation system was gradually eroded by Han Chinese penetration, lawful and illicit, into the region in the form of commercial expansion and agricultural migration. On the agricultural front, apart from frontier officials' connivance of Han Chinese migrants' cross-border cultivation, the Manchu emperors, being ruler of the different national constituencies of the empire, sometimes found it difficult to deny Han Chinese

migration beyond the Great Wall, especially when natural disasters struck in the northern part of China proper. With the spread of Han agricultural migration in the region, the State had to set up Chinese-style administrative units (*fu*, *ting*, *zhou* and *xian*) in the settlement areas to manage and control Han Chinese migrants, thereby fragmenting Mongolian territories and weakening the authorities of the Mongolian princes and *jasaks* in these areas.

Continued agricultural expansion in the region led to substantial reduction of pasturelands in the region, and this in turn caused a decline in nomadism among the Mongols. As livestock herding had long been Mongolia's subsistence economy, decline of nomadism inevitably pauperized many Mongols.

Another factor that led to pauperization of the Mongols was Han Chinese moneylending in Mongolia, which grew simultaneously with Chinese commercial expansion in the region. With debts continued to accumulate steadily, many Mongols were unable to repay them and became pauperized.

The combined effects of the state's oppressive taxation, Chinese settlements, shrinkage of pasturelands, unpayable debts, and abuses of banner princes' authority led not only to pauperization of the Mongols but also to economic and social decay of Mongolia during the nineteenth century. As a consequence, popular resentment against Chinese traders and settlers began to emerge and, by the late nineteenth century, anti-Qing sentiment also emerged in Mongolia. The Mongols' resentments against Han Chinese and Manchus not only led to interethnic tensions but also the amplification of Mongolian consciousness (consciousness of being a member of the Mongolian *Ulus*) during the late Qing period. As history would show, this deep-rooted attachment to the Mongolian *ulus* was further fanned by the various *xinzheng* reforms, which sought to further Han interest at the expense of the Mongols', and turned out to be the premodern precursor of modern Mongolian nationalism.

The Reforms

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing empire had been plagued by the twin challenges of the debt and the threat. Owing to the needs to fight external wars with Western powers and Japan, and to suppress internal uprisings that broke out in different parts of the empire, the imperial treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy. China's defeat by the expeditionary forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance following the Boxer Uprising of 1900 proved to be the last straw: a war repatriation of 450,000,000 *silver taels* was imposed on the Qing state.

Moreover, military defeats led to large portions of the empire's territory being taken up by the foreign powers as "concessions", and their presence threatened the Qing court's survival and China's territorial integrity. In desperation, the Qing court finally issued an imperial edict on 29 January 1901, calling for implementation of *xinzheng* reforms with a view to renewing the national strength by wealth and power.

The *xinzheng* reforms, known as New Policy (Policies) or New Administration in English, were introduced throughout the empire, including Mongolia, during the first decade of the twentieth century. Implementation of the reforms also coincided with the steady rise of Han Chinese officials in the late Qing politics. As a result, the reforms were dominated by Chinese political, economic and cultural visions.

As with other parts of the empire, the principal goals of the reforms in the Mongolian region were to raise money for the debt-ridden State and to counter the growing security threat posed by the Russian presence in the region.

Thanks to its geographical proximity to China proper, Inner Mongolia was the place where the reforms were first introduced and implemented with much zeal. As a consequence, the impact of the reforms on the Inner Mongols was more explicit, thus serving as a warning to the Outer Mongols of what would happen if the reforms were to

spread to their land.

To battle the twin challenges of the debt and the threat, the Court introduced the following reforms in Inner Mongolia:

(a) *Fangken Mengdi* (Reclaiming Mongolian lands for agriculture)

This reform was, in essence, an institutionalization of a former expediency as well as an expansion of China's agriculture-based economy into Mongolia. Instead of seeking to relieve population pressure in China proper, the goals of this reform were to generate revenue for the debt-ridden State by reclaiming Mongolian pasturelands for cultivation, and to counter Russian presence in the region by encouraging large-scale Han Chinese migration. Whilst the reform managed to raise money for the cash-strapped Court, it also brought about certain long term effects on Inner Mongolia, including further decline of nomadism; growing importance of agriculture; and further decrease of Mongolian population against continued increase of Han Chinese population.

(b) Military reform

The reform was composed of setting up modern military academies and re-training the dilapidated Banner armies into modern regular armies. However, the reform did not achieve much because of acute shortage of funding and the poor quality of serving soldiers (many of whom were drug addicts).

(c) Expansion of *Jun xian zhi* (Chinese-style Administration) and *Choumeng gaizhi* (Reforming Mongolian institutions)

The overall aim of the reforms was to strengthen the State's control over the Mongolian periphery. This mainly involved institutional reforms in the management and control of Mongolian affairs, such as replacement of the *Lifanyuan* by the *Lifanbu* at the center, expansion of *jun xian zhi* in Inner Mongolia, and proposed provincialization of the region:

(i) Apart from some structural streamlining, the *Lifanbu* was tasked with the additional responsibility of colonizing Mongolia and strengthening its defense;

(ii) The expansion of *jun xian zhi* in Inner Mongolia was, again, an institutionalization of a former expedient measure. While this was formerly implemented to meet practical needs of governance, the reform was now introduced with a view to strengthening the center's control over the Mongolian frontier. Further expansion of *jun xian zhi* inevitably increased interethnic tension, fragmented Mongolian territories, and weakened the authorities of the Mongolian noblemen; and

(iii) Provincialization also sought to enhance the center's control over the border. However, due to strong opposition from frontier officials in Outer Mongolia and shortage of money, only Manchuria was provincialized up to the end of Qing rule.

(d) Educational reform

The introduction of educational reform in the Mongolian region was aimed at enlightening and, more importantly, assimilating the Mongols with Han Chinese culture. To these ends, schools at different levels were established in the region. The most important innovation of the new school curriculum was the teaching of *guowen* (Chinese), with a view to promoting Mongolian-Han Chinese assimilation. However, as with most *xinzheng* reforms, the effect of educational reform was doubtful: ethnic segregation continued to exist in the schools; for local governments, school construction became a cover for money extortion; and, to the disappointment of the State, Mongolian schools furthered the growth of Mongolian consciousness rather than fostering a new national identity that the State had sought to promote.

In addition, the State also introduced various reforms with a view to reinforcing the

center-periphery connection, or promoting economic developments of the region. The former included railway construction, setting-up of post offices, and laying of telegraphic lines between Mongolian cities. The latter included the promotion of industrial mining and establishment of modern enterprises. However, due to factors such as lack of money, improper management, and technological backwardness, most of these reforms accomplished little or simply ended up in failure.

Admittedly, most of *xinzheng* reforms in the Mongolian region did not have many concrete achievements to show for it, they did lay the foundation for Mongolia's continuing modernization, the effects of which are still palpable today.

Outer Mongolia's Independence

For lack of funding, the *xinzheng* reforms carried out in Outer Mongolia, with the exception of Urga, were limited in scale and their impact insignificant. However, the reforms introduced by Sando, the last Qing *amban* in Urga, were generally regarded as the trigger for Outer Mongolia's independence movement in 1911.

During his short tenure in Urga from March 1910 till December 1911, Sando had introduced a number of reforms and created over twenty new organizations for their implementation. He also introduced an assortment of new taxes to finance the reforms. All these had imposed a heavy financial burden on the Outer Mongols.

In July 1911, the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the spiritual leader of Outer Mongolia, sent a secret mission to Russia to seek the latter's assistance in achieving independence from the Qing rule. The Russians, who had long considered Outer Mongolia its buffer against China, were also concerned by the reforms, especially those relating to the training of new armies and large scale Han Chinese migration. Under Russian pressure, the Qing court ordered in September 1911 that all the reforms in Outer Mongolia be suspended. However, emboldened by the Wuchang Uprising and the

consequential chaos in China, the Outer Mongols declared national independence in December 1911. With the expulsion of Sando and his staff in the same month, the Manchus' domination over Outer Mongolia since 1691 came to an end.

Xinzheng caused Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911?

In their petition dated 29 July 1911 to the Russian government, the Outer Mongols pinpointed the *xinzheng* reforms as their major grievances against the Manchu rule. Some Chinese historians therefore blamed Sando's mishandling of the reforms as the cause of Outer Mongolia's independence. However, there is now evidence to show that the Khalkhas had approached the Russians for assistance in their pursuit of independence well before introduction of the reforms in the Mongolian region. On this basis, it is argued that the independence movement was rooted in the deep-seated anti-Qing and anti-Chinese feelings among the Mongols, which were exploited by the elites of Khalkha Mongolia led by the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu. No doubt, the Han nationalism that had been prevalent among the Chinese revolutionaries further fanned the surge of Mongolian consciousness among the Mongols, who feared that they would not be treated equally with Han Chinese in the new nation state.

The rising Mongolian consciousness aside, there was an old element in the independence movement that was rooted in the steppe tradition of Inner Asia. In the Mongols' view, their relationship with the Manchus (not Han Chinese) was that of an alliance, and that their breaking away from this relationship was in keeping with the custom in the steppe when the Manchus, as leader of the alliance, were incompetent and failed to benefit the Mongols.

Nature of *Xinzheng*

Apart from institutionalizing previous expedient measures to meet new challenges,

the *xinzheng* in Mongolia was more intended to Sinicize than to modernize the Mongols. Instead of shielding the Mongols from Han Chinese commercial and agricultural penetration into the region, the Manchu court now turned to Han Chinese migrants and traders for assistance in sustaining its rule in the region. As a consequence, most of the reforms helped to further Han Chinese interests in the region, and to assimilate the Mongols with Han Chinese culture.

Moreover, the *xinzheng* reforms further widened the differences between Inner and Outer Mongolia in terms political systems, economics and society. They led to closer relationship between Inner Mongolia and China, but further alienated the Mongols north of the Gobi, who now turned to Russia for support.

National Aspirations in Conflict

The demise of the Qing empire in 1911 brought into being two nation states, namely the Republic of China and the *Yeke Mongghol Ulus*. The former, claiming to be the successor state of the Qing empire, endeavored to inherit the territories and peoples of its predecessor, including, among others, the Mongolian region and the Mongols. The latter, a theocracy under the rule of Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, sought to create a unified Mongolian state that would embrace all the Mongols of the region, including Inner Mongolia. Apparently, the geo-bodily interests of these new states came into conflict.

In order to win over the frontier ethnicities, the Republic government discarded Han nationalism, in favor of the new conception of *Wuzu yijia* (five nationalities in one family), with a view to integrating the non-Han groups and promoting a new national identity of *Zhonghua Minzu* (Chinese nation). It also tapped into the heritage of the former Qing empire's techniques of rule in order to woo the Mongols by conferring titles and material benefits on their elites. However, all the efforts of the Republican Government failed to impress the Outer Mongols.

Split of the Outer and Inner Mongolia

Following the Outer Mongols' declaration of independence in 1911, many Inner Mongols responded enthusiastically, and some Inner Mongolian elites even went in person to join the newly established *Yeke Mongghol Ulus*.

Apart from those zealous Inner Mongolian supporters, there were many Inner Mongolian princes who had initially pledged their allegiance to Urga, but subsequently gave their support to the Republic Government. Their change of allegiance could be attributed to different factors, such as the Republican government's assurance of the preservation of the Inner Mongolian noblemen's traditional rights and privileges; the Inner Mongols' economic dependence on China; their concern about Russian influence in Outer Mongolia; the presence of large numbers of permanent Chinese settlers in Inner Mongolia; the well-developed administrative control of the State in the region, etc. Most of these factors were, to a large extent, intensified by late Qing *xinzheng* reforms in the region. As a consequence, Outer and Inner Mongols finally split, thus paving the way for the geopolitical situation of today.

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